Lebanon is pressing for an Israeli ceasefire in southern Lebanon, as a prelude to moving towards negotiating the next steps. Such as the Israeli withdrawal from its occupied territories, in conjunction with linking the negotiating tracks to international demands, specifically addressing the issue of arms exclusivity.
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s position of rejecting direct negotiations “under fire” reiterated Lebanese priorities. These are priorities that he will meet with the President of the Republic, Joseph Aoun, and the Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, according to what experts tell Asharq Al-Awsat.
Ceasefire and entrance to negotiations
Retired Major General Dr. Abdul Rahman Al-Shehitli told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Berri’s position of rejecting direct talks under fire means that a ceasefire and a cessation of destruction constitute a condition for starting talks that enjoy internal consensus, and are not an alternative to the Israeli withdrawal demand. The withdrawal remains one of the basic files that the negotiations are supposed to discuss, but the gateway to their resumption is firstly a ceasefire and a halt to the destruction operations.”
He added: “If the negotiations are to begin with a unified Lebanese position, the key is to cease fire and stop the destruction. This demand is not limited to President Berri’s position; Rather, it constitutes a meeting point between the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, allowing the Lebanese negotiator to enter any talks based on a broader internal consensus.
Al-Shehitli explained that “stopping the destruction is a basic Lebanese negotiating demand, but at the same time it is a prelude to resuming negotiations with internal consensus, and not a concession to the other demands.” The issue is not that Lebanon is replacing withdrawal with a cessation of destruction, but rather that a cessation of fire and destruction create the conditions that allow a move to discuss withdrawals and other arrangements and agreements.
Israel's goals
Regarding the continuation of Israeli operations, Al-Shehitli said: “Israel has political goals that it is waiting to build on the results achieved by the military operation. In military logic, the military institution sets field goals that are later intended to be built upon to achieve political goals. What appears so far is that Israel is working to make parts of the south unlivable, through widespread destruction that precedes any possible arrangements or reconstruction process.
He added: “It does not seem that Israel will stop its operations just because Lebanon has provided what it can at the current stage. It will stop, according to this logic, when it considers that it has accomplished its military mission. Therefore, if it continues to fire, maintain its positions, and continues the destruction, the margin of what negotiations can achieve remains limited.”
Al-Shehaitli believed that “what is required of the Lebanese is to adhere to the ceasefire and stop the destruction as an entry point to any serious negotiating path, in parallel with building a comprehensive internal position, so that all Lebanese forces become concerned with what the negotiations will produce.”
He stressed that this “also assumes the opening of an internal dialogue with Hezbollah.” This does not mean that the party must necessarily be represented at the negotiating table, but rather in order for it to be concerned with the Lebanese position and what the negotiations lead to, and not to consider itself outside of its results.
A race between the field and politics
This proposal places the ceasefire and destruction within a broader framework related to the possibility of resuming the negotiation itself, and not only to the results that any new round could produce; Continuing operations during a period of stagnation not only puts pressure on Lebanon politically, but also changes the reality that the negotiations will address later, whether in terms of the extent of the damage, the possibility of the population returning, or the nature of the areas that any withdrawal is supposed to include.
On the other hand, another trend raises a different question: What cards does Lebanon have to obtain a cessation of destruction and withdrawal? Can he extract them in isolation from the issues that the international and Arab communities are demanding that the Lebanese state address?
Weapon file and synchronized path
Retired Brigadier General George Nader told Asharq Al-Awsat, “Israeli withdrawal remains a priority for Lebanon, and I do not see that stopping the destruction can replace it or become a substitute for it, but the problem is that Lebanon, in the current circumstances, does not possess the power cards that would enable it to impose withdrawal, whether militarily, politically, or diplomatically.”
He added: “The cessation of destruction and withdrawal cannot be separated from the issue of (Hezbollah’s) weapons. The international and Arab priority is clear in this file. It is not possible to achieve an Israeli withdrawal, stop the destruction operations, begin the path of reconstruction, and lift the economic, financial, and political siege on Lebanon without seriously addressing the issue of weapons.
Nader believed that “the problem today is not in arranging the cessation of destruction before withdrawal or vice versa, but in how to find a simultaneous path linking the handling of the weapons issue to the cessation of destruction and Israeli withdrawal,” considering that “political decisions that do not find their way to implementation do not change the reality on the ground, while Israel continues to increase pressure and destruction and impose additional facts on the ground.”
Military and security accounts
He said: “The solution begins with a serious step in the file of (Hezbollah’s) weapons and handing them over to the state. If the start of this path is clearly announced, and the state begins to take practical and public measures to implement it, Lebanon can demand, from a stronger and more credible position, an end to the Israeli destruction and withdrawal, and to ask the Arab and international communities to exert pressure to achieve this.
Nader pointed out that “Israel does not deal with what it is doing in the south randomly, but rather proceeds from military and security calculations related to what it considers current or future dangers,” warning that “continuing the situation as it is means more destruction, displacement, and expanding pressure on Lebanon.”
He concluded by saying: “We must deal with the balance of power and the existing reality as it is, not as we want it to be. Lebanon emerged from a military confrontation at a very great cost, and continuing to deny this reality and not taking political and practical steps will not stop the destruction and will not lead to withdrawal.
International Resolution “1701”, which has largely regulated the situation between Lebanon and Israel since 2006, is entering a very sensitive phase as the end of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in South Lebanon (UNIFIL) approaches at the end of this year, at a time when negotiation paths are progressing through the “Framework Agreement”, while Israel continues to build its security and political approach for the next stage based on a basic goal of ensuring the security of its northern settlements and disarming Hezbollah.
The question today does not seem to be limited to whether UNIFIL’s mandate will be extended or alternative forces will be brought in. Rather, it is related to the fate of Resolution 1701 itself: Will the international framework regulating the situation in the south and Lebanon’s reference in confronting Israel remain, or will it practically enter a new phase of “unenforceability,” if the international force charged with an essential part of its tasks is absent?
“UNIFIL”... one of the pillars of the implementation of “1701”
Legal and constitutional expert Saeed Malek explains that Resolution “1701” stipulated a specific mission for the international forces (UNIFIL), and therefore if these forces end their duties in Lebanon at the end of this year without renewal, this will definitely affect the implementation of the international resolution. Because it will lose one of its most important pillars, namely the role of UNIFIL in implementing this decision.
Malek believes, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that “the absence of UNIFIL without finding an alternative will practically lead to a vacuum in one of the tasks of implementing the resolution.” What imposes, from his point of view, one of two options: “Either extending the international forces, or creating another international force to undertake the same tasks.”
This issue gains special importance, in light of the field transformations that have occurred since the issuance of the decision. According to Malek, Israel is “seeking to stop the implementation of this resolution or cancel it, especially since the field data on the ground have changed and changed in its favor after it now occupies approximately 7 percent of Lebanon’s area,” pointing out that “Resolution (1701) cannot be cancelled, but may become considered unimplementable, with the lack of one of its most important elements, that is, the presence of UNIFIL, which is assigned specific tasks within the framework of this resolution.”
Hence, Lebanon's main battle, according to this logic, should not only be about preserving the decision, but rather about preserving the mechanism for its implementation, because the loss of this mechanism may transform the decision from an effective tool into a legal reference with limited impact on the ground.
The “Framework Agreement” is not an alternative
On the other hand, Malek does not believe that the “Framework Agreement,” a negotiating mechanism reached last June, under American sponsorship, that aims to establish security and political arrangements between Lebanon and Israel, including Israeli withdrawal, exclusivity of arms in the hands of the state, and mechanisms for monitoring and verification, is capable of replacing Resolution 1701. The mechanism stipulated in the agreement, including the Monitoring and Verification Committee and the experimental areas, differs in nature and powers from the role played by UNIFIL, which has broader tasks and powers within the framework of the international resolution.
Therefore, presenting the equation on the basis that the framework agreement could be an automatic alternative to “1701” involves mixing two different paths: the first is an international one based on a resolution issued by the Security Council, and the second is a political-security agreement with a special executive mechanism.
From this angle, Malek says: “Lebanon’s interest appears to be in adhering to the continuation of UNIFIL, or, at a minimum, working to create an alternative international force that will perform the same tasks, to avoid any vacuum that could be reflected in the decision’s implementation mechanism.”
Israel: Security first
But reading the future of “1701” cannot be separated from the Israeli position. According to the director of the Middle East Institute for Strategic Affairs, Dr. Sami Nader, “Israel’s approach to whether 1701 or the Framework Agreement is based on the priority of ensuring its security, especially the security of the northern settlements, and therefore it insists on disarming Hezbollah, which it considers a threat to its internal security.”
Nader recalls, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that “Resolution (1701) notes the Israeli withdrawal, as well as the disarmament of (Hezbollah), because it builds on all previous UN resolutions, including (1559).”
He adds: “Just as Tel Aviv is dealing with the framework agreement in terms of linking its withdrawal to the disarmament of the party, it is also dealing with Resolution (1701). As long as the party is not disarmed, it will cling to the yellow stripe and the security zone it occupies and refuse to leave it.”
Resolution “1701” has greater legal and moral value as an international resolution, while the framework agreement may have greater executive and political power by virtue of its connection to a direct negotiating path and the presence of American sponsorship.
What does the framework agreement add?
Although the framework agreement does not, according to Nader, replace Resolution 1701, it contains elements that make it a card that Lebanon cannot ignore. He says: “Its importance lies in the fact that it includes an Israeli acknowledgment that it has no ambitions in Lebanon, and that its military operations are linked, according to the Israeli narrative, to the presence and operations of Hezbollah.”
But the most important thing, according to Nader, is that the agreement is based on the presence of an American sponsor capable, theoretically and politically, of exerting pressure on Israel to implement what is reached.
Therefore, the comparison between them may not be in Lebanon's interest. The best thing, according to Nader’s reading, is to deal with them as two complementary tools, not alternatives: “1701” provides Lebanon with an international legal umbrella, while the framework agreement can provide a practical and political channel to achieve Israeli withdrawal and address the arms issue.
