U.S. President Trump calls a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan a "very good bargaining chip" when negotiating with Xi Jinping. The arms sales are still pending. What Beijing may see is room for bargaining, but what Taiwan hears is its own security, which may change the price along with the US-China deal. Ryan Hass, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a well-known American think tank, recently published "Repairing America's signaling on Taiwan," pointing out that the most thorny contradiction in Washington's Taiwan policy is that although U.S.-Taiwan security and economic and trade cooperation continue to deepen, the U.S.'s political determination to defend Taiwan is increasingly being questioned. No matter how long the arms sales list is, there is no guarantee that Beijing will believe that the United States will actually take action in a crisis.
This unease is already showing up in the polls. Academia Sinica's 2025 "American Image" survey showed that 59% of respondents were worried that the United States and China would reach an agreement that would harm Taiwan's interests; 59.6% believed that the United States was untrustworthy, an increase of 9.6 percentage points from the previous year. The survey reflects the anxiety in Taiwanese society at the beginning of Trump's second term. In September this year, U.S. Ambassador to China Pardue revealed that Trump had asked Xi Jinping if he wanted to buy U.S. weapons; Trump later denied it, and the State Department also clarified that U.S. law prohibits arms sales to China. But the question is not only whether these remarks are true, but also whether a president can make arms sales that are crucial to Taiwan's survival look like a business deal. Even the "six guarantees" proposed by the Reagan administration to Taiwan back then were lightly brushed off by Trump, saying that 1982 was too long ago. These remarks may not necessarily represent a change in policy, but they may cause Beijing to misjudge the bottom line of the United States.
Haas reminded that deterrence does not only depend on how many weapons the US military has, but also on the determination of leaders and how opponents interpret it. This is the warning signal that Taiwan must understand. Support from the U.S. Congress, military training, and cooperation in the semiconductor and artificial intelligence supply chains can accumulate common benefits; however, these institutional connections cannot automatically fill the political cracks left by the U.S. president’s remarks. In particular, U.S. military resources must be dispersed to respond to conflicts in the Middle East. If Beijing believes that Washington emphasizes deals and neglects commitments, it may miscalculate the cost of using force. However, the root cause of tensions across the Taiwan Strait is still China's continued military pressure. Beijing's responsibility cannot be obscured just because it questions U.S. commitments. Taiwan cannot deny Taiwan-U.S. cooperation just because of a few words from Trump, nor can Taiwan stop asking when weapons will be delivered, whether combat readiness can be implemented, and what the United States is willing to bear in a crisis just because the total arms sales are good.
Taiwan's homework is actually even heavier. The defense budget must be able to effectively respond to threats, and arms purchases must keep an eye on delivery dates, ammunition stocks, and logistics. Drones, counter-blockades, decentralized command, and people's livelihood backup must all move from demonstration to actual combat. Communication with the United States cannot rely solely on the White House, but must also go deep into Congress, local governments, and industry, so that support for Taiwan becomes a common interest across parties and across terms. It must also be made clear to Beijing that cross-Strait differences can only be resolved without force and coercion. Haas said at the end of the article that although arms sales to Taiwan are an important means of maintaining deterrence across the Taiwan Strait, military force alone cannot resolve cross-strait political differences. Only by demonstrating a firm, clear and consistent policy stance on the Taiwan issue can the United States reduce the risk of Beijing's misjudgment and safeguard peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and long-term strategic interests of the United States. This passage is not only worth listening to the United States and China, but also worth remembering in Taiwan itself.
