Tension escalates between Al-Manfi and Al-Dabaiba: Is the Libyan coalition approaching a clash?

Tensions are escalating between the head of the Libyan Presidential Council, Muhammad al-Manfi, and the head of the interim “national unity” government, Abdul Hamid al-Dabaiba, so that the formal alliance produced by the “Geneva Political Dialogue Forum” in 2021 turns into a situation approaching a clash.

With the emergence of the “American initiative,” which some believe has reshuffled the cards and reshaped the balance of influence, in conjunction with the understandings of the “4+4” committee, the partnership between the two sides in Tripoli has entered its deepest crisis, amid new political arrangements that may lead to the formation of an authority that excludes exile from the “next equation.”

Between the stages of agreement and scenes of clash, the relationship between Al-Manfi and Al-Dabaiba reflects an aspect of the nature of the Libyan political scene, where alliances are based on a balance of interests, and continue as long as calculations require their survival, before changing with the change in the balance of power.

Ali Al-Takbali, a member of the Libyan House of Representatives, believes that the relationship prevailing in the current scene is “governed more by interests than by a real political alliance.” He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Geneva Forum “formed the current executive authority; But now there is an international trend, with American support, to form a new authority that brings together the most prominent forces in the east and west of the country, and in light of this path, Al-Dabaiba must rapprochement with the leadership of the (National Army), not Al-Manfi.

For years, Libya has been experiencing a division between the “National Unity” government in Tripoli, and another headed by Osama Hammad, which runs the east and some areas of the south, commissioned by Parliament, and supported by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the “National Army.”

At the end of last month, representatives of the "Unity" government and the "National Army", under UN sponsorship, reached an agreement by the "4+4" committee, which stipulates the formation of a unified executive authority to prepare for elections within two years, amid expectations that its seats will be shared between the signatories.

In turn, the director of the “Sadiq” Research Center, Anas Al-Qamati, said that Al-Manfi and Al-Dabaiba’s partnership “was imposed by political necessity, as the Geneva Forum stipulated that the President of the Presidential Council be from the East and the Prime Minister from the West,” and described their relationship as “one of the most complex relationships in Libya, even if it was dominated by apparent consensus.”

In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Qamati attributed the roots of the dispute to “a wide disparity in powers between them,” and said that “Al-Manfi’s position as army commander remained ceremonial, in light of the armed formations in the west remaining outside his control, while the (National Army) is concentrated in the east and south under the command of Haftar.”

Despite his acknowledgment of the accumulation of tensions between them over the past years, Al-Qamati believes that “the American initiative and the recent UN agreement constituted the most dangerous transformation, as they remain - as is being said - Al-Dabaiba as prime minister in exchange for Saddam Haftar, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the (National Army), assuming the presidency of the Presidential Council, which made Al-Manfi the only party demanding his departure, given the remaining figures in the political scene.”

Al-Qamati explains that Al-Manfi tried “to appear as a neutral party in Al-Dabaiba’s disputes with the forces of the East, without achieving the desired effect. He also missed achieving a prominent achievement in the national reconciliation file, and therefore did not enjoy any clear popular support.”

For his part, Jalal Harchaoui, a researcher at the Royal United Services Institute, highlighted “the imbalance of power between the two men even before they assumed responsibility, which was greatly reflected in the period of their administration.”

Harchaoui pointed out to Asharq Al-Awsat that Al-Dabaiba’s affiliation to the city of Misrata, with its military weight, provided him support from armed brigades from the beginning, unlike Al-Manfi. He said that Al-Dabaiba “possesses the ability to move forces and employ financial resources, which are tools of influence that are not available to Al-Manfi, which made the balance of power clearly tilt in favor of the prime minister.”

For his part, the director of the Libyan Center for Security and Military Studies, Ashraf Abdullah, touched on the most prominent points of disagreement between Dabaiba and Al-Manfi before the “American initiative.”

In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdullah considered that the dispute between Al-Dabaiba and Al-Manfi began with the killing of Abdel-Ghani Al-Kakli, head of the “Stabilization Support Agency” affiliated with the Presidential Council, in May 2025. Al-Dabaiba then announced the dissolution of the agency, while Al-Manfi kept him and appointed a new president for him, in a move that revealed the rift in the relationship between the two men. He also referred to what he described as “the rapprochement between Al-Manfi and the leaders of the Deterrence Service after that incident.”

According to Abdullah, “The subordination of some security services to the Presidential Council did not give it actual influence, because the (unity) government continued to pay their salaries, and it remained the one with the greatest influence.” However, the relationship between Al-Manfi and Al-Dabaiba was not confrontational all the time, as it witnessed points of rapprochement, as the security researcher confirms, the most prominent of which was “their support for the removal of Al-Siddiq Al-Kabir from the presidency of the Central Bank.”

Abdullah believes that Al-Manfi’s situation after the “4+4” agreement has become “closer to someone who is tweeting outside the flock,” as he does not have the ability to compete with Saddam Haftar for the position, at a time when Al-Dabaiba continues to tighten his control over the money, which leaves Al-Manfi without pressure cards that would enable him to influence the arrangements for the next stage.

On the other hand, Al-Takbali warns that Al-Manfi “may rely on those who reject the (4+4) agreement, especially the armed formations in the West, which are relatively capable of obstructing its implementation,” but he pointed out that “this bet may collapse if Washington seriously supports the agreement and pressures those formations to adhere to it.”