As the US midterm elections approach on November 3, the battle goes beyond the traditional division between Republicans and Democrats into a struggle over the working class, women, youth, farmers and suburbanites. Between the decline in President Donald Trump's popularity, anger over prices, and the war with Iran, the bloc of hesitant and frustrated voters is emerging as the force that may draw the new political map.
But the question is no longer limited to the Democrats' ability to seize the majority from the Republicans, but rather which America will go to the polls, and which will remain at home? America: the big cities dominated by Democrats, or the rural areas that form the backbone of the Republicans? The factory workers wooed by Trump with his industrial promises, or the suburban women worried about his policies? Young people looking for change, or older voters who are used to participating?
Behind this scene, a social map is forming in which geographical differences intersect with education, income, age, race, and profession, while the repercussions of the war with Iran rearrange the priorities of voters whose loyalties seemed stable.
Polls reveal remarkable shifts, as a Reuters/Ipsos poll showed a few days ago that Trump's popularity had declined to 31 percent, and Democrats had advanced in voting intentions by 47 to 35 percent. But an AARP poll in 43 competitive House districts showed a Democratic lead of only 3 points. The difference sums up the Democrats' dilemma: national superiority does not automatically translate into a parliamentary majority. Most importantly, the decline in support for Trump does not mean that his supporters will move to the Democrats. Some of them are angry but still conservative, and some of them doubt the ability of the two parties to improve their situation. Therefore, the results may be decided by the votes of those who change allegiances, as well as those who decide not to participate.
Cities and countryside: a division that transcends politics
According to the Pew Research Center, the 2024 elections provide an important milestone in understanding the transformations. Trump received 69 percent of the rural vote, compared to 29 percent for Kamala Harris. In cities, the picture was reversed: 65 percent for Harris compared to 33 percent for Trump. Most importantly, Trump’s rural share rose from the 59 percent he achieved in 2016 to 65 percent in 2020, then 69 percent in 2024, without Democrats achieving similar gains in cities.
This division reflects economic and cultural transformations. In cities where universities, services, technology, and professional jobs are concentrated, voters tend toward Democrats. As for the countryside, which depends to varying degrees on agriculture, industry, energy, and transportation, Republican rhetoric on taxes, immigration, and national identity finds a broader resonance. However, the countryside is not a homogeneous bloc: it includes black and Latino communities and college towns, just as cities include conservatives and small business owners who respond to Republicans.
On the other hand, the Democrats, in turn, face an arithmetic dilemma. Urban victories are not enough if Republicans continue to expand their lead in less dense areas. So they are betting on reducing their rural losses, while Republicans are counting on the continuation of the alliance of conservatives and non-university workers. But do cultural loyalties withstand economic pressures?
Suburbs: The middle class is recalculating
If cities and the countryside are almost constant strongholds of bipartisanship, the suburbs are the area where political identity and economic interests intersect. According to Pew, the Democrats maintained their lead in the 2024 elections, but this lead practically shrank from 10 points in 2020 to only 4 points, which contributed to Trump’s return to the White House. The suburbs include employees, professionals, business owners, and families who rely on two incomes to cover housing, health insurance, education, and child care. These groups may support lowering taxes and tightening border controls, but they have reservations about some Republican social policies, such as restrictions on abortion, for example.
Democrats are betting on regaining voters they lost in 2024 for economic reasons, taking advantage of Trump's declining popularity. Republicans warn that Democratic control of Congress will mean more spending and taxes.
The importance of this competition is most evident in the states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Arizona, where suburbs overlap with industrial areas and middle-income neighborhoods. A single voter in these areas may combine a conservative position on immigration, a liberal position on social rights, and increasing concern about housing and health care prices.
However, the shift towards the Democrats extended to more conservative constituencies, as the Washington Post quoted the Cook election report as having modified the classification of 11 parliamentary races in their favor, including constituencies in Ohio, South Carolina, Kansas, and Nebraska. A district in Montana that Trump won by 12 points in 2024 also became a close race. This means that the suburbs are no longer the only ones exposed to volatility. Rather, the Republican retreat may extend to areas that the party considered relatively safe, which forces it to distribute its resources on a broader map.
Workers and farmers: loyalty based on prices
From Michigan's auto plants to Iowa's cornfields, from Ohio's transportation depots to its highways, Republicans face a remarkable paradox: After certain groups helped Trump win, they themselves became the most vulnerable to the repercussions of his economic policies and the war with Iran. Trump appealed to non-university workers with his anti-globalization rhetoric, closing factories, and transferring jobs abroad.
But the working class is not entirely Republican. Industrial unions and some labor communities maintain strong ties to Democrats, especially in Midwestern states. In the Pew poll, Republicans led among voters whose education did not exceed secondary school by 39 versus 35 percent, but education does not necessarily reflect professional affiliation, as industrial workers are not a single bloc, and their choices vary according to sectors, unions, regions, and wage level.
The pressures appear to be more severe in the agricultural and transportation sectors, where diesel prices have risen by about 70 percent since the outbreak of the war with Iran, to reach $6.32 per gallon, despite the administration’s measures to increase supplies and reduce taxes. This directly affects farmers and truck drivers; Because fuel is included in the cost of production and transportation, and not just in household expenses.
In an indication of the sensitivity of the situation, Trump recently announced in an executive order an $8 billion program to help farmers afford diesel during the harvest season, by expanding the use of tax-exempt funds in specific circumstances.
But the political problem for Republicans does not lie only in prices, but in the contradiction between promises to protect the local economy and the results perceived by voters. The tariffs that Trump presented as a means to support American industry increased the cost of imported equipment and materials, while the rise in energy pressures the profits of farmers and transportation companies. This is what Democrats are betting on, while Republicans are counting on cultural ties and positions on immigration and trade remaining stronger than economic anger. The result may be a decline in Republican participation in some areas, rather than a mass shift to the Democrats, and this is an important difference in districts that Republicans used to win by narrow margins.
Women and Youth: Voices of Change
Women and youth voters constitute two basic bases for democratic supremacy, but they differ in priorities and electoral behavior. The divisions within them are no less important than the differences between the two parties.
According to Pew, Democrats lead among women by 45 to 31 percent, while the two parties are tied among men at 42 percent. In the latest Reuters/Ipsos poll, the Democrats' lead among women widened to 50 versus 32 percent. The abortion issue remains an important factor in mobilizing women voters, especially in the suburbs. But the cost of living, health care, and childcare add economic dimensions to their choices. A university woman in a suburb is politically different from a woman working in the service sector in a rural area, despite their shared living pressures.
As for young people between 18 and 29 years old, they prefer Democrats by 51 to 23 percent, but nearly a quarter of them have not decided on their choice or prefer another candidate. In a survey by the Cycle Center at Tufts University, which included more than 5,500 young men and women, 56 percent said they were very likely to participate, while 41 percent expressed greater willingness to vote if there were parties or personalities that better represented their generation. This means that young people are not necessarily as enthusiastic about the Democrats as they want to change the status quo.
Trump's gains among some young people, especially men, in 2024 do not mean they will become consistent Republicans. Concern about job opportunities, housing costs, and war could push them to change their choices again, or move away from the funds.
The importance of first-time voters, who do not necessarily carry inherited party loyalties, but are more vulnerable to low participation, is highlighted. Therefore, the democratic preference among youth and women may not be enough unless it turns into actual turnout, especially in university cities and competing suburbs.
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Trump's expansion of his presence among some Latino voters and minority men was one of the most notable transformations of 2024, weakening the assumption that racial diversity automatically favors Democrats. But 2026 polls suggest those gains have not translated into stable Republican loyalty. According to Pew, 51 percent of Latino voters prefer Democrats, compared to 24 percent of Republicans. Among black voters, the percentages are 70 and 7 percent, and among Asians it is 56 and 16 percent. But these numbers do not mean an automatic return to the old Democratic coalition. Latino voters differ in their origins, incomes, generations, and areas of residence, and immigration does not always come before the economy and health care in their priorities.
One district in Colorado provides a striking example, as The Washington Post presented the case of an industrial worker of Mexican origin, who does not belong to any party, hesitating between a Democratic candidate whose position on health care she prefers, and a Republican candidate whose energy policies affect her family’s income. This picture summarizes the nature of competition. The same voter may be a Democrat in one issue and a Republican in another, which makes classifying him according to his ethnic affiliation alone insufficient to predict his vote.
While Democrats are betting on regaining lost votes in 2024, especially among Latinos and younger voters, Republicans are seeking to maintain their inroads into the multiracial working class. The results may determine the ability of the two parties to address these groups, as they are considered economic and social groups, not just ethnic blocs.
Old and independent: a silent force
Despite the focus on young people, older people may be more influential because of their voting regularity. In the AARB poll, which included 43 competing constituencies, 83 percent of voters over fifty said they were very enthusiastic about voting, compared to 66 percent of those under fifty. Republicans lead among the oldest by 53 to 43 percent, while Democrats lead among the youngest by 60 to 34 percent.
Here lies the Democrats' dilemma; The groups that are most inclined towards them are not necessarily the most regular in voting. But the poll also showed that 21 percent of voters over fifty in the competing districts are still persuadable, and their top priorities are prices, health care, and social security.
As for independents, 40 percent of them prefer Democrats, compared to 24 percent of Republicans, while 27 percent have not decided their position, according to Pew. This is a bloc that may disproportionately influence close races, especially if its decision is linked to economic performance more than party affiliation. What is more telling is that 77 percent of those who voted for Trump in 2024 intend to support Republican candidates, compared to 87 percent of Harris voters who intend to vote for Democrats. Among Trump voters who have a negative view of Republicans, only 49 percent declare their support for their candidates, while the rest are divided between hesitation and other options.
This means that Democrats may benefit from the decline in enthusiasm of a portion of Trump's voters, without convincing them to vote for them. But the possibility of Republicans losing Congress may also prompt them to participate in defense of the president and his agenda.
The final bet: Who comes out to vote?
With less than two weeks until the vote, the political environment appears more favorable for Democrats, but control of both chambers of Congress is not settled; In the House of Representatives, Democrats need 3 seats to seize the majority. As for the Senate, where Republicans control 53 seats compared to 47 for Democrats and independents allied with them, they need 4 additional seats.
According to the Roll Call Foundation, the number of states witnessing competitive Senate races increased from 5 to 13, with Republicans having to defend seats in Iowa, Kansas, Texas and Alaska. The Associated Press revealed that Republican spending was redistributed among House districts, while Democrats expanded their investments to areas that were considered relatively safe for their competitors. Democrats are betting on mobilizing cities, women, youth, minorities and suburbs, while reducing their industrial and rural losses.
As for Republicans, they are counting on the cohesion of their conservative and rural base, the continued support of working sectors, and the superiority in the participation of the elderly.
Prices remain the common denominator, according to the recent Associated Press-NORC poll, which showed that 85 percent of voters consider the economy a key issue, and 84 percent consider the cost of living, while 64 percent place the Iran war among their priorities.
But economic anger may lead to changing votes, abstaining from voting, or strengthening previous loyalties if a compelling alternative is absent. These possibilities appear in Democrats' attempts to regain their presence in rural states by focusing on local problems, the cost of fuel and fertilizer, and the impact of immigration policies on the labor force, rather than simply attacking Trump.
A few thousand votes in specific districts could make the difference between a broad Democratic victory and Republicans retaining one of the chambers of Congress. In this distance between party affiliation and livelihood concerns, the fate of Congress, and perhaps the remainder of Trump’s second term, may be determined.
In the past few days, social media and activist platforms in many regions have been filled with videos and pictures of girls forced to leave their studies in Azerbaijan’s schools. Because they are veiled. Many shared scenes that provoked the feelings of millions of Azerbaijanis, of female students expelled from school, and teachers surrounding children shedding copious tears during a hastily held farewell ceremony after they were forced to leave the classroom because of the hijab.
The scenes of dozens of girls trying to communicate with their classmates from behind the school walls, or meeting in a row on the outside stairs to continue their education despite the ban on their entry, were exciting and remarkable, especially after the situation was accompanied by attempts to break into schools, remove their doors, and start fires in some of the properties belonging to their directors. Then, noisy protests broke out across the country, which had been ruled with an iron fist for decades, and the appearance of active protests was not common there.
Moreover, a video clip filmed by a teacher circulated on the Internet, in which she asked a seven or eight-year-old girl to remove her hijab in front of all the students. The little girl cries but refuses to comply. In another video clip, a woman stands in front of a school board bearing pictures of soldiers killed in the Karabakh war, including her daughter's father, and demands that her daughter be allowed to go to school or that her father's picture be removed.
On the first day of banning female students from going to school, footage spread showing schools being stormed and at least one school principal’s car being burned. At least 200 people have been arrested as a result of the mass unrest, and are currently facing up to three years in prison.
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Interior said in a statement: “The main goal of these measures is to prevent the closure of roads and disrupt the normal functioning of educational institutions, in addition to ensuring the safety of students, teachers and other citizens.”
It is worth noting that most of the country's media completely ignored the protests. While children and their families were besieging schools in Baku, government media carried extensive coverage of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet's visit to the country. However, these same publications cover in detail schoolchildren's protests in France, accusing the Fifth Republic of imperialism and neocolonialism.
Present Karabakh
A new and shocking scene; At the official level, it was titled “Respect the secularism of the state, and impose measures consistent with the rejection of any religious or ideological manifestations within educational institutions.” At the popular level, the translation contradicted the principle of defending inherited values and the identity of society, of which Muslims represent 96 percent.
What is new in the scene is that the protests did not raise direct political slogans, unlike waves of popular protest witnessed previously in countries of the region. Rather, it reflected widespread disappointment towards a regime whose foreign policies generally enjoyed broad popular satisfaction.
But that does not mean that politics was completely absent, but that it was enveloped in a qualitatively different framework. The best example of this is the scene of the woman who removed the picture of her “martyr” husband that was hung on the school wall, and said that the school that expels her daughter because she wears a veil should not have a picture of the father who sacrificed his blood for the “liberation of Karabakh.”
