The heavyweight international relations journal "Foreign Affairs" published an article about Taiwanese military expert Liao Hongxiang and retired US Navy Admiral and former Director of National Intelligence Dennis. Dennis Blair's joint article pointed out that the current direction of Taiwan's navy is still over-reliant on large surface ships. In the face of China's increasingly mature surveillance, unmanned vehicles, and precision strike capabilities, Taiwan should rethink its naval force structure and shift from the traditional pursuit of "sea control" to a military-building strategy centered on "sea denial."
Foreign Affairs is one of the most influential international relations and foreign policy journals in the world. It has long been an important platform for debates on U.S. diplomacy, national security, and international strategy. While Chinese scholars and policymakers can often be seen participating in discussions on China issues, it is rare for Taiwanese authors to directly propose Taiwan’s defense policy in this journal. This time, the article was co-signed by Blair, the former commander of the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. The article attracted special attention.
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It is understood that Blair's participation in this research and policy initiative does not involve commercial interests in Taiwan's arms sales, shipbuilding or related defense industries. It is mainly based on long-term concerns about Taiwan Strait security and Taiwan's defense issues.
The two authors pointed out that if China wants to invade Taiwan on a large scale, it will still have to send a large number of troops, armored vehicles, weapons and supplies across the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, what Taiwan really needs is not necessarily a fleet that can compete with the Chinese navy for traditional sea control, but a set of "sea denial" capabilities that prevent the People's Liberation Army from freely using the Taiwan Strait.
The article believes that Taiwan has long relied on large surface ships such as destroyers and frigates as the backbone of its fleet. However, China has significantly strengthened its satellite, intelligence surveillance, electronic warfare, unmanned vehicles, and precision missile capabilities in recent years, making large warships more vulnerable to detection, tracking, and attack in the limited and highly transparent waters surrounding Taiwan.
However, this technological development also creates asymmetric conditions that are beneficial to Taiwan. If the People's Liberation Army wants to land in Taiwan, it still relies heavily on large amphibious ships and transport convoys. These ships are also difficult to conceal, and it is impossible to completely replace them with small ships. To put it simply, it is "very necessary" for China to cross the sea and land, but this may not be the case for Taiwan's navy.
"If we don't compete with China for large ships, the Communist army will not be able to cross the strait!" The two authors suggest that Taiwan should gradually reduce its reliance on large destroyers and frigates, and instead rely on surface combatants with more numbers, smaller tonnage, and powerful firepower as the core. These ships can be deployed dispersedly and operate independently, while sharing intelligence and coordinating attacks through the Internet. Even if some of the force is destroyed in the PLA's first wave of strikes, other ships can still survive and continue to fight.
The article specifically cited the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Ukraine does not have a traditional navy that can compete head-on with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, but it uses land-based anti-ship missiles, unmanned surface vehicles, drones and external intelligence to severely damage the Russian Black Sea Fleet and even force most of its ships to stay away from the Ukrainian coast. The author believes that this proves that a weaker party can deprive a stronger enemy of its freedom of action in a specific sea area without first gaining control of the sea.
The article points out that Taiwan does not have to start from scratch. Existing domestically-made missile patrol ships are smaller in tonnage, faster and have stronger firepower, and their cost is much lower than that of large surface combatants. If a stable production line is maintained, not only can the quantity be expanded, but the cost of a single ship can also be reduced through mass production and experience accumulation, and new missiles, sensors and unmanned systems can be continuously introduced in subsequent batches.
The two authors advocate that Taiwan should integrate small surface ships, shore-mounted mobile anti-ship missiles, fighters with anti-ship strike capabilities, submarines, drones, unmanned surface vehicles, and surveillance and command and control systems to form a maritime denial network that is decentralized, mobile, and difficult to destroy at once. Its core purpose is to allow Taiwan to retain sufficient combat power to continue attacking the Chinese fleet crossing the strait even if it withstands the first wave of large-scale attacks by the People's Liberation Army.
It is worth noting that the two authors believe that the biggest obstacle to Taiwan’s naval transformation may not be technology, but the system. Large warships are visible, and they can not only hold launching and formation ceremonies, but also drive shipbuilding orders and employment, and can more easily become a concrete symbol of the government's strengthening of national defense. In comparison, the political visibility of dispersed missile vehicles, unmanned vehicles and small combat ships is far less than that of large warships.
The article even advocates that Taiwan should not continue to invest a lot of resources in upgrading its increasingly aging large warships, but should gradually decommission them and shift its limited manpower, budget and maintenance energy to forces that are more in line with the needs of future battlefields across the Taiwan Strait. If this policy proposal is adopted by the government, the impact will not only be on which type of warships to purchase, but may also affect Taiwan's naval force building direction, budget allocation, manpower structure, operational doctrine and defense industry layout in the coming decades.
The article pointed out that this will not be an easy choice for the ruling party and the Ministry of National Defense. Large warships are highly symbolic and involve both shipbuilding plans and huge organizations and resources. But what does Taiwan need? A navy that looks powerful in peacetime, or a navy that can survive and continue to fight after a war breaks out, and prevent the People's Liberation Army from freely crossing the Taiwan Strait?
