Intensive Syrian preparations to issue the new media law

The Media Committee in the Syrian People's Assembly is intensifying its meetings with directors of media offices in government ministries, as part of preparation for the upcoming new media law.

Committee Chairman Moayad Qiblawi stressed in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that these meetings “are not interference in the media work of government agencies, and their goal is to find out the real obstacles that government departments suffer from in carrying out their media work in order to address them in the new law.”

In turn, the Syrian Journalists Union stressed the need to involve “various parties concerned at this stage, including private and public media institutions and independent media professionals.” Because the media law does not regulate the work of government institutions alone, but rather regulates an integrated media environment.”

Qiblawi explained that the discussion of the draft law took great effort and attention, and the Minister of Information, Khaled Zaarour, is being informed of all the provisions, noting that after the completion of the discussions, the draft law will be presented to the Council and amendments will be made so that it is suitable for all groups.

After describing freedom of the press as an “important element,” Qablawi pointed out that during the meetings, “how the government media should deal with crises during crises was discussed, and the committee’s observations were sent to the Ministry of Information, in order to codify the media process, so as to make dealing easy and legal.”

He stated that “in the presence or absence of crises, there are platforms and fictitious personalities that infringe on journalistic work and broadcast false information,” explaining that “refraining from making statements is not the responsibility of the government, but is sometimes subject to this hostile environment created by the platforms and fictitious personalities.” He stressed that during the meetings, “expanding the margin of work for journalists and protecting professional journalists is discussed, and at the same time, preserving national security and state institutions.”

Last Wednesday, the committee discussed the legislation regulating media work, with a delegation that included the Government Information Department in the Ministry of Information and the directors of the Information and Communication Departments in the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior during a meeting it held under the chairmanship of Qiblawi.

This was preceded by an expanded meeting held by the committee, headed by Qablawi, on November 2, during which it discussed legislation related to media and government communication with a delegation that included more than 23 media office directors in several ministries and bodies affiliated with the Government Information Department in the Ministry of Information, headed by Ismail Al-Ali.

On October 23, the committee discussed “the need to harmonize media legislation with media reality, and how to establish laws in order to harmonize legislation and media executive bodies. It also discussed means of government communication between ministries and the Ministry of Information, and the importance of media regulation in facilitating the flow of information.”

Last September, the Syrian Minister of Information announced the completion of a new media draft law, and explained that it “aims to guarantee the right of journalists to access information and protect their sources, abolish the prison sentence in cases related to media work, and replace it with financial penalties.”

Syrian media professionals stopped short when the various parties concerned did not participate in the meetings of the Media Committee in the People’s Assembly. Member of the Executive Office and Secretary of Relations and Communication in the Journalists’ Union, Baraa Othman, explained that the Union “was a key partner in preparing the draft of the media law, and was represented by two members in the discussions related to the rights of journalists, guarantees for practicing the profession, and regulation of the media sector. As for the recent meetings held by the Media Committee in the People’s Assembly, they were consultative meetings with government agencies and departments concerned with media and government communication, and the Union was not part of the delegation.” It is advertised.”

In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Othman said, “The involvement of the various concerned parties at this stage is necessary, because the media law does not regulate the work of government institutions alone, but rather regulates an integrated media environment, and defines the rights and duties of its workers and their relationship with public institutions and society.”

He stressed that the Union “views positively the holding of these meetings and considers them a natural and required step in the process of preparing new media legislation, especially since the success of any law does not depend only on the quality of its legal formulation, but is also linked to the extent of its response to the actual needs of the sector it regulates.”

He said: “The media law is not a law to regulate government communication or unify the media discourse of ministries, but rather it is a legislative framework that regulates the relationship between the media, the state and society, guarantees the freedom, independence and pluralism of media work, and defines the responsibilities of public institutions in providing information and making it available to journalists.”

He added: “We aspire to complete the law as quickly as possible, but what is most important for us is that a balanced and applicable law be issued and that it addresses the problems that the Syrian media has suffered from for decades,” explaining: “We are facing an opportunity to establish a new legal environment for the media in Syria. Therefore, the quality of the law and its guarantees are more important than the urgency of its issuance.”

The Syrian media witnessed a remarkable transformation after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024, as the scene moved from a media affiliated with the authority and dedicated to its absolute propaganda to an attempt to establish state media and society.

One of the features of this transformation is the restructuring of the media structure and laws, as the new authorities began to dismantle the previous regulatory system and abolish many of the laws and restrictions that were used to prosecute journalists and restrict freedoms. The Ministry of Information was transformed from a regulatory and security apparatus into an institution aiming to regulate the media environment and enable pluralism. Hundreds of media outlets of various types also obtained temporary or new licenses, after canceling impossible conditions.

Among the features of this transformation is the transition of the media from propaganda to public affairs, as the official media began reorganizing the process of moving from “power media” to “state media,” while allowing spaces to criticize government performance and discuss service and livelihood issues for citizens, in addition to launching initiatives for professional codes of conduct to control media standards.

In addition, a broad role has emerged for reporters, content makers, “podcast” platforms, and independent websites working in the field to convey reality and cover relief files, elections, and social issues via social media platforms, in conjunction with the return of many Syrian media professionals from countries of asylum and diaspora, and the openness of the Syrian interior to Arab, regional, and international media.

The disputes between the Iraqi government and the armed factions have moved to a new level of confrontation, with an escalation in the exchange of accusations regarding economic influence, the acquisition of real estate, and investment projects, in conjunction with security and military movements aimed at controlling the activities of armed groups that are not subject, according to government estimates, to the full control of the state.

This escalation came after questions raised by “Kata’ib Hezbollah” regarding oil sales deals to a regional company, and whether members of the “coordination framework” agreed to sell oil at reduced prices while sharing in the profits.

On the other hand, media outlets close to the government published information about what they described as a “phalange investment network,” which they said worked with the help of merchants and businessmen, included the acquisition of real estate, and turned into an investment project, in conjunction with a systematic campaign on social media sites that called “contracting” groups on “resistance” groups allied with Iran in the country.

It was not possible to independently verify the details of the accusations related to the real estate, or the parties benefiting from it. But the timing of publishing this information, according to observers, reflects the transition of the dispute to the file of economic interests, after the confrontation remained mainly focused on the issue of restricting weapons to the state, negotiations that have not achieved tangible progress so far.

In an attempt to stop corruption in military manufacturing contracts, especially after questions about their connection to benefits, mediations, and relations with armed factions, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi directed the cancellation of contracts with intermediary companies, and limiting contracts for military industries to direct dealings with manufacturing companies, after reports linking companies working in military manufacturing contracts and the “Hezbollah Brigades.”

In parallel, the security and military services began expanding the scope of monitoring the movements of armed groups affiliated with factions affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces, in a move that indicates an attempt to impose stricter government control on movements that previously enjoyed a wide margin of movement within their areas of deployment.

In this context, a security force stopped a group of members belonging to one of the factions, who were in possession of 35 missiles on their way to Babil Governorate, according to information circulating regarding the incident. The group's direction towards Babylon raised questions about the final destination of the shipment, especially since the region includes Jurf al-Sakhar, which is a major stronghold for the Hezbollah Brigades, and is subject to the factions' broad security and military influence.

A security source, asked by Asharq Al-Awsat about the incident, refused to comment on its details, but did not deny that “such actions, whatever the capacity of the implementing agencies, including affiliation with the Popular Mobilization Forces, are now under the control of the agencies concerned with follow-up and prosecution.”

With the seizure of the missiles, the issue of weapons control returns to the forefront as one of the most important challenges facing the government. Political researcher Falah Al-Mishaal believes that confiscating or handing over weapons represents a priority in the government’s program, noting that Al-Zaidi made pledges during his visit to Washington and his meeting with US President Donald Trump regarding a deadline for handing over weapons, which was scheduled for the end of last September, before the government requested an extension of the deadline until next June.

Al-Mishaal told Asharq Al-Awsat, “This project, which the United States set as a criterion for the success of the Zaidi government and a reason for its support, has been stalled, and it appears to the observer that the issue of disarming the factions has remained within the limits of media performance, and nothing has been achieved at the procedural level.”

He added that the recent period witnessed reports of weapons depots belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces being destroyed in the vicinity of Baghdad, in addition to news and leaks about the entry of weapons and experts from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard into the ranks of the factions. He considered that these developments prompted the American side to warn against a decline in government pressure on the issue of ending the presence of weapons outside the state.

For his part, media professor at Al-Mustansiriya University, Ghaleb Al-Daami, said that the United States is dealing with the Iraqi file according to interest and strategic calculations, and not according to political relations or personal considerations, indicating that failure to hand over weapons within the agreed upon deadline may push Washington to take economic and political measures against Iraq.

Al-Daami added to Asharq Al-Awsat that imposing sanctions or broad economic restrictions may exacerbate the internal situation, warning that the continued presence of weapons outside the control of the state raises the possibility of a clash between the competing parties.

He said that Iraq may find itself facing two options: either an expanding state of chaos as a result of the continued multiplicity of centers of armed power, or the government’s success in imposing its authority by confining weapons to state institutions.