◎ Lu Yu
▼From Yu Yingshi, Ming Juzheng to Liang Wenjie: Who has forgotten the lessons of the history of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party?
A political party that once shouted "anti-communism and anti-Russia" and taught generations of people that "the Han and the traitors will not stand apart" is now facing the Chinese Communist Party, but some people continue to package political compromise as peace and describe Taiwan's will to defend itself as a provocation. This kind of historical contrast is probably unimaginable even for most Kuomintang members back then.
A few days ago, Guanzhong and Ting Shouzhong proposed the "Cross-Strait Peace Initiative", advocating promoting cross-Strait political consultation and creating conditions for the final political arrangement. Liang Wenjie, deputy chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, immediately asked: "If we wanted to surrender, we could have surrendered in 1949. Why would we bring 2 million people to Taiwan?"
The really sharp point of this sentence is not to deny peace, but to reveal an unavoidable contradiction: when the Kuomintang rejected Communist rule, it was regarded as a necessary choice to preserve power; today, when the Taiwanese people reject Communist rule, why might it be regarded by some as an obstacle to peace?
Former Kuomintang legislator Ding Shouzhong (third from right) and former examination dean Guan Zhong (middle) hosted the "Commemorating the Birthday of the Founding Father and Cross-Strait Peace Initiative Conference" on November 12. Former Legislative Yuan Wang Jinping (third from left) was invited to attend and support. (File photo) What’s even more interesting is that this question was already raised thirteen years ago.
1. The political psychology that Yu Yingshi had already seen through
In 2013, historian Yu Yingshi criticized the Kuomintang for being "afraid of communism". It was afraid of China's use of force and Taiwan's independence, and even attempted to use Beijing's power to contain Taiwan's local politics. He therefore asked, if he could only surrender to the Communist Party in the end, why did he retreat to Taiwan? Wouldn't it be over if we just signed the surrender in Nanjing?
What Yu Yingshi criticizes is not cross-strait exchanges, but a certain power psychology deeply rooted in the culture of the party-state: when the Kuomintang can no longer monopolize Taiwanese politics, some people would rather rely on pressure from Beijing than fully accept the right of the Taiwanese people to independently determine their political destiny.
It is understandable to be afraid of war, and it is understandable to advocate dialogue. However, if we believe that Taiwan must limit its democratic choices because we are afraid of China; or if we oppose Taiwan independence and expect Beijing to help check and balance domestic political opponents, then we are not simply advocating for peace, but introducing external authoritarian forces into internal democratic competition.
The Kuomintang can oppose the DPP and Taiwan independence, but it cannot deny the Taiwanese people's right to freely determine their future. A political party can lose an election, but a country cannot lose its autonomy.
In 2013, historian Yu Yingshi criticized the Kuomintang for being "afraid of communism" and fearing both China's use of force and Taiwan's independence. (Taken from the post) 2. Historical lessons reminded by Ming Juzheng
Ming Juzheng, emeritus professor of the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University, recently discussed contemporary cognitive operations based on the experience of the Kuomintang-Communist Civil War in the program "What Baojie Said", reminding society to pay attention to the risks of history repeating itself.
Looking back at the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, during the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the 1920s, the Communist Party entered the political organization of the Kuomintang through a cooperative relationship; during the Anti-Japanese War, the two sides cooperated again, but there was always fierce political and military competition. After the end of the Anti-Japanese War in 1945, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party launched negotiations in Chongqing, and the following year there were political consultations and armistice arrangements, which eventually led to a full-scale civil war.
The defeat of the Kuomintang in 1949 certainly cannot be reduced to being defeated by the Communist Party’s united front. Factors such as military missteps, economic collapse, political corruption and social mobilization are equally important. But this period of history at least proves that political negotiations and power struggles can proceed simultaneously, and signing an agreement does not mean that the root causes of conflicts have disappeared.
This is where the historical warning raised by Ming Juzheng is worthy of discussion: If the Kuomintang has personally experienced cooperation, negotiations and civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and when it faces Beijing again today, it has an even greater responsibility to explain what institutional guarantees are sufficient to prevent its political commitment from failing again?
History will not repeat itself mechanically, but if politicians only remember the hope of negotiation but forget the cost of the failure of the agreement, they are not learning lessons from history, but selectively forgetting history.
3. Peace cannot just mean asking Taiwan to "concess"
What really needs to be tested in this "Cross-Strait Peace Initiative" is the political consultation it proposes, how to deal with the fact that China will not give up the threat of force, and the reality that the two sides of the Strait have fundamental differences over sovereignty and political status.
After the end of the Anti-Japanese War in 1945, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party launched negotiations in Chongqing, and the following year there were political consultations and armistice arrangements, which eventually led to a full-scale civil war. The picture shows Chiang Kai-shek (left) and Mao Zedong (right). (This newspaper’s data room) Peace is certainly worth pursuing, but if Beijing requires Taiwan to accept preset political preconditions before it is willing to start negotiations, does Taiwan still have the freedom to refuse? If negotiations involve changes to the current democratic system, who has the authority to approve it? Can the people decide through democratic procedures that are not threatened?
There are no answers to these questions, and the so-called "final political arrangement" may become a political contract that has not yet been filled in but requires the people to sign in advance.
What should be even more vigilant is that some peace discourses regard China's military threat as an unchangeable natural condition, but regard Taiwan's defense preparations as a source of tension. This kind of discussion easily blurs the responsibilities of the threat breaker and the threatened, and even makes peace a synonym for unilateral demands for Taiwan to make concessions.
4. Taiwan is not an accessory to the KMT’s retreat history
However, Liang Wenjie's historical rhetoric must also add a fact that cannot be forgotten: the Kuomintang's refusal to surrender in 1949 was first to preserve its own power, not to defend the democracy that the Taiwanese people had not yet enjoyed at that time.
The February 28th Massacre in 1947, as well as the white terror and long-term martial law that followed, have long demonstrated that the Kuomintang government claimed to resist communist totalitarianism, but at the same time used another authoritarian system to deprive the Taiwanese people of their freedom.
Therefore, just because Chiang Kai-shek was anti-communist, his rule cannot be repainted as a model of democracy; nor can Chiang Ching-kuo's political responsibility in the white terror system be erased just because he warned the CCP that it cannot be trusted.
What is truly worthy of comparison are the different political subjects of the two eras: the Kuomintang in 1949 was preserving power, while the Taiwanese people in 2026 were maintaining the political autonomy they had gained after decades of democratization.
Taiwan's democracy is not a political gift brought by the Kuomintang when it retreats, nor is it a historical asset that any political party can exchange with Beijing.
Yu Yingshi’s question thirteen years ago is still harsh to this day. If he were still alive today and continued to adhere to the principles of anti-communism and democracy, I am afraid he might still be dubbed the "Green Hero" by some people. What this irony exposes is the political absurdity of putting party positions above the principles of liberal democracy.
Back then, the Kuomintang fled desperately and refused to accept the rule of the Communist Party. Today, the people of Taiwan certainly have the right to refuse.
Mainland Affairs Council spokesman Liang Wenjie’s historical rhetorical question must be supplemented by a fact that cannot be forgotten: the Kuomintang’s refusal to surrender in 1949 was first to preserve its own power, not to defend the democracy that the Taiwanese people had not yet enjoyed at that time. (File photo) If the Kuomintang in 1949 could refuse to surrender in order to preserve its own power, then why can’t the Taiwanese people, who fought for democracy after decades of sacrifice, refuse to accept forced political arrangements in order to preserve their freedom?
It took the Taiwanese people decades to get rid of the authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang. There is no reason to leave their political destiny to another authoritarian regime.
(The author is a white terror victim and text creator)
This article is reprinted from Lu Yu’s Facebook with permission
