◎ Straightforward
Russia's all-out aggression in Ukraine has lasted four years and seven months, and it has not ended yet. This has taught Taiwan the most valuable lesson. That is: the issue in the Russia-Ukraine war is not "why Ukraine offends Russia", but another more important and serious question: "Why does Putin dare to attack Ukraine?"
The very important answer is Putin's misjudgment.
Putin believed that the Russian army could quickly enter Kiev, that the Ukrainian government would collapse soon, that the people's resistance was limited, and that he underestimated international assistance. The subsequent war proved that there was a big problem with Russia's estimation of Ukraine's will to resist.
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Therefore, the most dangerous time for war is not when the enemy hates you the most, but when the enemy thinks it is cheapest to fight you. This is what Taiwan should understand about the Ukraine issue.
Russia's all-out aggression in Ukraine was mainly due to President Putin's misjudgment. (Reuters file photo) First, let’s talk about Crimea. Because Crimea was first occupied by Russia.
Being pro-Russian does not mean being willing to accept Russian rule. Crimea has long been pro-Russian, has a large Russian-speaking population, and has close historical, cultural, and economic ties with Russia. However, a poll conducted in 2013, a year before the Russian army entered Crimea, showed that 53% of Crimean residents wanted to maintain the autonomous status of Ukraine, while only 23% wanted to leave Ukraine and join Russia. This number is important.
Being pro-Russian is sentiment; accepting Russian rule is sovereignty. There is a country between the two.
This also reminds me of Kinmen and Matsu.
Jinma is close to mainland China and has many exchanges. Its life circle, relatives and culture are all closely related. Kinmen people like to go to Xiamen to spend money and hope for peace across the Taiwan Strait. What’s wrong with that? Not at all. However, liking Xiamen does not mean that we are willing to become Xiamen; advocating exchanges does not mean that we are willing to hand over our government to Beijing.
The warning Crimea gives us is not that "being close to China is dangerous", but whether Beijing will misinterpret local closeness as acceptance of political rule; will it therefore think that limited military operations will not encounter strong resistance? This should make us think deeply.
Just because Kinmen people like Xiamen does not mean they want to become Xiamen. The picture shows the Jinxia Swimming Crossing activity. (File photo) Misjudgment is the danger.
Furthermore, Zelensky came to power with a promise of peace, but what did Putin see in it?
There is a history that is often mistold. Zelensky is not a pro-Russian. An important promise of his 2019 presidential campaign was to end the war in Donbass. He is willing to negotiate and talk directly with Putin in the hope of stopping the war.
Is it wrong to want peace? Of course not. The question is: How do your opponents interpret your good intentions?
If what the opponent sees is: "This person wants peace, so I should also take a step back," peace takes a step forward.
If what the opponent sees is: "This person needs peace too much, so as long as I shout war louder, he may take another step back." The result is completely different.
Peace is a purpose and cannot be turned into a trump card that can be seen through by opponents.
The most dangerous peace for a country is not to negotiate with the enemy; it is to convince the enemy that as long as you shout war loud enough, you will retreat. This also gives us food for thought.
Of course the two sides of the Taiwan Strait need to communicate, but what does communication tell Beijing?
The more opposing the two sides are, the more they need to talk. The United States and the Soviet Union have been in cold war for decades, and they still need hotlines. The less communication there is between the two sides, the higher the chance of miscalculation.
The question has never been whether Fu Kunqi, Cheng Liwen and other pro-China factions can come to China for exchanges; the real question is: What signal will Beijing get after the exchanges?
If Beijing gets a signal that Taiwan is willing to be peaceful and open to dialogue, but the political system and future of the Taiwanese people must still be determined by the Taiwanese people, then it will reduce hostility.
The question is what kind of message will Beijing receive when pro-China representatives like Cheng Lai-man (left) and others come to China for exchanges. (AP file photo) If what we get is that Taiwan's major political forces gradually accept Beijing's definition of "one China" and at the same time reduce their ability to resist, then Beijing may get a completely different message.
Communication can eliminate hostility; but if communication eliminates one's own subjectivity, it may also reduce the political cost of the other party's use of force.
In this regard, the international status of Taiwan and Ukraine is very different.
The Russian army crossed the Ukrainian border, and the world easily understood that as aggression. Taiwan is different. Beijing will definitely tell the world: "This is China's internal affairs. This is to complete China's reunification. Foreign countries are not allowed to interfere."
Therefore, one of Taiwan's most important international assets is to let the world always know clearly: Taiwan is not part of China, and the Taiwanese people have never authorized Beijing to use missiles to choose our government for us.
Taiwan does not have to rush to be recognized as a country by the world before it can ask the world to oppose the use of force to determine the future of 23 million people.
Beijing most wants to describe the Taiwan Strait War as a "Chinese civil war" and "China's internal affairs." The last thing Taiwan can do is to complete the script for Beijing.
Next, let’s talk about arms purchases. Arms procurement is not about comparing who has more money, but about making it difficult for the People's Liberation Army to cross the sea.
Look at the arms purchase controversy in the Legislative Yuan today. Congress should certainly oversee arms purchases. If the weapon is expensive, of course you have to ask; if you buy the wrong weapon, of course you have to cut it; if the submarine has not completed testing, of course you can ask the Ministry of National Defense to clarify. But the purpose of supervision is to allow Taiwan to buy better weapons, not to end up without weapons.
In May 2026, the Legislative Yuan passed a 780 billion yuan special defense regulation, but the originally planned drones, unmanned boats, and Taiwan's tactical network were not included. In June, the Executive Yuan proposed another NT$210 billion special regulation on autonomous autonomous unmanned vehicles for national defense, which was temporarily suspended. Later, the Kuomintang proposed another NT$240 billion version over six years. In August, the Legislative Yuan finally passed the six-year, NT$240 billion version of the Unmanned Vehicle Industry Development Regulation in the third reading.
The Legislative Yuan passed the "Regulations on Strengthening National Defense Independence and Development of the Unmanned Vehicle Industry" led by the Kuomintang group in the third reading a few days ago. (File photo) In this back and forth, what is really worth asking is not which party won, but: Has Taiwan’s most important asymmetric combat power been delayed as a result?
Taiwan has only 23 million people. It is impossible to compare the number of aircraft, warships, and soldiers with China. What Taiwan wants to do is to prevent the People's Liberation Army from crossing the Taiwan Strait. UAVs, unmanned boats, submarines, mines, and shore-mounted anti-ship missiles are all here.
Missiles can destroy cities, but they cannot capture them. To rule Taiwan, the People's Liberation Army will eventually have to send people across the Taiwan Strait.
Therefore, the real purpose of Taiwan's national defense is not to prove that we can defeat China, but to prevent China from calculating whether it can defeat Taiwan.
What we should really ask is: What is Taiwan’s politics telling Beijing?
If one day, Beijing believes that Kinmen and Matsu will not resist; believes that the people of Taiwan are afraid of war, so they will not resist; believes that Taiwan's Congress will continue to delay key national defense construction; believes that Taiwan's political forces have gradually accepted Beijing's one-China framework; finally, it believes that the United States and Japan will not be willing to pay the price for Taiwan after seeing Taiwan's own attitude.
These five things are not necessarily true. War does not have to wait for them all to come true; the worst thing to fear is that Beijing believes them to be true.
Putin launched the war not because he understood Ukraine correctly, but perhaps because he misunderstood Ukraine.
What Taiwan really needs to guard against is not that Beijing knows how strong we are, but that Beijing mistakenly believes that we are weak.
Political parties can advocate exchanges or unity; Congress has the power to oversee every dime of the defense budget. But the country cannot let China think that Taiwan can be bullied.
Democracy can allow for both unification and independence, but national defense cannot be based on the hope that "the enemy will not come."
To truly avoid war, two pillars are needed. The first root is peace: Let Beijing know that the door to peace will never be closed and Taiwan will never initiate a war. The second root is deterrence: let Beijing know that the door to war will never be easy to enter, and the outcome of the war will definitely be uncomfortable for Beijing, and the final result may be contrary to Beijing's expectations.
Real peace is not about convincing China that Taiwan does not dare to fight; it is about convincing China that Taiwan does not need to be fought and will never be easy to fight.
Ukraine has told the world one thing with its blood: weakness does not necessarily lead to war, but misjudgment of weakness may become an inducement to war.
If Taiwan wants to avoid war, it cannot let Beijing sit in Zhongnanhai one day and make the same mistake Putin made on February 24, 2022.
If Taiwan wants to avoid war, it cannot let Beijing sit in Zhongnanhai one day and make the same mistake Putin made on February 24, 2022. The picture shows the "Xinhua Gate", the main entrance of Zhongnanhai, a schematic diagram. (Reuters file photo)
