The office of Mohammad Baqir Qalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and Special Representative for China Affairs, denied that Beijing had stipulated reopening the Strait of Hormuz, stopping the collection of fees, and settling Tehran’s disputes with the United States and Saudi Arabia, in exchange for a visit by the Iranian Parliament Speaker to China or expanding relations between the two countries.
The denial targeted the statements of Hossein Marashi, Secretary-General of the “Karkzaran Sazandeki” (Construction Cadres) Party, one of the most prominent parties associated with the legacy of former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, after he quoted from the Chinese side a list of four demands that he said had been communicated to Tehran “very clearly.”
In an official statement, Ghalibaf’s office announced that “attributing such conditions to the Chinese side, and the claim that the visit of the Special Representative and the development of relations between the two countries are conditional on achieving the issues raised, lack truth.”
The statement stressed that relations between Tehran and Beijing are based on “mutual respect, common interests, and comprehensive strategic partnership,” and that political, economic, trade, and investment cooperation between them continues.
The office warned the media and politicians against publishing “unconfirmed news, interpretations, and speculation” regarding Iran’s foreign relations, adding that “foreign relations and national interests are not an arena for factional and media rivalries and conflicts.”
The Foreign Ministry denies “conditions”
The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly entered the dispute, as Ali Asghar Mohammadi, Director General for East Asia and the Pacific, described Marashi’s account as incorrect.
Mohammadi explained that the claim that China has put forward conditions related to bilateral relations is “unrealistic,” noting that the leadership of the two countries is “determined to maintain and strengthen relations in all areas of common interest.”
The Iranian official called on political movements to refrain from presenting or promoting information that has “no basis in reality.”
In an interview with the Echo Iran website, Marashi had conveyed a message that he said Beijing had sent to the Iranian side before Ghalibaf’s expected visit.
He attributed the Chinese to saying: “They told us very clearly: You open the Strait of Hormuz, do not collect fees, and solve your problem with Saudi Arabia and America, and after that, Qalibaf will come to China.”
Marashi did not specify the source of the information or the Chinese party that conveyed that message, and Beijing did not issue a public announcement containing similar conditions.
Since May, Ghalibaf has been Iran's special representative for Chinese affairs, with a mandate proposed by President Masoud Pezeshkian and approved by Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. His mission includes coordinating the various sectors of relations between Tehran and Beijing, especially the implementation of the 25-year joint cooperation agreement, but he has not yet visited China in this capacity.
Attack from conservatives
The issue quickly turned into a political and media confrontation between Iranian factions. Kayhan newspaper, affiliated with the Iranian Supreme Leader's office, described Marashi's statements as a "lie" and accused him of trying to harm Iran's relations with its eastern partners, using strong language that linked his statements to American policy towards Tehran.
The newspaper wrote that Marashi presents himself, as it put it, in the role of “paving the way for White House policies,” and accused him of seeking to “poison” strategic relations with China from within.
The “Raja News” website, which is linked to the extremist “Resilience Front” and is close to Saeed Jalili, the representative of the Iranian leader in the National Security Council, took the same path, and sharply attacked Marashi, considering that his story went beyond the limits of an “analytical error” to publishing incorrect information affecting a sensitive file in foreign policy.
Hard-line MP Malek Shariati, a member of the Baydari bloc, asked whether Marashi’s statements regarding the relationship with China were “false,” and why the presidency or the office of the Speaker of Parliament, in his capacity as special representative for China affairs, did not file a judicial complaint against him.
Shariati wrote on the “X” platform: “Why don’t the presidential office and the parliament speaker’s office complain about Mr. Marashi? Why does the judiciary not take action against him? He added: “If mere denial was sufficient, why was denial not sufficient in similar cases, and they resorted to filing complaints?”
As for Quds newspaper, which is close to the Revolutionary Guard circles and Qalibaf’s team, it focused on the timing of the statements, and believed that presenting them during the war gave Iran’s opponents material that could be used in the media confrontation.
The newspaper “Farhikhtegan”, which is close to the office of Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian leader, went on to recall the broader disagreement within the regime regarding the direction of foreign policy, accusing the Hashemi Rafsanjani faction of seeking to undermine the course of relations with the East in the interest of a policy based on reducing tension with Washington.
The criticism went beyond questioning the validity of the information, and addressed Marashi's political background, as he is one of the most prominent representatives of the movement that has historically defended economic and diplomatic openness and reducing the cost of foreign confrontation.
The Charsooq newspaper, which is linked to the government circles of the late President Ebrahim Raisi, joined Marashi's critics, and considered his statements an attempt by reformists to harm Iranian-Chinese relations.
The newspaper referred to the denial issued by Ghalibaf’s office, and said that the claim that China imposed the four conditions “was not even raised by the American media.”
The conservative Charsouq newspaper devoted a prominent space to attacking Marashi, under the title “Guardian of America’s Benefits in Iran,” and accused the reformists of trying to sabotage relations between Tehran and Beijing. It relied on the denial of Ghalibaf’s office, considering that talk of Chinese conditions for return had not even been raised by the American media.
Marashi was accused of raising the issue from inside Iran at a sensitive stage in relations with Beijing. She linked his statements to the internal dispute over Iran's orientation to the east, and accused him of presenting a narrative that serves American pressure on Tehran at a stage in which Washington is trying to tighten Iran's economic isolation and push its partners, led by China, to reduce dealing with it.
A third novel
Mustafa Najafi, advisor to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, said that Marashi’s statements regarding specific Chinese “conditions” were “inaccurate,” but he pointed out that Beijing wants Tehran to clarify the direction of its policy in sensitive files, including the Strait of Hormuz, relations with countries in the region, and the future of the nuclear file.
According to Najafi's account, China does not necessarily demand that Iran open the Strait immediately, but rather wants to know what policy Tehran will follow regarding it, the objectives associated with it, the conditions under which it will be opened or closed, and how long the current situation can continue.
He explained that the Chinese priority is to “reduce the level of ambiguity and uncertainty,” allowing Beijing to assess risks and organize its economic and strategic plans.
China between Tehran and Washington
The uproar raised by Marashi coincided with a more complex phase in China's relations with both Iran and the United States, after the security of energy and navigation routes turned into one of the main issues in the war.
China is Iran's largest trading partner and the main importer of Iranian oil, which makes the continuation of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz an issue directly related to Chinese energy security.
On the other hand, Washington escalated its pressure on Chinese companies, refineries, and institutions that deal with Iran, and hinted during the war at expanding sanctions on parties that buy Iranian oil or provide Tehran with financial and commercial channels.
During Trump's visit to China in May, the US President said that his counterpart, Xi Jinping, agreed with him on the necessity of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while the White House announced that Xi opposed collecting fees on ships' transit.
Beijing did not announce its readiness to put pressure on Tehran according to American conditions. She also rejected reports of Iran supplying weapons as “baseless fabrications,” while Trump said Xi told him he would not send military equipment to Iran.
During the meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in late August and early September, China opposed a clause calling for “free, safe and predictable transit” through the Strait of Hormuz, according to the Hom Mihn newspaper, in addition to its objection to other clauses in the document.
At the same time, Beijing has repeatedly called for the restoration of normal navigation in the Strait. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in June that the stability of shipping traffic through Hormuz is essential for global production and trade chains.
The cost of maritime turbulence
At the same time, China faces disruption in two main routes for its trade and supplies. The deterioration of navigation security in the Red Sea led to the diversion of ships and rising shipping costs between Asia and Europe, while the war around the Strait of Hormuz increased the risks threatening the flow of energy supplies to Asian markets, most notably China.
Washington is trying to exploit these interests to push Beijing to exert greater pressure on Tehran, in parallel with sanctions on Chinese companies linked to Iranian oil trade.
As for China, it seeks to protect energy and trade flows without joining the US isolation campaign or abandoning its strategic relationship with Iran.
25 year old file
The controversy is also related to the task assigned to Ghalibaf to supervise the China file, a task that was previously the responsibility of figures closely connected to the Iranian decision-making center.
Ali Larijani assumed the role at an earlier stage, and contributed to the negotiations that ended with the signing of the 25-year strategic and trade cooperation agreement between Iran and China in 2021.
Qalibaf became one of the most prominent Iranian diplomatic figures during the war, especially after he headed the Iranian delegation in the Islamabad negotiations with the United States in April.
In the latest communication at the leadership level, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian did not hold a bilateral meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping during the twenty-sixth summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, and their communication was limited to a short conversation as they entered the summit hall.
Marashi belongs to a different political generation within the Iranian establishment. He is one of the most prominent figures in the moderate reformist movement. He held a position as Vice President, Mohammad Khatami, and was previously a member of Parliament and head of Rafsanjani’s office. He is also the brother of the former president’s wife.
