The Egyptian position rejecting the Ethiopian port and France’s warnings against digital interference

Egyptian position

In the face of these Ethiopian efforts, the Egyptian position was explicitly rejecting Ethiopia's access to a sea port, without linking this to its dispute with Addis Ababa with the water issue.

Regarding the sea port that Ethiopia wants, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati said in statements last September 10, “There are sovereign countries that have ports on the Red Sea, and no one has the power to grant any country military sea access, otherwise it will be chaos, especially since many African countries are landlocked.”

In late August, Abdel Ati stressed, during a phone call with US Presidential Advisor Massad Boulos, “the necessity of respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the countries of the region, and refraining from any unilateral moves that would threaten regional peace and security, or seeking to impose maritime access by force in violation of the rules of international law.”

Abdel Ati also stressed, in other statements, that the countries overlooking the Red Sea are sovereign over its ports, and that no country can be granted a military sea port, warning that otherwise would open the door to chaos, while stressing that there is no problem in the commercial access of landlocked countries.

Although Abdel-Ati did not name the intended countries, he said in October 2025 that “Egypt rejects Ethiopia’s entry into the governance of the Red Sea coasts.” This Egyptian rejection of Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea is repeated, and during Abdel Ati’s meeting last May with Yemeni Prime Minister Shaye’ al-Zindani in Cairo, the issue of the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden was discussed. Abdel Ati stressed at the time “Egypt’s categorical rejection of any efforts to internationalize or militarize the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as well as the refusal of any parties outside of it to engage in arrangements concerning it.”

Also, during Abdel Ati’s visit to Asmara last May, he met with Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh, and they stressed that the security and management of the Red Sea “remains the exclusive responsibility of the countries riparian to it, and that Egypt rejects any attempts by non-riparian parties to impose security arrangements or roles in this context,” according to a statement by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry at the time.

On the other hand, Nebiat Getachew, spokesman for the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said last May that the Egyptian government “is trying to encircle and obstruct his country’s access to the Red Sea.” Although he did not specify details, he stressed that Ethiopia will continue to work hard to obtain a sea port through peaceful and sustainable routes.

Here, African affairs expert Dr. Ramadan Qarni warns that Egypt does not mind Addis Ababa obtaining a commercial outlet according to legal frameworks sponsored by neighboring countries, as previously proposed by Djibouti and rejected by Ethiopia. “But Cairo is strictly confronting military efforts, in anticipation of the repercussions of opening ports on the Red Sea that would harm Arab and African national security, especially with parties such as Israel entering the crisis line and the Houthi groups supporting threats to Bab al-Mandab.”

The Egyptian expert believes that despite the media and diplomatic mobilization of Abiy Ahmed’s government, the chances of seizing a permanent military foothold on the Red Sea remain surrounded by complex challenges. Most notable is the international and regional rejection by the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which supports Somalia’s sovereignty. This is in addition to Addis Ababa’s fear of African isolation and harming its position as the headquarters of the African Union institutions, and the continuation of internal pressures amid the worsening Ethiopian economic and security crises in regions such as Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray, in addition to the tension in its relations with neighboring countries (Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia).

Qarni asserts that Cairo “succeeded in building a solid wall of regional and international intelligence and political consensus, blocking any unilateral steps, ensuring the preservation of national security and the protection of the region’s vital waterways.”

The Eritrean-Somali position

On the other hand, the Eritrean-Somali position has a remarkable presence among those who reject this Ethiopian path regarding the sea port.

Mogadishu strongly responded to a memorandum of understanding that Addis Ababa signed with the separatist region of Somaliland in 2024, according to which it would be able to access the port of Berbera. It issued a presidential decision to cancel the agreement, amid Arab support, especially Egypt, for this rejection, before Türkiye intervened through mediation at the end of that year and that effort disappeared from view.

Also, Eritrea, the owner of the port of Assab, which accuses Ethiopia of looking to control it again, has rejected that path more than once. One of the most prominent positions was the accusation by Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, during July 2025, that Ethiopia was seeking to destabilize regional stability under slogans related to water and demanding an outlet on the Red Sea, considering this demand “a pretext for fueling conflicts.” At that time, Eritrean Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel described the Ethiopian speech regarding the sea port as “recklessness and a return to beating the drums of war,” stressing that the sovereignty of Eritrea and its coasts was not subject to review.

Last May, Nebiat Getachew, spokesman for the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, likened Cairo’s movements within countries in the region, including Eritrea, Djibouti and Kenya, to “an attempt to besiege Ethiopia and prevent it from reaching a sea port.”

According to Qarni, the agreement crisis between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region constituted a strategic shift in the Horn of Africa region, and a major driver of Egyptian foreign policy in the region. This development came as a “real alarm bell” that prompted Cairo to take intensive, multi-track action to protect its national security and the security of the region.

He pointed out that this was translated into partnerships with Eritrea and Somalia, and in a tripartite alliance and almost complete agreement between Egypt and the three main partners (Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia) on the idea of ​​the exclusive right of the riparian countries regarding the coastal outlet or the presence of coasts on the shore of the Red Sea.

Israeli support

On the other hand, during last September, the Ethiopian News Agency reported that Israel announced its diplomatic support for Ethiopia’s efforts to secure a port to the sea, and quoted the Israeli ambassador to Ethiopia, Avraham Negusi, as saying that his country stands strongly alongside Ethiopia’s efforts to secure a sea port to the Red Sea. The ambassador continued to the Ethiopian News Agency, “Empowering and strengthening Ethiopia and achieving stability in the Red Sea is in the interest of everyone, not Ethiopia alone, and Israel stands alongside Ethiopia in this effort.”

This is not the first position that Negusi has put forward in situations related to tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia. Last August, he said in a press statement that Israel “will continue to strengthen its support for Ethiopia, with the aim of helping it become a leading economic power on the African continent.” At that time, Ambassador Mohamed Al-Orabi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and head of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, warned of the repercussions of the Israeli statements, indicating in previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat that they “will not undermine and will not change” Egypt’s positions.

Qarni, for his part, does not believe that this Israeli support will change Egypt’s firm position in rejecting Ethiopia’s sea port, stressing that Israel only wants to put pressure on Egypt on other issues, but the Egyptian state is capable of protecting its rights.

On the other hand, Abdel Moneim Abu Idris, an expert in African affairs, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Addis Ababa obtaining a sea port in light of its current tensions with its neighbors is difficult, especially since it is accused by Sudan of supporting the Rapid Support militia.

He stressed that Egypt could not allow an Ethiopian military presence on the Sudanese coast or the Red Sea. Out of concern for its national security and the security of the region.

But the Ethiopian parliamentarian, Mohamed Nour Ahmed, sees the possibility of achieving this, noting that his country’s government is working to persuade the parties and neighboring countries to review their positions and engage in understandings that advance everyone’s interests.

Who manages the influence? Why is France being targeted?

According to observers, the “MAGA” system appears in the form of a wide network that includes American officials, businessmen, digital platforms, research institutions, conservative activists, media outlets and European political figures. They believe that France is an important target for this network. Because it is the European country whose political transformation could change the balances of the “European Union” on issues of defense, immigration, sanctions, and the relationship with Washington.

Indeed, a recent analysis published by Le Monde newspaper indicated that the French candidates competing with Marine Le Pen have begun to move their battle to the field of foreign policy. Because they believe that the proximity of the “National Rally” to the American and Russian Presidents, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, represents a weakness that can be exploited. In this direction, the leader of the Green Party, Marine Tondillier, said in a speech in the city of Strasbourg - in the far north-east of France - that the French elections will have a major impact in Europe, and therefore, “it is not a coincidence that Elon Musk, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump have shown this amount of interest in them.”

Also, an article published by Le Monde newspaper on its English-language website stated that France is now a major target of the ideological campaign led by the “MAGA” movement in Europe. She saw that the rapprochement between the National Rally Party and the American right-wing movement is no longer just a matter of mutual admiration, but rather is emerging in positions related to immigration, sovereignty, and the European Union.

Three motives

Three motives intersect here: the first motive is “geo-political.” Because the rise of a nationalist French government may weaken the “European integration” project and strengthen the idea of ​​a Europe composed of conflicting national states, which is a vision more consistent with Trump’s perception of international relations.

The second motive is economic and technological. Because Musk and American technology companies are in a constant clash with European rules and regulations related to regulating digital platforms, data protection, and competition. Hence, supporting forces that describe European regulation as “surveillance” can serve commercial interests as well as political goals.

The third motive is ideological; American conservative circles want to transfer their battle against cultural liberalism, immigration, judicial institutions, and traditional media to the European arena.

In fact, this does not mean that the immigration problems or the crisis of confidence in French institutions... are “American made.”

Of course not, as these are real issues rooted in French society. But experts distinguish between producing the crisis and exploiting it. The foreign power does not need to invent the division, but rather it is sufficient for it to amplify it, give it a unified language, and connect it to media and digital networks capable of rapid access to voters.

“gray areas”

The government warnings come at a time when researchers are increasingly concerned about the exploitation of artificial intelligence and digital platforms in elections. Ophélie Coelho, a researcher associated with the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) and specializing in digital geopolitics, believes that artificial intelligence not only accelerates the production of fake news, but also reduces the cost of manufacturing it and customizing it to a specific audience. It is then easy to produce thousands of different messages about the same candidate, with each audience receiving the narrative that best suits its concerns: immigration for the security-anxious voter, censorship for the conservative voter, and declining spending power for the classes angry with the government.

As for Julie Martinez, Director-General of the Positive France Center and author of the book “Artificial Intelligence and Fake News,” she participated in a parliamentary debate and warned that citizens may find themselves faced with content that appears journalistic or personal, but is in fact automatically produced and designed to influence their choice. The danger lies in the fact that the “false message” does not need to convince everyone. Rather, it is sufficient for it to reach a small group in close electoral districts, or to sow persistent doubt about the integrity of a candidate or institution.

Indeed, last July, a report by the French Senate sparked debate about “gray areas in the media,” and proposed the establishment of an independent observatory for domestic disinformation, in addition to strengthening the powers of the “Audiovisual and Digital Regulatory Authority” (ARCOM). The report pointed out that France has a “Vigenome” device to monitor foreign digital manipulation, but it does not have a similar mechanism to monitor organized operations that start from within or in which internal sources are mixed with external funds and networks.

Warnings...

French Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu tried to reassure the parties that the state was not targeting a specific political movement, but he warned in a press conference of “heavy threats” that could affect the presidential elections. He added that the government will propose a draft law that will triple the penalties imposed on publishing false content during the electoral period, while introducing an urgent judicial procedure to deal with fake materials spread on social networks. In Senate sessions, representatives from the right and center linked protecting elections and reducing candidates’ dependence on foreign funds.

In response to concerns about campaign financing, the government discussed with French banks to facilitate candidates’ access to loans, because using French or European banking institutions reduces the possibility of campaigns being exposed to pressure or external financing. The Prime Minister's interests have confirmed that providing French funding to all candidates, regardless of their political affiliation, is necessary to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.

But some right-wing voices warned against anti-interference becoming an excuse for political censorship. This was evident in the controversy raised by the Senate report on “domestic interference.” A number of its members objected to expanding the definition of “disinformation” to include controversial opinions or local campaigns, fearing that a new body would become a tool for monitoring political discourse.

On the other hand, the left is pushing for tighter censorship of the platforms. Marine Tondillier, the leader of the “Greens,” had explicitly called for preventing the “X” platform from influencing electoral campaigns, or for imposing strong restrictions on its work during the electoral period, and Musk responded to her, demanding, according to what the European press reported, that she be “silenced” after he accused her of “treason,” which revealed that influence is no longer limited to supporting a candidate, but rather includes attacking his opponents directly.

A double test of French democracy

The facts available so far prove three things:

First, an American figure with global influence publicly supported a specific French candidate on a platform whose algorithms she owns.

Secondly, the US government studied funding European organizations with an agenda close to the priorities of the conservative right, and then excluded French organizations due to fears of electoral interference.

Third, the French government, parliament, and monitoring agencies deal with the digital environment as an actual field for attempts at influence and manipulation. Therefore, the 2027 elections appear to be a double test for France: on the one hand, it is a test of the institutions’ ability to protect voters from manipulation, and on the other hand, it is a test of their ability to do so without confiscating freedom of expression. The democratic rule does not necessarily require silencing Elon Musk, Marine Le Pen, or their opponents, but it does require disclosing sources of funding, monitoring algorithms, distinguishing political advertising from press releases, and requiring platforms to make information available about coordinated campaigns. However, the greatest danger, as Le Monde analysts saw, is not that a foreign party imposes a specific candidate, but rather that it convinces the French that the elections themselves are no longer capable of producing free will.