The Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China opened in Beijing on October 26 and is expected to conclude on the 29th. In the past, the Fifth Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee usually focused on economic development and five-year plans, but the main topic this time is "comprehensive and strict governance of the party." Simply put, it means continuing to fight corruption, purge cadres, and strengthen intra-party control.
There are three key points worth paying attention to in this meeting.
First, Xi Jinping has been fighting corruption for more than ten years. Why are corruption cases still emerging one after another?
Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the anti-corruption campaign has never stopped. From local officials to high-level central officials, from the government to the military, groups of cadres have been dismissed, many of whom were officials promoted by Xi Jinping after he came to power.
Anti-corruption is certainly necessary, but if high-level corruption continues to occur for more than ten years, we must ask: Does the problem lie with individual officials or with the entire system?
In a system that lacks independent judiciary, news supervision and checks and balances of power, anti-corruption can easily turn into "the people in power deciding who should be investigated." What officials are most concerned about may no longer be how to administer in accordance with the law, but how to figure out their intentions and ensure political security.
Second, at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2027, Xi Jinping is preparing to continue to take power.
Next year (2027) will be the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of China. Whether Xi Jinping can enter his fourth term as general secretary is the most important focus of Chinese politics.
The Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is likely to rectify personnel in advance, eliminate political risks, and pave the way for next year's power arrangements.
It is worth noting that in recent years, top military officials of the Chinese Communist Party have been purged one after another, reflecting that even in a highly centralized system, leaders still need to constantly reaffirm the loyalty of their subordinates. Anti-corruption is not just a matter of discipline; it may also become a means of redistributing political power.
Third, this Fifth Plenary Session is in sharp contrast to the historical resolution of 1981.
In 1981, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China passed a historical resolution denying the Cultural Revolution, reflecting on the political movement of the Mao Zedong era, and laying the foundation for reform and opening up.
The direction at that time was to oppose the cult of personality, avoid excessive concentration of power, and shift China from political struggle to economic construction.
45 years later, Xi Jinping has taken almost the opposite path. It emphasizes political loyalty, centralized and unified leadership of the central government, and the party's overall control over the country and society.
If the historical resolution of 1981 was a "book of reflection" that attempted to end the political movement, then the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2026 may become a declaration to institutionalize and long-term political purges.
When a regime values loyalty over ability, discipline over system, and concentration of power over supervision and checks and balances, a contradictory result may eventually occur: the leader’s power becomes greater and greater, but the sense of security becomes less and less.
This may be the biggest political dilemma of the Chinese Communist Party today.
