Åsa Wikforss: The power over people's perception of reality is not unlimited
Analysis of how Orbán, Vučić and Trump lost power after turning their countries into electoral autocracies, and what it means for Europe.
Quick Look
- The article describes how authoritarian leaders like Orbán, Vučić and Trump lost power in 2026 despite turning their countries into electoral autocracies.
- The reason is that voters eventually fight back when corruption and authoritarian abuses become apparent.
- Civil society and strong resistance ruled in the United States, Hungary, Serbia and Brazil.
AI-generated summary
Why It Matters
The article describes a global trend where authoritarian leaders are gaining ground and democracy is retreating, but at the same time surveys show that more and more people are embracing democratic values. The explanation is that authoritarian politicians do not go to the polls to dismantle democracy but claim to save it, and that system change often comes stealthily. The model is called electoral autocracy, where general elections are retained but the executive is strengthened and the opposition weakened. In 2026, Orbán in Hungary, Vučić in Serbia and Trump in the United States lost power after major voter mobilization and civil society efforts.
The picture has long seemed contradictory. On the one hand, surveys show a steady development where more and more people embrace the basic democratic values – more and more people want to be free and equal and more and more people turn against authoritarian obedience requirements. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders and parties are gaining ground and democracy is in decline globally.
The apparent contradiction is explained by a number of factors. An important one is, of course, that authoritarian politicians do not go to the polls to dismantle democracy. On the contrary, they must save democracy, they claim, and restore the true will of the people. Another factor is that system change normally comes stealthily. It takes attention, and knowledge, to notice what is going on, for example knowledge of what distinguishes a rule of law.
The point is that the end point for today's authoritarian leaders is not a dictatorship of the well-known variety but what is usually called an electoral autocracy. The disasters of the 20th century gave the dictatorship a bad reputation, a different model was needed. Viktor Orbán in Hungary seemed to find the solution for aspiring autocrats: Keep general elections but strengthen the executive branch and make sure to make it really hard for rival candidates to win. This can be done, for example, through attacks on the media, a politicization of the authorities and measures that weaken the opposition's economy.
This model was the express goal of the conservative forces that brought forward Trump 2024, including The National Heritage Foundation, and it has inspired right-wing nationalist actors worldwide. The model seems ingenious, precisely because it allows the authoritarian leaders to describe themselves as champions of democracy. But at the same time, these leaders live more dangerously than the dictators of history because there is a risk that the electorate will nevertheless strike back and use their right to vote to demand accountability. The political development during the past year has shown precisely this.
It started with Orbán finally losing power in Hungary in the spring of 2026, despite the efforts of the world's collective far-right, from the Trump administration to Vladimir Putin. The remnants of free media that remained managed to reach out, the knowledge of the corruption of power gained great influence and the divided opposition came together. Orbán was voted out, just as the Law and Justice party had previously done in Poland. Autumn 2026 continued in the same direction. A grassroots movement of students fed up with years of authoritarian and corrupt rule by Aleksandar Vučić won the elections in Serbia. And in Brazil, after great voter mobilization, they managed to resist Flávio Bolsonaro, who had far-reaching plans to undermine the constitution.
Now the development has also reached the United States. A few things can already be established about the astonishing election results. First, Trump became overconfident and imagined that he could do whatever he pleased and still have the support of the voters. His remarkable comeback after the January 6 disaster convinced him that he was invulnerable. Tear down parts of the White House, impose tariffs that destroy the economy, use crypto to enrich himself, let ICE use violence and empty the streets of immigrants, censor the media, undermine free research, threaten Canada and Greenland, betray Ukraine and attack Iran? Anything goes.
Second, the power over people's perception of reality is not unlimited, even if you have the world's tech platforms on your side and Elon Musk's billions to sprinkle. You can get people to question established science and embrace crazy conspiracy theories, but you can't get them to long-term doubt their own experience—get them to believe that high food prices are a hoax or that the neighbors haven't been hauled off by ICE. And even if it is possible to create distrust of journalists, it is not possible to completely shut out reporting on a failed war or on widespread corruption.
When it becomes apparent what is going on, they back off.
Third, people care about the survival of democracy. When it becomes apparent what is going on, they back off. There was not a majority to turn the US into a techno-fascist autocracy. The economy was high on the voters' agenda (39 percent cited it as decisive), but so was democracy (32 percent) (BBC, 6/11). The really successful politicians, like Jon Ossoff in Georgia, connected the issues by talking about the bottomless corruption of the Trump administration. One of the many advantages of democracy is precisely that the degree of corruption is lower than in autocracies.
The extent to which it is possible to vote out the authoritarian rule depends on how far the process has progressed. In Turkey, for example, it has not been possible to get rid of Erdogan. Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have stated that the most important obstacles to the consolidation of authoritarian rule are structural. In countries with a developed economy, there is a stronger private sector, a more robust civil society and more independent citizens. Just before the mid-term elections, they therefore predict that even if Trump has turned the United States into an electoral autocracy, and done so at record speed, the system change will not be long-lasting.
It is civil society that has played a decisive role in the return of democracy in 2026. Most noticed in the US was the courageous fight against ICE abuses in Minnesota and the regularly recurring demonstrations under the slogan "No Kings", which gathered a record number of participants. To reverse ongoing autocratization, the opposition's victory must be overwhelming because otherwise the authoritarian leaders will challenge the election results. In the US, Trump had laid the foundation for a new denial campaign, the same applies to Orbán in Hungary and Bolsonaro in Brazil. But the great mobilization among the voters forced these leaders to accept the election.
Developments in 2026 show that the authoritarian tide can be turned. People want democracy on good grounds, the vast majority value freedom and decency, therein lies the hope. The crucial question for contemporary democracies is therefore what they can do to protect themselves when authoritarian leaders are on the rise. How can you strengthen civil society and spread knowledge of the dangers so that you don't have to live through an authoritarian winter?
Now it is the democracies of Europe that are faced with this question. Perhaps the experiment in the United States can deter voters attracted by the radical extremes, for example in the French presidential election in 2027. Perhaps Trump's right-wing nationalist failure, and the collapse of the Republican Party, can mean that traditional parties stick to the red lines established against right-wing radical parties, for example in Germany where there is a risk that the firewall against the AfD will be torn down.
What we know for sure is that how it goes is not determined by fate but depends on how we act. We must keep a steady eye on what the threats to democracy look like and what risks being lost when the authoritarian forces prevail.
What to Watch
AI outlook — possibilities, not facts
Traditional parties in Europe will stick to red lines against right-wing radical parties, for example in Germany where the firewall against the AfD may have been preserved.
Possible · Within months
The 2027 French presidential election could be affected by the experiment in the United States and discourage voters attracted by the radical extremes.
Possible · Within months
The system shift in the US to an electoral autocracy will not be long-lasting due to the country's developed economy, strong private sector and robust civil society.
Likely · Within months
Open Questions
- How far has authoritarianism gone in different countries, and is it always possible to vote out authoritarian rule?
- What concrete steps can Europe's democracies take to protect themselves against authoritarian leaders?
- Will traditional parties in Europe stick to red lines against far-right parties after Trump's defeat?
- How does the collapse of the Republican Party affect American politics in the long run?







