This article is written by Emirati lawyer and writer, Dr. Habib Al Mulla, Managing Partner, Habib Al Mulla & Associates. The opinions expressed below are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of CNN.
With the repeated targeting of King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, the question arises about Iran’s responsibility according to international law for these attacks due to its support for the Houthis, and can the Kingdom take measures against it?
First, we must separate the illegality of the attacks from Iran's responsibility and the possibility of attributing the attacks to it. Each level has its conditions, evidence and effects.
The basic principle is that civil airports are protected objects and do not become military targets because of their economic importance or because disrupting them puts pressure on the state. Even if the Houthis claim that they are targeting military supplies or dual-use facilities, this does not legitimize the attack on airports as long as they do not effectively contribute to military action. This is the standard contained in Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I of the rules of customary international humanitarian law.
Even warning civilians against using airports does not negate their legal protection, and the threat itself may constitute a violation if its purpose is to spread panic among the population in accordance with Rule 2 of customary international humanitarian law.
As for Iran’s responsibility, it has two main foundations:
The first is: violating the arms embargo. Resolution 2216 of 2015 imposed a ban that includes specific persons, entities, and those working on their behalf or under their direction. Then came Resolution 2624 of 2022, subjecting the Houthis as an entity to arms embargo measures. The embargo includes weapons, equipment, technical assistance, training and financing related to military activities. If it is proven that Iranian support was provided, responsibility for this violation arises without requiring proof of Iranian knowledge of the civilian target of each attack.
The report of the UN experts addressed indicators of external support and expertise and the similarities between Houthi systems and Iranian systems. He also documented seized weapons with characteristics similar to weapons produced by Iran.
The second basis is: the commitment not to encourage violations of international humanitarian law. In the Nicaragua ruling, the International Court of Justice decided that there is an obligation not to encourage persons and groups involved in the conflict to violate Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which protects people who are not directly involved in the fighting.
Here the evidentiary value of repeatedly targeting Riyadh Airport appears. The repeated targeting of airports and the Houthis’ announcement of their targeting makes the nature of these operations public. This helps prove that the supporting actors knew that their support was being used in these attacks.
As for holding Iran responsible for the attack on Riyadh Airport, it requires proving that the Houthis carried it out based on its instructions, or under its direction or actual control over the operation in question. Arming, financing, training, and even public participation in military planning alone are not sufficient to attribute every attack to it. However, the inability to prove this connection does not absolve Iran of its independent responsibility for prohibited support.
The accuracy of the hit also requires an investigation into the sources of technology, information, and expertise, and who chose the target, issued instructions, and controlled its implementation. If it is proven that members of the Revolutionary Guard participated in their official capacity, their actions will be attributed to Iran as the actions of an organ of the state.
The question is: What steps can the Kingdom take against Iran?
First, the Kingdom can build a proof file for each attack, linking the weapon used, its source, the route of its transfer, and the parties that financed it or provided the expertise to operate it. This includes examining debris, serial numbers, and guidance systems, documenting communications, shipping and financing records, and proving the nature of the targeted facilities and the resulting damage.
Secondly, directing an official demand to Iran specifying the violations and evidence, requesting that the prohibited support be stopped, measures be taken to prevent its recurrence, and reparation of damages proven to be causally linked to Iranian behavior. This claim does not require proof that Iran ordered each attack, if liability is based on an independent violation, such as the transfer of prohibited weapons.
Third, referring the file to the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution 2140 and the Group of Experts, and requesting an investigation into the supply networks, intermediaries, and parties involved. Persons and entities found to be involved in violating the arms embargo may be requested to be listed. The file could also be presented to the Security Council to request additional binding measures, while being aware of the possibility that some countries might use the veto.
Fourth, taking a judicial or arbitration course of action to claim compensation, if there is a basis for jurisdiction. The International Court of Justice does not have automatic jurisdiction. Rather, there must be a basis based on the acceptance of the countries concerned, such as a special agreement or an applicable treaty text.
The claim for compensation is not limited to material damage to the airport. Rather, it also includes losses resulting from the cessation or diversion of flights, operational losses of airlines, as well as lost profits when proven with a degree of certainty.
The nationality of the injured does not preclude claiming compensation for death or injury, including treatment expenses, loss of income, and moral damages in accordance with the applicable rules. The countries whose nationality the victims hold can adopt their claims. These paths do not all have to wait for proof of Iranian control over the attacks, because responsibility for prohibited support can be established independently.
The bottom line is that Iran is not exempt from responsibility for its actions because the Houthis carried out the attack. But determining exactly what she did determines what the kingdom has the right to do against her.
