Who manages the influence? Why is France being targeted?
According to observers, the “MAGA” system appears in the form of a wide network that includes American officials, businessmen, digital platforms, research institutions, conservative activists, media outlets and European political figures. They believe that France is an important target for this network. Because it is the European country whose political transformation could change the balances of the “European Union” on issues of defense, immigration, sanctions, and the relationship with Washington.
Indeed, a recent analysis published by Le Monde newspaper indicated that the French candidates competing with Marine Le Pen have begun to move their battle to the field of foreign policy. Because they believe that the proximity of the “National Rally” to US and Russian Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin represents a weakness that can be exploited. In this direction, the leader of the Green Party, Marine Tondillier, said in a speech in the city of Strasbourg - in the far north-east of France - that the French elections will have a major impact in Europe, and therefore, “it is not a coincidence that Elon Musk, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump have shown this amount of interest in them.”
Also, an article published by Le Monde newspaper on its English-language website stated that France is now a major target of the ideological campaign led by the “MAGA” movement in Europe. She saw that the rapprochement between the National Rally Party and the American right-wing movement is no longer just a matter of mutual admiration, but rather is emerging in positions related to immigration, sovereignty, and the European Union.
Three motives
Three motives intersect here: the first motive is “geo-political.” Because the rise of a nationalist French government may weaken the “European integration” project and strengthen the idea of a Europe composed of conflicting national states, which is a vision more consistent with Trump’s perception of international relations.
The second motive is economic and technological. Because Musk and American technology companies are in a constant clash with European rules and regulations related to regulating digital platforms, data protection, and competition. Hence, supporting forces that describe European regulation as “surveillance” can serve commercial interests as well as political goals.
The third motive is ideological; American conservative circles want to transfer their battle against cultural liberalism, immigration, judicial institutions, and traditional media to the European arena.
In fact, this does not mean that the immigration problems or the crisis of confidence in French institutions... are “American made.”
Of course not, as these are real issues rooted in French society. But experts distinguish between producing the crisis and exploiting it. The foreign power does not need to invent the division, but rather it is sufficient for it to amplify it, give it a unified language, and connect it to media and digital networks capable of rapid access to voters.
“gray areas”
The government warnings come at a time when researchers are increasingly concerned about the exploitation of artificial intelligence and digital platforms in elections. Ophélie Coelho, a researcher associated with the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) and specializing in digital geopolitics, believes that artificial intelligence not only accelerates the production of fake news, but also reduces the cost of manufacturing it and customizing it to a specific audience. It is then easy to produce thousands of different messages about the same candidate, with each audience receiving the narrative that best suits its concerns: immigration for the security-anxious voter, censorship for the conservative voter, and declining spending power for the classes angry with the government.
As for Julie Martinez, Director-General of the Positive France Center and author of the book “Artificial Intelligence and Fake News,” she participated in a parliamentary debate and warned that citizens may find themselves faced with content that appears journalistic or personal, but is in fact automatically produced and designed to influence their choice. The danger lies in the fact that the “false message” does not need to convince everyone. Rather, it is sufficient for it to reach a small group in close electoral districts, or to sow persistent doubt about the integrity of a candidate or institution.
Indeed, last July, a report by the French Senate sparked debate about “gray areas in the media,” and proposed the establishment of an independent observatory for domestic disinformation, in addition to strengthening the powers of the “Audiovisual and Digital Regulatory Authority” (ARCOM). The report pointed out that France has a “Vigenome” device to monitor foreign digital manipulation, but it does not have a similar mechanism to monitor organized operations that start from within or in which internal sources are mixed with external funds and networks.
Warnings...
French Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu tried to reassure the parties that the state was not targeting a specific political movement, but he warned in a press conference of “heavy threats” that could affect the presidential elections. He added that the government will intend to propose a draft law that will triple the penalties imposed on publishing false content during the electoral period, while introducing an urgent judicial procedure to deal with fake materials spread on social networks. In Senate sessions, representatives from the right and center linked protecting elections and reducing candidates’ dependence on foreign funds.
In response to concerns about campaign financing, the government discussed with French banks to facilitate candidates’ access to loans, because using French or European banking institutions reduces the possibility of campaigns being exposed to pressure or external financing. The Prime Minister's interests have confirmed that providing French funding to all candidates, regardless of their political affiliation, is necessary to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.
But some right-wing voices warned against anti-interference becoming an excuse for political censorship. This was evident in the controversy raised by the Senate report on “domestic interference.” A number of its members objected to expanding the definition of “disinformation” to include controversial opinions or local campaigns, fearing that a new body would turn into a tool for monitoring political discourse.
On the other hand, the left is pushing for tighter censorship of the platforms. Marine Tondillier, the leader of the “Greens,” had explicitly called for preventing the “X” platform from influencing electoral campaigns, or for imposing strong restrictions on its work during the electoral period, and Musk responded to her, demanding, according to what the European press reported, that she be “silenced” after he accused her of “treason,” which revealed that influence is no longer limited to supporting a candidate, but rather includes attacking his opponents directly.
A double test of French democracy
The facts available so far prove three things:
First, an American figure with global influence publicly supported a specific French candidate on a platform whose algorithms she owns.
Secondly, the US government studied funding European organizations with an agenda close to the priorities of the conservative right, and then excluded French organizations due to fears of electoral interference.
Third, the French government, parliament, and monitoring agencies deal with the digital environment as an actual field for attempts at influence and manipulation. Therefore, the 2027 elections appear to be a double test for France: on the one hand, it is a test of the institutions’ ability to protect voters from manipulation, and on the other hand, it is a test of their ability to do so without confiscating freedom of expression. The democratic rule does not necessarily require silencing Elon Musk, Marine Le Pen, or their opponents, but it does require disclosing sources of funding, monitoring algorithms, distinguishing political advertising from press releases, and requiring platforms to make information available about coordinated campaigns. However, the greatest danger, as Le Monde analysts saw, is not that a foreign party imposes a specific candidate, but rather that it convinces the French that the elections themselves are no longer capable of producing free will.
US President Donald Trump's battle with the media is no longer a dispute over a provocative question or a negative report. With CNN, MS Now, and Politico banned from entering the White House, and the major networks suspending joint television coverage of its activities, the conflict has shifted to testing the limits of power over information, and the ability of the press to defend its independence before an audience whose confidence in it is declining. The confrontation brings together questions that are difficult to separate: Where does the administration’s authority to regulate access to government institutions end? Where does the punishment of editorial orientation begin? Did some media outlets weaken their position when political rivalry dominated their interpretation of the facts? Then, does Trump’s style alone explain this escalation, or does it reveal a broader crisis in the relationship between elected institutions, the press, and citizens? Between a president who sees “hostile” coverage as a distortion of his policies, and institutions whose exclusion is considered an attack on freedom of the press, a conflict is taking place that extends beyond both parties: who determines what information reaches Americans about their government, and under what conditions?
The final chapter began last week, when US President Donald Trump announced the ban on CNN, MS Now, and Politico, accusing them of spreading fake news. After that, its journalists were prevented from entering and their permits were withdrawn. The judiciary entered the front line after institutions resorted to it on Monday. On Wednesday, Judge Timothy Kelly, who was appointed by Trump in 2017, ordered the immediate restoration of the credentials of the three institutions’ journalists, and halted implementation of the ban for 14 days. The decision suggested that the ban violated constitutional guarantees, and considered that the national security justifications lacked sufficient factual support. It is a temporary intervention that places the administration's actions under judicial oversight, while the dispute continues over the limits of its authority over press access.
Roots in Trump's first term
The dispute has roots in Trump's first term, when he revoked the accreditation of CNN correspondent Jim Acosta in 2018, before Kelly ordered its reinstatement due to the lack of the necessary procedural guarantees. But moving from a measure against a reporter to excluding entire institutions expands the scope of the question: Is the work of the press regulated according to declared rules, or does its continued existence become dependent on the president’s evaluation of its coverage?
During his second term, the conflict spread to other locations. In February 2025, the Pentagon removed institutions from their workspaces as part of a program that it said expanded access to other institutions. Subsequent accreditation requirements sparked a court dispute, and in March 2026, a judge ruled the challenged policy unconstitutional, before the ministry announced amendments and continued the appeal.
These facts reveal that the issue relates to institutional rules that can continue after Trump leaves office. On the other hand, reducing the right's choices, from immigration to trade and foreign policy, to the personality of the president, obscures the discussion about the reasons for supporting them. The media can question choices and their outcomes, but interpreting each of them as a personal whim may weaken its ability to understand the society that gives it support. “Personalizing” the conflict also provides a political service for the president: when the discussion turns into a trial of his character, it is easy to raise objections to his decisions, as a rivalry with him and his voters. Then verifiable questions, such as the cost of the policy, its outcomes, and available alternatives, give way in favor of a debate about intentions and loyalties. This is an editorial problem even when the original criticisms are justified.
The press is under test
The crisis of confidence gives this discourse a broader platform; In a Gallup poll, published in October 2025, 28 percent of Americans said they had great or reasonable confidence in the ability of newspapers, television, and radio to present news accurately, fairly, and comprehensively. The percentage was 8 percent among Republicans, 27 percent among independents, and 51 percent among Democrats.
Indeed, these numbers do not prove that the news is false, but they do show that media organizations are not addressing an audience that agrees that they are qualified to judge the facts. The weakness of confidence among independents, and its decline even among Democrats, prevents the problem from being interpreted as a result of Trump’s rhetoric alone.
However, accusing the media of turning into a political opposition requires evidence that goes beyond the number of negative news stories: is information contrary to the prevailing narrative given its place? Is the correction clearly visible? Can the reader distinguish news from analysis and opinion? These are standards that can be applied to both liberal and conservative institutions.
In covering the Iran war, for example, Secretary of State Marco Rubio accuses the media of appearing to defend Tehran. Here, criticizing the war decision or questioning the official narrative differs from operational details that may expose individuals to danger. Investigating losses or failures is also different from assuming management's bad intentions in advance. When the authority describes criticism as treason or distortion of facts, and when coverage treats every official interpretation as a definite deception, these differences are lost.
However, the problem of interests appears in other files, such as the controversy surrounding the “dangers” of artificial intelligence. In an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, Gabriele Mazzini, a fellow at the MIT Connection Science Initiative who led the team that drafted the European Commission's AI law proposal, argued that AI companies overstating the risks of their technologies may serve regulatory, commercial and monopoly interests. This is an argument that requires testing the companies' narratives and sources, without proving that the dangers are fabricated or that the press is adopting a unified agenda against the president.
The test here is practical: Are the claims of a powerful company treated with the same level of scrutiny as a political statement? Does the report explain what has been proven by experience and what remains expected? These questions also apply to tariffs, immigration, and wars, where official, commercial, and partisan sources compete to direct coverage. It goes without saying that the professionalism of journalism is measured by its ability to expose these interests, including the interests of sources that agree with them.
In its defense before the court, the administration said that entering the White House is “a privilege, not a right,” and accused the excluded institutions of violating professional standards and publishing sensitive and confidential information. According to the New York Times, the letters addressed to her cited reports about White House facilities and security arrangements, and others about Trump’s estimates of war with Iran.
These are arguments of the executive authority in an ongoing lawsuit, not rulings proving violations. Media organizations say that the punishment targeted their editorial direction and was implemented without warning or prior opportunity to object, while the administration maintains that the measures it provided after the ban were sufficient. The legal distinction is fundamental: the press does not have an absolute right to enter every place or attend every presidential meeting. But the precedent of “Sherrill v. Knight” in 1977 determined that the administration of the press permit system is subject to constitutional guarantees, which include clear standards, notification of the reasons for refusal, and the opportunity to respond.
Hence, describing entry as privileged is not sufficient to exempt exclusion decisions from review. The sensitivity of accountability increases when the concept of national security expands to include the publication of a political assessment that the president does not like. The New York Times quoted law professor Barbara McQuaid as saying that the courts give the executive authority a margin in national security, but she warned that the unserious use of this pretext may weaken it when it is actually necessary.
The dispute includes the timing of presenting the reasons for the ban and the guarantees available to object to it. The three institutions say that the administration withdrew the accreditations of their journalists without prior notice or opportunity to appeal, while the White House maintains the adequacy of the procedures it provided after implementing the decision. The newspaper quoted Gabe Rotman, vice president of policy at the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, as objecting to suspending accreditation and then providing subsequent justifications. Thus, the dispute extends to the procedures followed by the administration, in addition to the dispute over the content of press coverage.
Antecedents and standard of comparison
Vice President J.D. Vance defends the decision as blocking privileged access from institutions that, as he describes it, engage in propaganda, and citing the treatment of conservative outlets under Obama and Biden. The administration says that the excluded institutions are still able to publish, while those institutions believe that continuing to broadcast does not compensate for their deprivation of news gathering inside the presidential residence.
There are already precedents of pressure taken by Democratic administrations, most notably the leak investigations during the Obama era, which included the records of the Associated Press and Fox News correspondent James Rosen. However, these precedents do not produce an automatic justification for the current measure, and do not allow a mathematical ratio that reduces the comparison between the two parties.
Pursuing a source, obtaining a communications record, being excluded from an interview, and withdrawing an institution’s accreditation are procedures that differ in their nature and effects. A limited measure may have a significant impact if it intimidates sources and disrupts investigations. The most serious criterion combines the scope and duration of the action, guarantees for objection, and the extent of its connection to a specific violation or editorial position.
The participation of Fox News, which is affiliated with Republicans, in the networks’ position complicates the reduction of the confrontation as a conflict with the liberal media. In a joint statement published by the network with ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC, the organizations affirmed “the public’s interest in independent information,” and refused to restrict an organization due to objection to its reporting. However, although this “solidarity” does not eliminate competition or biases between networks, it does clarify the existence of a common professional interest in preventing the authority from choosing who will monitor it. It also poses a question to the media itself about how to defend the right of access while continuing to provide the public with information, even while protesting restrictions.
Democracy and the crisis of confidence
The White House met the decline in syndicated coverage with the launch of Trump TV, which offers content chosen by the administration. It began with the president's speeches and military scenes, without original programs. This highlights the possibility of bypassing the press intermediary and reaching the audience directly, with the absence of independent questions from the official screen. However, the mediation crisis is not exclusively American. The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism’s 2026 report found that confidence in news declined in 29 out of the 48 markets it surveyed.
