The Syrian Al-Ikhbariya channel reported on Sunday that “the Israeli occupation forces bombed the vicinity of the village of Samdaniya al-Sharqiya in the central Quneitra countryside with an artillery shell.”
A video from the Information Directorate in Quneitra Governorate showed the death of a number of sheep in the Israeli bombing that targeted lands in Samdaniya al-Sharqiya in the Quneitra countryside, and the shepherd was injured. As a result of the bombing that came from the new Hamidiya base.
The Israeli army launched attacks with 7 artillery shells on the town of Al-Rafid in the Quneitra countryside, after incursions and inspections carried out by its forces on Saturday evening.
Syria TV reported that “the Israeli occupation army targeted the southern outskirts of the town of Al-Rafid in the southern Quneitra countryside with 7 artillery shells, followed by shooting from Al-Jalaa Hill in the occupied Golan towards agricultural lands,” noting that “another occupation patrol entered the village of Umm Al-Batinah in the central Quneitra countryside.” He pointed out that "the Israeli occupation opened fire on houses in the western neighborhood of the village of Ma'ariya in the western countryside of Daraa."
Last Thursday, Israeli forces targeted the eastern vicinity of Tal al-Ahmar in the southern Quneitra countryside with two artillery shells, and on Tuesday they arrested a shepherd west of the town of al-Rafid, before releasing him hours later.
The human rights center “Sijil” documented 267 “violations” committed by Israeli forces inside Syrian territory during the month of August, bringing the total since the beginning of 2026 to 1,752 “violations.”
International Resolution “1701”, which has largely regulated the situation between Lebanon and Israel since 2006, is entering a very sensitive phase as the end of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in South Lebanon (UNIFIL) approaches at the end of this year, at a time when negotiation paths are progressing through the “Framework Agreement”, while Israel continues to build its security and political approach for the next stage based on a primary goal of ensuring the security of its northern settlements and disarming Hezbollah.
The question today does not seem to be limited to whether UNIFIL’s mandate will be extended or alternative forces will be brought in. Rather, it is related to the fate of Resolution 1701 itself: Will the international framework regulating the situation in the south and Lebanon’s reference in confronting Israel remain, or will it practically enter a new phase of “unenforceability,” if the international force charged with an essential part of its tasks is absent?
“UNIFIL”... one of the pillars of the implementation of “1701”
Legal and constitutional expert Saeed Malek explains that Resolution “1701” stipulated a specific mission for the international forces (UNIFIL), and therefore if these forces end their duties in Lebanon at the end of this year without renewal, this will definitely affect the implementation of the international resolution. Because it will lose one of its most important pillars, namely the role of UNIFIL in implementing this decision.
Malek believes, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that “the absence of UNIFIL without finding an alternative will practically lead to a vacuum in one of the tasks of implementing the resolution.” What imposes, from his point of view, one of two options: “Either extending the international forces, or creating another international force to undertake the same tasks.”
This issue gains special importance, in light of the field transformations that have occurred since the issuance of the decision. According to Malek, Israel is “seeking to stop the implementation of this resolution or cancel it, especially since the field data on the ground have changed and changed in its favor after it now occupies approximately 7 percent of Lebanon’s area,” pointing out that “Resolution (1701) cannot be cancelled, but may become considered unimplementable, with the lack of one of its most important elements, that is, the presence of UNIFIL, which is assigned specific tasks within the framework of this resolution.”
Hence, Lebanon's main battle, according to this logic, should not only be about preserving the decision, but rather about preserving the mechanism for its implementation, because the loss of this mechanism may transform the decision from an effective tool into a legal reference with limited impact on the ground.
The “Framework Agreement” is not an alternative
On the other hand, Malek does not believe that the “Framework Agreement,” a negotiating mechanism reached last June, under American sponsorship, that aims to establish security and political arrangements between Lebanon and Israel, including Israeli withdrawal, exclusivity of arms in the hands of the state, and mechanisms for monitoring and verification, is capable of replacing Resolution 1701. The mechanism stipulated in the agreement, including the Monitoring and Verification Committee and the experimental areas, differs in nature and powers from the role played by UNIFIL, which has broader tasks and powers within the framework of the international resolution.
Therefore, presenting the equation on the basis that the framework agreement could be an automatic alternative to “1701” involves mixing two different paths: the first is an international one based on a resolution issued by the Security Council, and the second is a political-security agreement with a special executive mechanism.
From this angle, Malek says: “Lebanon’s interest appears to be in adhering to the continuation of UNIFIL, or, at a minimum, working to create an alternative international force that will perform the same tasks, to avoid any vacuum that could be reflected in the decision’s implementation mechanism.”
Israel: Security first
But reading the future of “1701” cannot be separated from the Israeli position. According to the director of the Middle East Institute for Strategic Affairs, Dr. Sami Nader, “Israel’s approach to whether 1701 or the Framework Agreement is based on the priority of ensuring its security, especially the security of the northern settlements, and therefore it insists on disarming Hezbollah, which it considers a threat to its internal security.”
Nader recalls, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that “Resolution (1701) notes the Israeli withdrawal, as well as the disarmament of (Hezbollah), because it builds on all previous UN resolutions, including (1559).”
He adds: “Just as Tel Aviv is dealing with the framework agreement in terms of linking its withdrawal to the disarmament of the party, it is also dealing with Resolution (1701). As long as the party is not disarmed, it will cling to the yellow stripe and the security zone it occupies and refuse to leave it.”
Resolution “1701” has greater legal and moral value as an international resolution, while the framework agreement may have greater executive and political power by virtue of its connection to a direct negotiating path and the presence of American sponsorship.
What does the framework agreement add?
Although the framework agreement does not, according to Nader, replace Resolution 1701, it contains elements that make it a card that Lebanon cannot ignore. He says: “Its importance lies in the fact that it includes an Israeli acknowledgment that it has no ambitions in Lebanon, and that its military operations are linked, according to the Israeli narrative, to the presence and operations of Hezbollah.”
But the most important thing, according to Nader, is that the agreement is based on the presence of an American sponsor capable, theoretically and politically, of exerting pressure on Israel to implement what is reached.
Therefore, the comparison between them may not be in Lebanon's interest. The best thing, according to Nader’s reading, is to deal with them as two complementary tools, not alternatives: “1701” provides Lebanon with an international legal umbrella, while the framework agreement can provide a practical and political channel to achieve Israeli withdrawal and address the arms issue.
Many Iraqi governorates, including the capital, Baghdad, are suffering from a severe fuel crisis, forcing car owners to wait long hours in some cases to obtain gasoline, which causes additional burdens on citizens who suffer from a decline in services in general, a decline in the hours of provision of electrical energy, in addition to delays in the arrival of salaries for retirees and employees in the public sector.
Despite the government's continuous promises to overcome the fuel crisis, queues of tires at gas stations are widely seen in the governorates of Baghdad, Kirkuk, Babylon, Basra, and most governorates of the Kurdistan region, which doubles the feelings of loss of popular confidence in government data.
According to observers, the current fuel crisis “represents one of the repercussions of the war and the state of tension existing between Washington and Tehran and its negative repercussions on Iraq since its outbreak on February 28 last.”
However, successive Iraqi authorities face severe popular criticism as a result of their failure and inability to build oil refineries to meet local needs in a country floating on a sea of oil.
“Planned manipulation”?
While many experts link the fuel crisis to the negative effects left by the US-Iranian war, especially after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the cessation of most of Iraq’s oil exports and the cessation of its foreign imports, as locally produced fuel does not meet the actual market need, parties close to the government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi do not rule out the existence of “planned manipulation” in the departments of the Ministry of Oil that exacerbates the crisis, and they link this manipulation to groups that were recently affected by the arrests of senior officials in the ministry on charges of theft. Billions of dinars and dollars, including the former Undersecretary for Liquidation Affairs, Adnan Al-Jumaili, and the Undersecretary for Distribution Affairs, Ali Maaraj Al-Bahadli, in addition to the General Manager of the “Petroleum Products Distribution Company,” Hussein Talib Abboud, and other figures.
On the other hand, the Ministry of Oil attributes the current fuel crisis to a number of reasons, including increased demand and high daily consumption of gasoline locally, technical malfunctions that led to the cessation of some production units in local refineries, and the delayed arrival of imported fuel shipments due to security tensions at ports and regional transportation routes.
Despite the queues of cars at filling stations that are seen in more than one governorate, the Minister of Oil, Bassem Muhammad Al-Abadi, confirms “the availability of petroleum derivatives,” and said during a meeting attended by senior officials in the ministry, that “the temporary shortage of gasoline that occurred is being addressed, and that additional shipments of gasoline will arrive soon, which will contribute to ensuring the stability of supply and meeting the needs of citizens.”
He added, "The rate of gasoline consumption is about 33 million liters per day, and it increases to about 38 million liters when a state of anxiety occurs among citizens."
He stressed that his ministry “continuously follows the movement of equipment and supplies, and takes the necessary measures to secure oil derivatives and enhance the stability of the local market.”
Regarding the country's current oil exports after the almost complete halt that befell them after the US-Israeli-Iran war, Minister Al-Abadi stated that “crude oil exports were around 250 thousand barrels per day when the government was assigned, while crude oil production currently exceeds 3 million barrels per day.”
The Ministry of Oil explained, in a later statement, that “the state of overcrowding at fuel filling stations is due to the existence of a negative gap between production and consumption, and that the Ministry relied on compensating for the shortfall through import shipments through sea ports, but the events in the region and the ongoing conflict are causing some logistical problems for the movement of tankers; “What delays its arrival or docking in Iraqi ports.”
No intention to export...
On Saturday, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil denied what was circulated by some media and agencies regarding its intention to export the gasoline product, stressing that the interim goal is to achieve self-sufficiency first.
A statement from the ministry stated that “the shift to exporting some petroleum products in the future is linked to the completion of expansion work in other refineries, which is what the ministry is working to achieve within its strategic plans to transform from an importing country to an exporting one.”
The statement indicated that “Iraq is currently exporting fuel oil and naphtha producers, in addition to previous shipments of jet fuel and sulfur.”
