Lebanon is pressing for an Israeli ceasefire in southern Lebanon, as a prelude to moving towards negotiating the next steps. Such as the Israeli withdrawal from its occupied territories, in conjunction with linking the negotiating tracks to international demands, specifically addressing the issue of arms exclusivity.
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s position of rejecting direct negotiations “under fire” restored Lebanese priorities. These are priorities that he will meet with the President of the Republic, Joseph Aoun, and the Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, according to what experts tell Asharq Al-Awsat.
Retired Major General Dr. Abdul Rahman Al-Shehitli told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Berri’s position of rejecting direct talks under fire means that a ceasefire and a cessation of destruction constitute a condition for starting talks that enjoy internal consensus, and are not an alternative to the Israeli withdrawal demand. The withdrawal remains one of the basic files that the negotiations are supposed to discuss, but the gateway to their resumption is firstly a ceasefire and a halt to the destruction operations.”
He added: “If the negotiations are to begin with a unified Lebanese position, the key is to cease fire and stop the destruction. This demand is not limited to President Berri’s position; Rather, it constitutes a meeting point between the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, allowing the Lebanese negotiator to enter any talks based on a broader internal consensus.
Al-Shehitli explained that “stopping the destruction is a basic Lebanese negotiating demand, but at the same time it is a prelude to resuming negotiations with internal consensus, and not a concession to the other demands.” The issue is not that Lebanon is replacing withdrawal with a cessation of destruction, but rather that a cessation of fire and destruction create the conditions that allow a move to discuss withdrawals and other arrangements and agreements.
Regarding the continuation of Israeli operations, Al-Shehitli said: “Israel has political goals that it is waiting to build on the results achieved by the military operation. In military logic, the military institution sets field goals that are later intended to be built upon to achieve political goals. What appears so far is that Israel is working to make parts of the south unlivable, through widespread destruction that precedes any possible arrangements or reconstruction process.
He added: “It does not seem that Israel will stop its operations just because Lebanon has provided what it can at the current stage. It will stop, according to this logic, when it considers that it has accomplished its military mission. Therefore, if it continues to fire, maintain its positions, and continues the destruction, the margin of what negotiations can achieve remains limited.”
Al-Shehaitli believed that “what is required of the Lebanese is to adhere to the ceasefire and stop the destruction as an entry point to any serious negotiating path, in parallel with building a comprehensive internal position, so that all Lebanese forces become concerned with what the negotiations will produce.” He stressed that this “also assumes the opening of an internal dialogue with Hezbollah.” This does not mean that the party must necessarily be represented at the negotiating table, but rather in order for it to be concerned with the Lebanese position and what the negotiations lead to, and not to consider itself outside of its results.
On the other hand, another trend raises a different question: What cards does Lebanon have to obtain a cessation of destruction and withdrawal? Can he extract them in isolation from the issues that the international and Arab communities are demanding that the Lebanese state address?
Retired Brigadier General George Nader told Asharq Al-Awsat, “Israeli withdrawal remains a priority for Lebanon, and I do not see that stopping the destruction can take its place or become a substitute for it, but the problem is that Lebanon, in the current circumstances, does not possess the power cards that would enable it to impose withdrawal, whether militarily, politically, or diplomatically.”
He added: “The cessation of destruction and withdrawal cannot be separated from the issue of (Hezbollah’s) weapons. The international and Arab priority is clear in this file. It is not possible to achieve an Israeli withdrawal, stop the destruction operations, begin the path of reconstruction, and lift the economic, financial, and political siege on Lebanon without seriously addressing the issue of weapons.
Nader believed that “the problem today is not in arranging the cessation of destruction before withdrawal or vice versa, but in how to find a simultaneous path linking the handling of the weapons issue to the cessation of destruction and Israeli withdrawal,” considering that “political decisions that do not find their way to implementation do not change the reality on the ground, while Israel continues to increase pressure and destruction and impose additional facts on the ground.”
He said: “The solution begins with a serious step in the file of (Hezbollah’s) weapons and handing them over to the state. If the start of this path is clearly announced, and the state begins to take practical and public measures to implement it, Lebanon can demand, from a stronger and more credible position, an end to the Israeli destruction and withdrawal, and to ask the Arab and international communities to exert pressure to achieve this.
Nader pointed out that “Israel does not deal with what it is doing in the south randomly, but rather proceeds from military and security calculations related to what it considers current or future dangers,” warning that “continuing the situation as it is means more destruction, displacement, and expanding pressure on Lebanon.”
He concluded by saying: “We must deal with the balance of power and the existing reality as it is, not as we want it to be. Lebanon emerged from a military confrontation at a very great cost, and continuing to deny this reality and not taking political and practical steps will not stop the destruction and will not lead to withdrawal.
Iraq is suffering from a severe fuel crisis, as car owners are forced to wait long hours to get gasoline, which causes additional burdens on citizens. Despite government promises, queues of tires appear frequently in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Babylon, Basra, and the Kurdistan region.
According to observers, the current fuel crisis “represents one of the repercussions of the war and the state of tension existing between Washington and Tehran and its negative repercussions on Iraq.” While experts link the crisis to the effects of the war, parties do not rule out the presence of “planned manipulation” within the Ministry of Oil’s departments that exacerbates the crisis.
On the other hand, the Ministry of Oil attributes the crisis to increased demand, technical malfunctions, and the delayed arrival of imported fuel shipments due to security tensions. The Minister of Oil, Bassem Muhammad Al-Abadi, confirmed “the availability of oil derivatives,” indicating that the shortage is temporary and is being addressed, and that the average daily consumption is about 33 million liters.
The Iraqi Ministry of Oil denied its intention to export gasoline, stressing that the interim goal is to achieve self-sufficiency first, and that it is working to expand refineries within its strategic plans.
