The Iraqi team's exit from the Arabian Gulf Cup tournament, "Gulf 27", ignited a wide wave of anger and criticism in Iraqi sports and media circles. The reactions were not only focused on the draw that granted Oman a pass to the semi-finals, but also extended to the team's performance against Saudi Arabia, and the choices of the technical staff led by Australian Graham Arnold, all the way to the way of managing some of the details that had a direct impact on the fate of the "Lions of Mesopotamia."
The intensity of anger appeared clear in the Iraqi sports studios after the end of the last round, and the discussion in its programs reached a debate between the guests, after one of them said sarcastically: “Congratulations to some people sitting here in the studio on the team’s exit,” rejecting what he considered to be the exploitation of exclusion to settle scores with the Football Association.
The speakers called for separating personal differences and evaluating what happened on the field, amid assurances that the primary technical responsibility falls on Arnold. His management of the confrontation with Saudi Arabia was described as “bad and primitive,” while his body language on the pitch was criticized, considering that it did not reflect, according to opinions expressed in the studio, the image of a coach leading a team that came to compete for the championship title.
Iraqi media headlines reflected the extent of frustration: “With the drawing of lots, we bid farewell to the tournament... Our national team has turned backwards... We are being neglected.”
The lineup that Iraq started to face Saudi Arabia was one of the points that was most criticized. Questions were raised, especially about the decision to start Mustafa Saadoun before he left in the 42nd minute, as analysts wondered why he was brought in from the beginning if he was not able to complete the match, and about the role of the medical staff in determining the extent of his readiness.
The left side of the Iraqi team was also subjected to harsh criticism because of the spaces that the Saudi team exploited, especially through Zakaria Hawsawi, and one analyst came to describe that side as having turned into “the streets of Moscow,” in an expression of the size of the spaces that appeared in it.
The criticism did not stop at the coach, as it affected a number of players, and during the discussion there were demands to exclude Mustafa Saadoun and Ahmed Qasim from the team, an indication that the Iraqi anger was not only linked to the method of exclusion, but rather to the level at which the team showed in the match in which it needed a draw to ensure its qualification.
In the first response from within the Iraqi Football Association after the exit, Federation member Imad Yassin apologized to the Iraqi fans, and described the exclusion as unexpected, considering that the team had the capabilities that allowed it, at least, to reach the semi-finals.
Yassin directed his comments in particular to the choices of the technical staff in the last match, considering that the lineup and the beginning of the confrontation against Saudi Arabia were not successful, and he said that he felt as if the coaching staff was dealing with the match on the basis that qualification to the semi-finals was guaranteed, even though the calculations did not allow for this.
The Federation member stressed that Iraq should have decided its fate on its own instead of waiting for what happens against Oman and Kuwait, considering that the performance against Saudi Arabia was not good, and that the team was required to rely on its result and not on the results of others.
Yassin also revealed a remarkable detail regarding the cards, which later became an essential part of the qualification calculations, as he explained that the Federation was aware of this possibility, and that there was an idea to hold a lecture for the players presented by the former international referee and member of the Federation, Sabah Qassem, to explain the regulations and the importance of cards in the tie-breaking criteria, but the lecture was not held in the end.
The irony is that the scenario that Al-Ittihad feared actually came true, after Iraq and Oman were equal in the qualification calculations, up to the card criterion, before resorting to the lottery became a separator between the two teams.
At the same time, Yassin denied the Federation members’ interference in the work of the technical staff or the selection of the squad, stressing the coach’s independence in his decisions, but he called for a recalculation after the exclusion, especially in light of his conviction that the elements and tools available were allowing Iraq to go further in the tournament.
The headlines of the Iraqi press reflected the extent of the shock caused by the exclusion, as phrases such as “After the 27 Gulf shock... the reasons for Iraq’s failure,” and “When everything is equal... the midnight lottery decides the ticket for Iraq or Oman,” came before the decision came with a direct headline, “The lottery qualifies Oman at the expense of Iraq.” The coverage did not stop at the luck factor, but rather opened the door to technical and administrative review, with talk about the continuous change in the lineup and the “administrative chaos” that accompanied the participation, leading to demands to address the errors before the next Asian tournament.
Fahd Al-Raisi, former Secretary of the Omani Football Association, revealed that the Omani national team’s celebration of qualification after the end of the match against Kuwait was based on information that reached the administrative and technical staff indicating that Oman had the advantage over Iraq in the qualification calculations, before it later became clear that the two teams were equal in standards and resorted to a lottery.
Al-Raisi said, in an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat: “The information that reached the team and the administrative and technical staff indicated that we qualified, and therefore the joy was spontaneous at that time.”
Regarding the number of yellow cards for the two teams, Al-Raisi explained: “We knew before the match that the Iraqi team had eight cards, while we had three cards before facing Kuwait, and during the match we got five cards, bringing our total to eight cards as well.”
He pointed out that some of the cards obtained by Omani players during the confrontation were not, from his point of view, deserved, but he stressed that this became a reality after the end of the match.
In response to Asharq Al-Awsat’s question about the reason for the Omani team’s celebration despite the two teams being equal even in the fair play standard, Al-Raisi said: “After the two matches, the number became eight warnings for each team, but our celebration came based on information that reached us that the Omani team has an advantage over its Iraqi counterpart.”
Al-Raisi denied that the information that reached the Omani side indicated that the Iraqi team possessed ten or more cards, adding: “No, we did not receive such information. What has reached us is that we have an advantage over the Iraqi team, and on this basis the celebration took place.”
