On Friday, the Moroccan media strongly criticized a Spanish police report that indicated “complete complacency” by Moroccan forces in the face of the influx of tens of thousands of migrants into the Spanish-occupied enclave of Ceuta in northern Morocco in late July.
More than 70,000 migrants crossed from Morocco to Ceuta on July 30 and 31, in an unprecedented wave that killed dozens, most of them drowned, while trying to swim around a sea barrier.
A Spanish police report - seen by Agence France-Presse on Wednesday - indicated “complete laxity” in the Moroccan police response, which facilitated the flow of migrants, with some officers directing them towards the water.
The report, which was based on satellite images, publicly available videos and migrants' testimonies, said that police numbers around the border crossing were "much lower than usual" and that officers "did not make any serious attempt" to control the crowds.
The leftist government in Spain has always avoided holding Morocco responsible, while it has spent years trying to improve its historically complex relations with it, especially regarding the status of Ceuta and Melilla.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez confirmed on Thursday that there was no “conclusive evidence” that Morocco planned or orchestrated the influx of migrants. There has been no official comment from Morocco on this report yet, but several Moroccan media outlets have criticized its content. The Hespress website considered that the text “reveals a fragile narrative structure, lacking material evidence, and full of blatant contradictions that refute the hypotheses of the report itself.” The website saw in it “a desperate attempt to transform Morocco from a reliable strategic partner in border management into a scapegoat for settling purely political and judicial scores in Madrid.” As for Lodisk, for his part, he denounced “a document that was completed in a hurry,” pointing out several incorrect facts, such as mentioning the date of June 30 instead of July 30. He also pointed out that the terms “state” and “Moroccan government” do not appear in the report when describing responsibilities.
The TelQuel weekly adopted the same position, noting that, contrary to what was widely circulated in the media, the report does not attribute responsibility for “planning and implementation” to Morocco, nor does it identify any Moroccan official by name.
For its part, the economic news website “Media 24” emphasized “the necessity of taking a Moroccan view” on this report, which was widely followed in Spain, especially by media outlets whose positions are “hostile to Morocco,” according to the website, which denounced the use of the term “complacency” on the grounds that the report is based on “satellite images that capture a real-time moment and nothing else.”
In early August, a high-ranking Moroccan official confirmed to Agence France-Presse, requesting that his name not be revealed, that there had been no negligence in Moroccan security measures.
Italian readiness to intervene with its friend Ethiopia; To discuss its crisis with Egypt regarding the “Renaissance Dam,” in addition to Chinese support for Egypt’s right to the Nile River, at a time when Cairo affirmed “relying on friends to support water security,” what experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat considered a step that strengthens the bet on the possibility of maximizing pressure on Addis Ababa and pushing for fair solutions that do justice to Egyptian rights.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aty, during a joint press conference with his Italian counterpart Antonio Taiani, at the conclusion of their talks in Cairo on Thursday, stressed “the importance of full compliance with the rules of international law, most notably the principle of not causing harm, the principle of rejecting any unilateral measures, and relying on friends to support Egyptian water security,” according to the German News Agency.
Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Taiani announced Rome's readiness to mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia to reach a solution to the water crisis between the two countries, stressing his country's readiness "to benefit from its good relations with Ethiopia to help reach a solution to the crisis, and to facilitate this dialogue in the coming weeks, if Egypt and Ethiopia wish to do so," according to Egyptian media.
This Italian effort is in addition to a Chinese affirmation of Egypt’s right to its water security, and its support for adherence to international law by the Nile Basin countries, at the conclusion of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo last Tuesday.
This was preceded by American efforts since last January, when US President Donald Trump sent an official letter to President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, presenting Washington’s readiness to resume the “Renaissance Dam” negotiations and reach a final and just solution to the issue.
The Nile is no longer a bilateral issue
Member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and former Assistant Foreign Minister, Mohamed Hegazy, believes that recent developments “reflect an important fact, which is that the Nile crisis is no longer a bilateral issue that can be left hostage to stagnation or fait accompli management, but rather has become an issue of regional stability that requires responsible action from friendly powers and international partners.”
Hegazy affirmed in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat: “If friends have a required role at this stage, it is not to take sides with one party against another, but rather to help everyone realize the simple fact that a just agreement is a victory for all, and that true stability cannot be built on a fait accompli policy,” stressing that “the most important bet today is for Egypt’s strategic relations with its friends and allies to turn into a real driving force towards resuming serious negotiations, based on what has been accomplished previously, not starting from scratch, and targeting Reaching a comprehensive and binding agreement that achieves the interests of the three countries (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia).”
For his part, the Vice President of the Egyptian Council for African Affairs, Ambassador Salah Halima, believes that this movement proposed by Rome, Beijing, and before that Washington, “clearly indicates a trend towards supporting the Egyptian position, and the necessity of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the crisis.”
Regarding the expected role of the “Friends of Egypt,” Halima pointed out that “it is possible to launch mediation through individual or collective actions or joint coordination.” With the aim of communicating with all parties,” he pointed out, “talking about the possibility of providing incentives or investments to Ethiopia by China, Italy, or others to change its position is a matter that is up to the vision of each party, but Egypt wants to adhere to the laws, and give priority to the language of cooperation instead of confrontation.”
Egyptian threat of escalation
Last August, Egypt affirmed more than once that the water issue is “national security and a red line,” according to a statement by an official source reported by the Egyptian News Agency. The Egyptian Foreign Minister also hinted at using the “right of legitimate defense” regarding developments in the Nile River file and the “Nahra Dam” crisis.
After about less than a decade, negotiations between Cairo and Addis Ababa were frozen for 3 years, before resuming in 2023, then frozen again in 2024, amid Ethiopia, which is considered an upstream country, refusing to conclude an agreement, and asserting that it does not harm Egypt or Sudan, the two downstream countries.
Hegazy believes that “the escalating Egyptian position and international support for concluding an agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia confirm that Cairo will not accept Addis Ababa’s management of the Nile unilaterally... Cairo wants to reach a fair equation that guarantees development without harming others, and transforms the Nile from a potential source of tension into an area of joint cooperation.”
He explained that “the true role of friends should not be limited to intervening when the crisis approaches the brink of danger, but rather working from now on to prevent reaching that brink, by supporting a just solution that guarantees Ethiopia’s right to development, and at the same time protects the water rights and existential security of Egypt and Sudan.”
Halima points out, “There are challenges and difficulties, and the matter requires great efforts given the divergent positions of the two parties, especially in light of Ethiopia’s politicization of the water issue.”
Fears of the Sudan war turning into a regional conflict are no longer just estimates put forward by observers. Rather, they have exceeded them to strikes and mutual accusations across the border between Sudan and Chad, in conjunction with worrying military movements near the border with Ethiopia.
The US President's senior advisor for Arab and African affairs, Massad Boulos, conveyed these concerns to the Security Council, warning that these repercussions may inflame the conflict and threaten to drag neighboring countries deeper into the war.
These American warnings do not appear to have been issued in a vacuum. It is difficult to separate it from Washington's extensive intelligence capabilities that allow it to monitor military movements, weapons routes, drones, and cross-border networks. Therefore, raising the level of warning to the Security Council reflects American assessments of the existence of real and growing risks, even if the American administration has not publicly revealed the full information on which it is based.
This warning was reinforced by a call Paul made with Chadian President Mohamed Idriss Deby, following reports of a military strike inside Chadian territory. He said that the two sides expressed “deep concern about the spread of the war in Sudan across its borders, fueling further escalation and threatening regional peace and stability,” calling for an end to external support for its parties.
More than three years after its outbreak, the war is no longer just an internal confrontation between the army and the Rapid Support Forces. As the battles moved to areas bordering Chad and Ethiopia, and the use of advanced weapons expanded, Sudan became the center of a conflict in which the calculations of neighboring countries were intertwined with the interests of regional and international powers.
Internationalization is expanding
Indications of the internationalization of the war are clear in the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission’s announcement that weapons, military technology, fighters, and external supply networks contribute to prolonging the conflict and strengthening the capabilities of both parties. The mission spoke of a cross-border network linked to individuals, entities, and countries, which it said provided weapons, equipment, logistical support, and foreign elements for “rapid support,” although these concerned countries denied the accusations, stressing their commitment to neutrality and supporting peace efforts, while the mission said that its investigations into the sources of external support for the army are still preliminary.
Sudanese researcher Kholoud Khair, director of the Confluence Advisory Centre, told the Financial Times newspaper last April that the war had “extended across the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel region,” and that there was no country among Sudan’s seven neighbors completely removed from its influence or calculations. Alan Boswell, director of the Horn of Africa Project at the International Crisis Group, also believes that the war is dividing the region and increasing the polarization of the surrounding countries around its two sides. He believes that Chad and South Sudan are most vulnerable to its repercussions, with the need to monitor Ethiopia and tensions in Somalia, warning that the continuation of the conflict may drag the region into a “vortex of violence.”
For his part, the crisis management and negotiation expert at the Center for Strategic Research and Studies, Major General Amin Ismail Majzoub, ruled out the conflict turning into a direct military confrontation between Sudan and neighboring countries, suggesting that the most likely scenario is an escalation of the “proxy war,” through continued financial and military support, and the use of mercenaries and armed groups, leading to a prolongation of the war. Majzoub told Asharq Al-Awsat that Khartoum's accusations against Chad and Ethiopia are based, according to the Sudanese authorities, on evidence presented to the African Union, IGAD, and the Security Council, as well as reports of the use of bases and airports to support the Rapid Support Forces.
He added that the transition of these parties from indirect support to declared military intervention may push Sudan's regional allies to support it, and then the conflict could expand to include the Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. But he ruled out this scenario, saying: “This will not happen,” because the outbreak of a comprehensive regional war is not welcomed by the countries of the region. At the same time, he pointed out that the repercussions of the conflict were beginning to appear within neighboring countries, citing the growing voices of opposition groups in Chad rejecting what they say is support provided to Arab groups loyal to the Rapid Support Forces.
As for retired Major General in the Sudanese army, Kamal Ismail, he warned that the intersections of regional interests are gradually pushing the conflict beyond Sudan’s borders. He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We warned a lot about the conflict moving from within Sudan to the region, and the indicators are moving in this direction,” adding that the expansion of the fighting may lead to a more comprehensive civil war and make the scene more complicated. Ismail believed that the escalation of the conflict of interests may push regional parties to intervene directly, under the pretext of protecting their interests, warning that “the longer the war lasts, the more its parties will lose the ability to control its course or stop it.” He called on the Sudanese to unite in order to stop the fighting and preserve what remains of the homeland.
Ethiopia and Chad
The shift of operations to Blue Nile State near the Ethiopian border represents one of the most worrying developments. The Human Research Laboratory at Yale University published reports based on satellite images and analysis of open source information, in which it spoke of the assembly of brigade-sized military support inside an Ethiopian Defense Forces base in Ossa, and linked it to “rapid support” activities. Assa gains importance due to its proximity to the Blue Nile and the city of Karmuk. Therefore, any military presence related to the war within the region (if confirmed) may establish a new border front.
To the west, Chad stands in the eye of the storm due to its long border with Darfur and the tribal overlap between its two sides. Tensions escalated after the head of the Sovereignty Council and the army commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, accused N'Djamena of facilitating the support provided to the "Rapid Support", while Chad denies using its lands or airports to transport weapons. Cameron Hudson, a former American official and expert on Sudanese affairs, says that the repercussions of the strikes inside Chad are no longer only on the ground, but have turned into a diplomatic confrontation.
Countries affected by war
South Sudan may be the country most exposed to the consequences of the war. Its economy depends on exporting oil through Sudanese facilities and ports, and it has received more than a million returning Sudanese and southerners since the outbreak of fighting. The cessation of oil exports or the spread of fighting to the border would threaten the fragile stability in Juba.
As for Kenya, although it does not have a direct border with Sudan, it is exposed to the spread of political polarization, financing networks, fighters, and trade disruption, in addition to damage to the role of IGAD, of which Nairobi is one of its pillars.
Uganda faces similar dangers across South Sudan; Any new explosion in Juba may lead to a wave of refugees towards its territory, as it already hosts more than a million refugees from South Sudan. Thus, the effects of the war may spread from Sudan to South Sudan, then Uganda and Kenya, without regular armies crossing the borders.
Egypt, in turn, faces repercussions related to refugees, the security of its southern borders, the Nile waters, and the balance with Ethiopia, while Eritrea fears the spread of chaos to eastern Sudan and the Red Sea coast. The Executive Secretary of IGAD, Rakne Gbeyehu, says that the challenges of peace and security have become more interconnected than can be faced by a single country or institution, describing Sudan as one of the clearest manifestations of the combination of military confrontation, humanitarian catastrophe, institutional disintegration, regional expansion, and geopolitical competition.
Sudan's war has not yet turned into a full-fledged regional war, but it has long since transcended the boundaries of internal conflict. As the episodes overlap, the question will not remain in the future: Will the war expand into the region? Rather: Have you started?
