Negotiations to end Iran war... Interest in the ‘balance sheets’ of both countries

Washington = Yonhap News) Correspondent Cho Joon-hyung = Attention is also focused on the 'balance sheets' of both countries due to the Iran War, which virtually ended 106 days after the start of the war with the conclusion of war-end negotiations between the parties, the United States and Iran, on the 14th (US time).

Both sides claim to be 'winners', but it is also widely pointed out that both countries lost as much or more than they gained in this war.

First of all, for the United States, especially President Donald Trump, who decided to start a war, he turned back the clock on Iran's nuclear development with the airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities in June last year, and through this war, it is meaningful that he has imprinted his will not to tolerate Iran's possession of nuclear weapons.

Of course, the prevailing view is that it remains to be seen whether the agreement on Iran's denuclearization to be reached through these negotiations is a further advance compared to the agreement under the former Barack Obama administration (JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) from which he withdrew.

Nevertheless, if the agreement, which includes the destruction of 440 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) held by Iran and the cessation of uranium enrichment for 15 or 20 years, is carried out as President Trump recently said, it will likely be considered a security 'achievement' from the U.S. perspective.

At the same time, it is assessed that the significant weakening of the conventional forces of Iran, a hostile country, including the destruction of a significant portion of Iran's warships, contributed to the security of the United States and its allies in the Middle East, especially Israel. This part is also the reason why Israel is evaluated as the ‘biggest winner’ of this war.

However, it is also difficult to ignore the point that it is impossible to be sure whether this war, which lasted over 100 days including the ceasefire period, made the United States and its Gulf region allies safer in the long term.

President Trump appears to have had regime change in Iran in mind as one of his main goals in the war, given that the U.S. military devoted effort to the 'decapitation operation' to eliminate Iranian leaders in the early stages of the war, starting with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei on February 28, the first day of the war.

However, some say that Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the supreme leader who died in an explosion, took over his father's position, and Iran's theocratic system is not only healthy on the outside, but has actually become stronger.

Although Iran's old leadership was removed through war, it did not lead to a true 'regime change' that would cause Iran to abandon its policies hostile to the United States and Israel.

On the contrary, there is an assessment that this war strengthened the 'right to speak' of young hardliners in Iran, who were strongly united in nationalist sentiment, and drowned out the voices of ordinary citizens who had resisted the regime.

Above all, the realization of Iran's 'strategic weaponization' of the Strait of Hormuz, which had previously been only in the realm of 'theory', can be seen as a great 'loss' for the United States.

The fact that Iran was able to overcome its absolute inferiority in military power to some extent by successfully taking the global economy hostage through the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was a painful point for President Trump, who was aiming for an early victory.

At the same time, the situation in which America's allies and partner countries in the Gulf region, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have suffered retaliatory attacks from Iran also places a burden on the United States and President Trump in terms of managing alliances in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Iran appears to be able to consider it as its own 'achievement' that it has confirmed its presence and status within the anti-American camp by withstanding wave after wave of attacks by the world's most powerful country, the United States, and the Middle East's 'small power' Israel, for more than 100 days.

In addition, confirming the effectiveness of the 'leverage' of blocking the Strait of Hormuz is likely to be considered a 'harvest' by Iran's hard-liner regime, as the size of the negative impact it has had on the United States and the international community.

However, after Iran was attacked by the United States and Israel, it indiscriminately attacked neighboring Arab countries such as the UAE and Qatar under the pretext of 'retaliatory strikes' on U.S. military bases in the Middle East, and blocked the Strait of Hormuz, which handles about 20% of international energy transportation. There is also considerable speculation that Iran's long-term international isolation could be brought about.

In particular, following the bloody suppression of protesters, it is expected that anti-government public opinion within the country, which has been suppressed under the pretext of a war with powerful external enemies such as the United States and Israel, may revive after the end of the war.

This war has raised questions about whether the actions of the Iranian theocratic regime, which used a significant portion of the country's finances to support proxy forces such as Hezbollah (Lebanon), Houthi rebels (Yemen), and Hamas (Palestine) while causing its own people to suffer not only from the direct damage of the war but also from sanctions by the international community, are permanently sustainable.

Of course, there is a cautious view that the true gains and losses of the two countries in this war can only be assessed by observing the results of the upcoming nuclear negotiations, the reorganization of the Middle East security landscape, including the U.S.-Iran relationship after the end of the war, and changes in the relationship between Iranian authorities and citizens.