In order to achieve the goal of North Korea's denuclearization, U.S. President Donald Trump must re-enter the negotiation phase during his term, and experts in South Korea and the U.S. have predicted that the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war will be an important variable in this.
Susan Thornton, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, emphasized at a seminar hosted by the Sejong Institute and Stimson Institute, a Korea-U.S. think tank, on the 9th (local time), "President Trump's advantage is that he can meet directly with the highest levels of the North Korean regime," adding, "This provides an opportunity that will not be available again in the future."
Lee Sang-hyeon, former director of the Sejong Institute, also said, “The (immediate) goal is to find a realistic entry point to resume denuclearization negotiations,” and added, “One of the most constructive roles that President Trump can play in the early stages is that of an icebreaker, that is, the role of breaking the diplomatic deadlock and reopening the door to negotiations.”
Former State Department Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun, who led working-level negotiations with North Korea during the first Trump administration, predicted, "I think both President Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un will be willing to participate in a kind of show-off summit that I think they both enjoy, in which the world's attention will be focused on them."
Former Representative Biegun and former Assistant Secretary of State Thornton predicted that the reversal of the war in Ukraine could provide momentum for further progress in the North Korea-US dialogue, which had been lacking since the 'Hanoi No Deal' during Trump's first term.
Former Representative Biegun said, “Russia may not be in a position to continue to provide the same level of financial and technological benefits that North Korea expects (in exchange for support for the war in Ukraine),” and added, “By far the best policy toward North Korea is to defeat Russia in Ukraine. That will make everything else easier.”
Former Assistant Secretary of State Thornton said, “To have an opportunity to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, we must wait until some form of agreement or temporary ceasefire is reached in the Ukraine war,” adding, “Russia, following its unique transactional approach, will at some point throw North Korea out like a hot potato.”
Experts agreed that negotiations between North Korea and the United States should be approached with patience, setting denuclearization as a long-term goal, given that North Korea already has significant nuclear weapons and delivery means and is strengthening them, and that there is virtually no possibility that North Korea will respond to negotiations on the premise of denuclearization.
Former Director Lee suggested that we should start by "resuming diplomacy between the United States and the United States by returning to the promises made in Singapore, while also dealing with the unresolved issues that led to Hanoi's failure."
Kim In-wook, a professor at Sungkyunkwan University, said, “The problem is not how to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program, but how to prevent nuclear war,” and argued that the policy priority should be placed on reducing the realistic risk of a nuclear war, not on reducing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.
Professor Kim said that "partial restoration of the inter-Korean comprehensive military agreement, withdrawal of threats of preemptive strikes or decapitation operations, or prior notification of South Korea's military activities" could be presented as incentives to North Korea, adding, "Avoiding unintended nuclear escalation is one of the few issues on which Seoul and Pyongyang can agree."
Even if North Korea-US negotiations resume during President Trump's term, the refusal to recognize North Korea's status as a nuclear state is a 'red line' that cannot be conceded to North Korea, and the common view of experts is that expanded deterrence pledges, such as providing a nuclear umbrella, and sanctions against North Korea must be maintained in the ROK-US alliance system.
Former Representative Biegun said, “The principle of not harming the alliance must be strictly adhered to,” and “We must not accept any demand to recognize (North Korea) as a nuclear state.” He added that we must maintain cards on the negotiating table, such as "the existence of sanctions (against North Korea), U.S. troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, and joint exercises conducted by the U.S. and South Korea."
Former Assistant Secretary Thornton said, "We will never recognize North Korea as a nuclear state," and ordered that South Korea and the United States must agree on a long-term, sustainable negotiation mechanism for North Korea that is not affected by regime change.
Former Director Lee said, "We must work toward the long-term goal of denuclearizing North Korea, but at the same time, we must maintain a strong deterrence posture and crisis management posture," and gave examples such as the Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD).
Experts who attended the seminar were generally skeptical about the argument made by some in Korea that South Korea should arm itself with nuclear weapons to increase its negotiating power in the face of North Korea's advancement of nuclear capabilities.
Former Representative Biegun said, “I cannot imagine any situation in which the United States would have to support it (Korea’s nuclear armament),” pointing out that the nuclear armament of Korea and Japan would lead to the collapse of the global nuclear non-proliferation system.
Former Director Lee predicted, “If South Korea possesses nuclear weapons, North Korea will make desperate efforts to secure more nuclear weapons, more capable nuclear weapons, and superior delivery systems.”
Professor Kim said, “If you conduct an opinion poll on the general public, 70% support nuclear armament, but if you conduct a separate poll on the elite group, the approval rating drops to 30%.”
