Last week, the Libyan House of Representatives approved the outcomes of the “4+4” committee, which was sponsored by the United Nations mission between the two ruling authorities in the East and West, putting the Supreme Council of State before a difficult political test, in light of its presidency’s insistence on rejecting the agreement, leaving the only legislative institution off track.
As the UN deadline granted to the two councils to adopt the agreement approaches, at the end of September, experts expect increasing pressure on the “Supreme Council,” amid questions about whether it will reconsider its position or whether continued rejection will push the mission to search for a mechanism that goes beyond the role of the two councils.
So far, there have been no indications of a change in the position of the Supreme Council, as the head of its political committee, Muhammad Muazib, said that “the presidency of the council and the majority of its 142 members are still adhering to rejecting the agreement, with the exception of a small number that the mission is trying to attract.” Moazib ruled out “the success of any members in holding an official session to approve the agreement during the remaining days,” explaining to Asharq Al-Awsat that “the number will remain below the required quorum, especially since issues of the constitutional framework require the approval of two-thirds of the members, that is, more than 100 members.” He criticized what he described as “the mission’s disregard for the position of the Council Presidency as a unified institution, and its effort to attract individual members to pass the agreement.” Moazib warned that “the greatest threat to the implementation of the (4+4) agreement will not be limited to possible judicial challenges facing it,” but rather, according to his estimate, “it may extend to expected divisions among the signatories themselves, as it is an agreement based on narrow interests.”
In western Libya, certain parties view the agreement as a translation of the initiative of the US President’s Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, which is said to be based on an understanding that requires Saddam Haftar to assume the presidency of a new presidential council, with Abdul Hamid Al-Dabaiba remaining head of the unified government, while Boulos recently denied that his country’s vision includes a “deal” of this kind.
Here, observers note that the meetings of the President of the Supreme Council of State, Mohamed Takala, with international and regional ambassadors, including representatives of Russia and Qatar, discussed the background of his rejection of the agreement, “considering it bypassing the role of legislative institutions and the political agreement signed in Skhirat.” Takala also re-presented the frozen 2017 draft constitution, during a meeting with the head of the “Constituent Assembly for Constitutional Drafting,” Marja’ Nouh, in conjunction with a national forum during which the Council affirmed that “the solution to the crisis must start from solid legal and constitutional foundations.”
On the other hand, the statements of the head of the “Unity Government,” Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, in which he linked the political progress in the negotiations with eastern Libya to his government’s vision for holding elections, put additional pressure on the “Supreme Council,” according to observers, as it was considered an implicit approval of the “4+4” agreement, noting that the Council had previously agreed with the government on several files. However, from the perspective of Council Member Ahmed Abu Bariq, the Council’s vote a week ago to dismiss two of its members who participated in the “4+4” mini-committee without authorization, by a large majority, represents “an internal referendum on rejecting the agreement,” as he put it.
In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, he called for “a return to the outcomes of the joint committee between the two chambers (6+6), which were voted on and included in the 13th Amendment to the Constitutional Declaration.” The agreement, concluded between representatives of the interim “National Unity” government and the “National Army” at the end of August, under international auspices, resolved the files of the Commission and the electoral laws, and stipulated holding elections within two years under a unified executive authority.
In contrast to a position that rejects the agreement within the Supreme Council, there are other voices that believe that this rejection “may lead to bypassing the council.” One of its members, Saad bin Sharada, warned that “the international community and the mission may ignore those they consider to be an obstacle to them.” In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ben Charada wondered “why the objectors, within the Council or from other political forces, did not take advantage of the month’s deadline to discuss with the members of the (4+4) committee about their reservations about the electoral laws and advancing the political process, instead of being satisfied with rejection without an alternative.” He pointed out that “the members of that committee are Libyan figures who represent the most prominent forces capable of actually implementing any agreement,” pointing to “the dissatisfaction of the Libyans and the international community with the House of Representatives and the State depleting time over the past period, and considering them as obstructive parties compromising their legitimacy, at a time when the country is experiencing economic decline and living crises.”
Although he acknowledged that “the mission’s positions were not always positive,” and he understood “the fears of some that the powerful forces would be satisfied with sharing power without going to elections,” Ben Charada believed that there was “30 percent hope that these forces would manage the elections, which is better than continuing the current stalemate for additional years.” He cited the precedent of the political agreement in Skhirat, Morocco, in 2015, suggesting that “this is the closest scenario to what might happen with (4+4).”
In a compromise position, Council member Abu al-Qasim Qazit believes that “the (4+4) agreement will find supporters within the Supreme Council of State if it is confirmed that it is an international path independent of any other paths that divide influence, and actually leads to a reliable path towards elections and unified executive authority.” He concluded by saying, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that the “constructive ambiguity” that the mission is following now must be constructive clarity tomorrow, to maintain the course and prevent its collapse.
Experts' opinions varied about the impact of the decision to “fix the interest rate” on Egyptians’ decisions regarding saving, especially since it coincides with “the fluctuations of gold, the price of the dollar, and fluctuations in real estate markets.” While some asserted that “there is no direct impact,” others spoke of the fact that “the decision will push many to search for other savings sources.” The Monetary Policy Committee of the Central Bank of Egypt decided, on Thursday evening, to stabilize the interest rate, and to keep the overnight deposit and lending returns and the main operation rate at 19, 20, and 19.5 percent, and the credit and discount rates were kept at 19.5 percent.
The Central Bank indicated that the decision to stabilize the interest rate was “a reflection of its assessment of the latest developments in inflation and its expectations,” in addition to “changes in the risks surrounding the path of prices and economic activity.” He explained that the global economy “is still affected by geopolitical tensions and trade conflicts, which imposes a state of uncertainty about global growth prospects, inflation and commodity prices, especially energy.” According to the Central Bank, these developments may lead to “increasing global market volatility and tightening financial conditions, at a time when major central banks continue to evaluate monetary policy paths according to developments in inflation and economic activity.”
The decision to fix the “interest” coincided with fluctuations in the gold and real estate markets in the country, in addition to the fluctuation in the price of the dollar, which reached about 51.80 pounds on Friday, which raised questions about the impact of “fixing the interest” on Egyptians’ decisions to save. Economist Karim Al-Omda believes that despite the stabilization decision, the interest rate is still high, and he told Asharq Al-Awsat that “this will encourage many people to save their money in banks, because it is still the safe option, compared to any other savings pot.” He stresses that “on the other hand, the decision to fix interest will have a negative impact on borrowing to expand economic or commercial projects or establish new activities, as many people will refrain from resorting to borrowing.” Regarding the economic implications of the decision to “fix interest,” the mayor explains that this means that “the inflation rate is under control and within reasonable limits.”
The Central Bank of Egypt confirmed the continued improvement in indicators of economic activity in the country, as “the real gross domestic product recorded a growth of 4.7 percent during the second quarter of this year, compared to about 5 percent during the corresponding quarter of last year.” The annual growth rate of real gross domestic product also rose to 5.1 percent during the fiscal year 2025/2026, with expectations of continued recovery during the fiscal year 2026/2027.
Economist Wael Al-Nahhas believes that “the decision to fix the interest rate has no direct impact on savings decisions,” and he told Asharq Al-Awsat that “most savings accounts in banks, whether through certificates or deposits, are extended in time for periods of up to 3 years, so savings options will not be affected.” According to Al-Nahhas, “fixing the interest is aimed at reducing the increase in the cost of domestic debt, because if the interest is raised, the cost of the debt will increase, which will increase the budget deficit.”
As for the economic expert, Rashad Abdo, he believes that “fixing the interest rate” may push many Egyptians to search for other saving alternatives. He explained to “Asharq Al-Awsat” that “after the decision to raise the interest rate in America, it was expected that the (Egyptian Central Bank) would make a similar decision, but it seems that the decision to keep the interest rate unchanged has other dimensions.” According to Abdo’s opinion, “every 1 percent increase in the interest rate costs the state about 70 billion pounds in interest on local debts,” and he points out that “many Egyptians may be forced to search for savings sources other than banks, such as gold or dollar bills.” The Central Bank stressed in its statement, on Thursday evening, that “the path of inflation during the coming period will remain linked to developments in global commodity prices, especially energy, in addition to movements in exchange rates and global and local financial conditions.”
The Friday sermon in Egyptian mosques sparked a discussion about the boundaries between protecting the privacy of individuals and the right of citizens to document incidents that may involve an attack, a violation, or a violation of the public interest, after the Ministry of Endowments devoted this week’s sermon to the topic of “the prohibition of photographing individuals without permission.” The sermon warned against “invading people’s privacy” and photographing them without permission, stressing that the sanctity of privacy is not limited to physical places, but rather extends to the digital space, and the images, information, and personal data it contains, and warning of the harm that may result from taking, publishing, and circulating images via digital media.
During the recent period, incidents that were photographed and circulated contributed to revealing their circumstances or triggering official procedures regarding them, which raises questions about the boundaries between protecting privacy and the legitimacy of photography as, in some cases, a means of proving a right or documenting an incident of assault. Dr. Nashwa Akl, professor of media at Cairo University and member of the House of Representatives, told Asharq Al-Awsat that there is a need to distinguish between “an attack on a person’s privacy without justification, and the use of a camera to document an incident that requires it.” She believes that “filming an ordinary person without justification or against his will could represent an infringement on his privacy, as long as the matter is not related to a public figure or an incident that requires documentation,” adding that “if the person is committing a violation, then photography in this case can become a witness to the incident and a means of documenting it.”
However, Nashwa Akl differentiates between documenting the incident and publishing it on social media sites, explaining that the natural course of action for someone who films a violation with the intention of proving it is to submit the filmed material as part of a report to the competent authorities, and it does not necessarily have to be put up for public circulation. She links the resort of some citizens to publishing these clips to the speed of response provided by social media sites, explaining that “citizens have begun to notice a rapid interest in the facts that spread through digital platforms, while a report that follows its usual legal path may take longer.” Nashwa Akl considers that responsibility in this case is “divided between individuals and the police force,” calling for “dealing with the same care with reports submitted through the legal process, in a way that reduces the need for citizens to publish the facts, provided that they receive the same speed and attention as the facts published through social networking sites.”
Digital media expert, Mohamed Fathi, believes that the issue calls for a distinction between “the human right to privacy and society’s right to knowledge and documentation,” explaining that “the problem is not in photography per se, but in its purpose and how the photographed material is used.” He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “When a person documents an incident of assault, violation, negligence, or behavior that represents a danger to others, the filming may have a justification related to the public interest, especially if the goal is to provide evidence to the competent authorities, whether the Ministry of Interior or the Public Prosecution. However, the situation is different when photography turns into a means of defamation, revealing details of private life, or achieving views at the expense of people’s privacy.” He added: “Social media sites have already become an effective channel for presenting citizens’ complaints and quickly reaching state institutions, but this role does not mean that they have become a substitute for investigation and judicial authorities,” adding: “Any person must document what serves the public interest, protect what belongs to private life, and not make the investigation of views a justification for violating people’s privacy.”
From a legal standpoint, criminal lawyer Mohamed Abdel Maqsoud points out that photography may become “a means of documenting an incident and preserving evidence that can be submitted to the competent authorities in an official report, which explains why some people resort to a mobile phone camera when exposed to a violation or assault.” While, on the other hand, he asserts to Asharq Al-Awsat that Egyptian law “provides protection for private life, and criminalizes recording or transmitting images of people in private places without their consent. Liability may also extend to the circulation of photographed material if it involves an attack on privacy,” stressing “the necessity of distinguishing between documentation and violating private life or expanding the scope of circulation of photographed material.”
During the recent period, several incidents have emerged in which photography played a role in revealing their circumstances or initiating official procedures regarding them. This September, a video clip documented the incident of a woman assaulting an administrative security officer in a residential complex (compound) in “New Giza” in Giza Governorate (south of Cairo), before the security services examined the incident and arrested the woman, while the prosecution ordered the clip to be seized and examined, in addition to unloading the surveillance cameras surrounding the site of the incident. Last June, the circulation of a video clip of an incident of harassment of a girl in the Al-Haram area in Giza Governorate led the security services to take action, identify the car shown in the clip, and arrest its driver, who admitted to committing the incident.
