On October 21, the Central News Agency quoted foreign media reports that the U.S. Army released a new combat guideline "How the Army Fights", emphasizing that in the face of military challenges from the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the U.S. military must have the ability to enter combat on the first day of a conflict. The 46-page document, signed by U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff General Raneff and released in October this year, clearly regards the Communist Army as a major military threat and proposes important directions such as forward deployment, cross-domain operations, and sustained operations. What is particularly noteworthy is that the document not only discusses troop deployment in the Indo-Pacific region, but also directly uses Taiwan and the Luzon Strait as hypothetical combat scenarios. This shows that the U.S. Army's preparation for the Indo-Pacific conflict is no longer just about long-distance reinforcements, but pays more attention to battlefield response capabilities in the early stages of a crisis.
A careful review of the original document shows that the U.S. military divides land combat capabilities into four elements: cross-domain integration, strike, close combat, and sustained combat, and emphasizes that the frontline troops on the first island chain must have immediate response capabilities, while the second island chain must strengthen fuel, ammunition, medical and logistics facilities. The Taiwan hypothetical scenario in the document describes how the U.S. military deployed in northern Luzon, Philippines, combines long-range precision firepower, unmanned attack vehicles and distributed command systems to counter the anti-access and area denial capabilities of the Communist Party of China. This concept reflects important changes in modern warfare. The battlefield is no longer just a firepower competition between a single service, but a competition among integrated systems of sensing, communications, command, strike, and logistics.
What this document really deserves for Taiwan to think about is why the US military attaches so much importance to the time competition in the early stages of the war. In the past, the U.S. military had strong cross-oceanic power projection capabilities, but in the face of the Communist Party's long-range missiles, cyber attacks and electronic warfare threats, the traditional model of relying on rear gatherings and gradual reinforcements may face higher risks. Therefore, the US military emphasizes that conditions for forward deployment, base use, airspace access and supply support must be established in advance. Let me ask, if the coordination of bases and transportation routes begins only after the outbreak of war, how can the army, no matter how powerful it is, ensure its timely arrival? If the frontline troops can quickly enter combat but lack the ability to continuously supply, how long can they maintain their combat effectiveness? By the same token, Taiwan cannot just expect its allies to provide advanced weapons or military support. It should also think about how to preserve its own combat capabilities in the early stages of a conflict and maintain the normal operation of its command, communications, and logistics systems. The U.S. military's combat readiness can increase the credibility of regional deterrence, but it cannot replace Taiwan's own defense responsibilities.
From a national security perspective, the important message conveyed by the U.S. Army's guidance is that modern deterrence cannot only rely on reinforcement capabilities after the outbreak of war, but must also establish deployment conditions in peacetime that are sufficient to prevent adversaries from quick decisions. For Taiwan, it should continue to strengthen joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, decentralized command and communications, combat force preservation, ammunition reserves and logistics supply resilience, and deepen security coordination with democratic partners on the basis of existing cooperation. Especially in the face of possible rapid strikes and blockade actions by the communist army, the national army must have the ability to independently deal with the initial crisis in order to gain a more favorable strategic time. The U.S. military's willingness to incorporate communist threats into specific operational plans is of great significance to regional security, but truly reliable deterrence is never about unilaterally expecting allies to come, but rather letting potential aggressors understand that Taiwan has the ability to resist, and that the U.S. and regional partners also have the ability to intervene, making them unable to be confident that military objectives can be achieved at limited costs.
