The living crisis for the majority of Syria's population, including the Syrian capital, has worsened with the wave of price increases, which has deepened the gap between the value of monthly salaries and living requirements, after the recent government decision to raise the prices of fuel and domestic gas.
The crisis has deepened further in a country where more than 90 percent of the population still lives below the poverty line, with water scarcity forcing families to buy it at high prices.
The prices of foodstuffs, vegetables, fruits, and transportation and freight costs have witnessed significant price increases since the Permanent Committee for Determining the Prices of Petroleum and Mineral Resources issued, on September 13, a new temporary price bulletin for petroleum derivatives, which raised prices by rates ranging between 9 percent and 40 percent, influenced by regional and global events.
However, after the wave of angry popular protests that erupted in rejection of the decision, and despite the announcement by the Minister of Energy, Muhammad al-Bashir, on September 17, that the ministry would offer subsidized diesel at a reduced price, directed mainly to heating, agriculture, and groups eligible for support, the overall prices of food and basic supplies did not decline from the level they reached following the September 13 decision.
Samer Al-Adnan, who works as a transactions auditor, and although he is considered to have a middle income, describes the prices in the markets as “very harsh, not at all commensurate with his monthly income.”
Al-Adnan told Asharq Al-Awsat: “People envy us for what we earn per month, and we cannot deal with these prices, so how will the poor, who constitute the vast majority in the country, deal with them?”
Economists and studies estimate the monthly costs for a family of three people to secure their basic requirements for living at an average level at no less than 80,000 Syrian pounds, which is 4 times the monthly salary of the majority of first-class government employees, which does not exceed 20,000 Syrian pounds.
This deep gap between the value of the monthly salary and the basic requirements for living has led a large number of families to adopt a policy of great austerity in securing their basic requirements for living.
Rima Al-Ahmad, a basic education teacher (second cycle), whose husband works as an employee in a government bank, explains that the situation in the country improved after the liberation of Syria from the previous regime in several ways, most notably in terms of extending security and security and reducing the state of fear to a great extent. But the living situation, according to Al-Ahmad’s statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, “is getting worse due to government decisions that lead to an astronomical rise in prices, in addition to the failure to control prices in the markets by the government. What is required is to find a solution to this living hardship that has made families lose their ability to bear it.”
The Syrian government had issued several decrees increasing employee salaries, but the gap remained large between monthly incomes and costs of living. Also, the recent rise in prices that followed the increase in fuel prices, and before that the decision to increase electricity consumption tariffs in late October 2025, by a rate equivalent to 60 to 70 times, compared to their previous prices, which were in the range of 10 liras per kilowatt hour, consumed the value of those increases.
What has deepened the living crisis for the majority of the population of Damascus and its countryside and burdened them is the severe scarcity of drinking and washing water that reaches homes from the government network, due to weak pressure, which forces large numbers of families to buy it from tankers at high prices.
Although the government follows a rationing program to supply water to the areas and neighborhoods of Damascus, which includes pumping it about 10 hours every 3 days, Abu Hamza, who lives in the “Daf Al-Shouk” neighborhood in southern Damascus, confirms that throughout the summer, water only reached his house two or three times.
The man told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The families are very tired. Her concern is to secure food for the day and secure the electricity bill and the price of water. “Life has become very difficult.”
Academic economist Ziad Arabsh explains that the livelihood crisis in Syria is exacerbated by three interconnected gaps: the balance of payments, the general budget, and purchasing power versus prices.
In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Arabsh believes that raising fuel prices or modifying subsidies alone will not solve the crisis, because treating the price of diesel in isolation from the exchange rate and the budget will not succeed. Therefore, what is required, according to Arabash, is “an integrated, gradual plan that includes immediate measures within weeks, such as a subsidized food basket, cash transfers, sales outlets at subsidized prices, temporary employment programs, fixing a reference exchange rate for basic commodities, medium reforms within months, including electricity, agriculture, and small projects, and structural reforms within years, including the budget, trade, and renewable energy.”
It is also necessary to restore productive and concessional lending, and immediately adopt a smart trade policy that protects the local product, and support inputs and then the quantities produced. The golden rule, from Arbash’s point of view, is that “no raising prices without alternatives, no reducing subsidies without compensating the poor, and no reform without social justice. The best scenario achieves tangible improvement within 2-3 years by implementing an economic plan that is still absent, and the worst scenario continues for 5-10 years by constantly feeling the way without effectiveness, and the lesson is implementing the plan, transparency and fighting corruption, because Delay means more poverty and immigration, and the citizen no longer has the luxury of waiting, and every day of delay is a discount from the future.”
In the first direct collision between the return of investment to Syria and the legacy of the previous regime of expropriating private land ownership, protests took place for the second day in a row in the Qudsaya suburb in the countryside of the capital, Damascus, demanding the cessation of work on a large real estate investment project before settling the rights of its original owners. At a time when Human Rights Watch called on the government, donors, and investors to ensure that reconstruction projects serve local communities.
In addition, a number of residents of Dummar, Qudsaya, Al-Bejaa, and Al-Muadamiyah in the Damascus countryside organized a protest on Sunday against the launch of a real estate investment project on lands expropriated during the previous regime, and the property rights of their owners have not been settled yet.
Hussam Al-Jajah, relations official at the Internal Security Command in the Damascus countryside, pledged to the protesters to open a legal office to review the expropriation issue before the end of this week. He appeared in a circulating video clip interviewing the protesters, stressing that “whoever has a right will take it,” asking them to calm down and break up the protest.
This came a day after a similar protest at the project site, on Saturday, during which residents prevented the machinery from working. Then the protesters entered the headquarters of the investing company and raised slogans demanding the abolition of the new expropriation law.
Abu Akram, a resident of Moadamiya, told Asharq Al-Awsat that about five decades ago, the state seized large areas of the Western Ghouta of Damascus in order to establish popular housing, what is known as organized housing, and military installations that included lands from Moadamiya, Al-Bejaa, Qudsaya, Al-Hama, Dummar, Al-Demas, Al-Saboura, Yafour, Deir Qanun, and others. Accordingly, projects were implemented, including the suburbs of Qudsaya, Al-Fayha, Dummar, and Al-Dimas, the Republican Guard housing, the expansion of Mezzeh Airport, military facilities, and others.
The spokesman added that the state, at that time, also turned a blind eye to the spread of random housing and seized areas such as Al-Sumaria and Jabal Al-Ward, while large areas remained empty. Instead of returning the empty lands to their owners according to the expropriation law, which requires their return if the project does not implement the reason for the expropriation, the new government is offering them for investment and establishing real estate projects for the rich while their original owners suffer from poverty, stressing that “it is not permissible by law to establish a profit-making project on usurped land.”
Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1983 and its consequences are among the most problematic laws in Syria, and are among the reasons for the protests against the Assad regime.
The expropriation law allows public entities to expropriate built and unbuilt real estate to implement projects of “public benefit,” while specifying mechanisms for estimating the value of real estate, compensating rights holders, and registering properties in the name of the expropriating entity.
If the projects are not implemented within 5 years from the date of the decision, or if the compensation is not paid or is frozen, the owners have the right to file a lawsuit before the Administrative Court to demand the cancellation of the expropriation and the recovery of their properties.
However, the legal problem, according to human rights activist Basma Saeed, is in Law No. 15 of 2008, which allowed the entry of private companies and investment companies into real estate development projects within the expropriated areas, meaning the absence of the reason for expropriation, i.e. “public benefit,” and the establishment of profitable projects. Noting the clarity of the text of the Constitutional Declaration: “Individual property shall not be expropriated except for the public benefit and in exchange for fair compensation in accordance with the law.” Therefore, converting real estate into a private, profitable investment project is considered a circumvention of the Constitution and emptying the protective guarantees of their content.
Human rights activist Basma added to Asharq Al-Awsat that a legal settlement requires reviewing expropriation decisions, the purpose specified in each decision, ownership records, and compensation, in addition to reviewing the legal basis on which the new projects were based. She saw that all of this slowed down reconstruction. This forces the government to search for fair solutions, especially since the Syrians have suffered for many decades from unfair laws issued during the era of the previous regime (father and son), and it is not fair to accept the continuation of their effects, as she puts it.
Many areas in the Damascus countryside, especially Western Ghouta, witnessed many protests this month demanding the abolition of the expropriation law and sequestration decisions after the disappearance of the reason for expropriation and the demise of the Assad regime, which enacted laws primarily aimed at consolidating its authority.
The people of the Moadamiya region, about 77 percent of whose total area is owned by the state for barracks and military sites, demanded the settlement of their rights to the lands of the Mezzeh Military Airport expansion, in conjunction with the announcement of the immediate conversion of it to a civilian and investment airport.
It is noteworthy that after the fall of the regime, the people of the Al-Hamah and Moadamiyah regions reopened the file of their lands, on which random housing neighborhoods were built in Jabal Al-Ward and the Al-Sumaria area, as lands seized by the previous regime under the expropriation law, and then turned into private property by seizure, knowing that raising this file had negative repercussions on security and was accompanied by acts of sectarian violence.
It is worth noting that the legal frameworks regulating the reconstruction process still “lack guarantees that guarantee the participation of affected communities and the protection of their rights to housing, land, and property,” while the Syrian government continues to sign billions of dollars in reconstruction deals, according to a report issued by Human Rights Watch on Sunday. The organization called on the government, donors and investors to ensure that reconstruction projects serve local communities, and that the process includes clear mechanisms for consultation and compensation, in addition to an independent mechanism that enables residents to object to decisions related to their homes and lands.
Until 3 weeks ago, merchants in the Gaza Strip were still receiving cash from Gazans, even though the majority of them were worn out banknotes, before they gradually stopped more than 10 days ago, and they tightened their positions in the past four days, and used applications and electronic wallets.
This coincided with Israel's intensification of targeting and assassinating Hamas financial officials over the past weeks, and it turned out that among them were some of those responsible for transferring salaries to members of the movement.
According to Hamas employees, the majority of them, whether from the government sector or the military arm (Al-Qassam Brigades), receive their salaries in cash. More than one source in Hamas spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat that government employees receive part of their salaries approximately every 100 days, amounting to only 1,000 shekels (a dollar equals 3.05 shekels), and often in obsolete currencies, while others (Qassam activists) receive their salaries every 40 or 50 days, amounting to about 60 percent of the total salary, and no less than 1,200 shekels. Almost good coins.
Market dealers in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that, during the recent period, some merchants had tended to accept cash from individuals and transfer them electronically, in exchange for a commission of up to 10 percent through applications and electronic wallets.
This crisis represents a situation opposite to what was the situation during the peak years of the war that began in October 2023, when Gazans struggled to transfer their money in wallets to “cash,” and commissions started from 10 percent and sometimes reached 60 percent, before the scope of electronic transactions expanded. Last August, an Israeli army spokeswoman issued a warning to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip against canceling dealing with a certain category of old banknotes designated by the letter “B” of the shekel, in a move to stifle the Hamas movement economically.
What do we do with old money?
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Ahmed Al-Najjar (39 years old), an employee in the Hamas government in Gaza, asked angrily about the fate of the obsolete money they were receiving, and said: “How long will it remain like this?” We are the ones who pay the price with our lives, and we find no one to stand with us. There are no officials, no merchants, and others who fight us in various ways to achieve huge profits and gains.”
Since October 7, 2023, Israel has prevented the entry of any cash into Gaza, at a time when banks were subjected to major thefts during the war, while the Israeli security authorities sought to impose conditions on Gazan merchants after they allowed the entry of goods from time to time, for payment via electronic applications in a move that was aimed at besieging the Hamas movement.
With the new reality, it appears that the Hamas movement is actually facing a major crisis regarding the availability of cash among its activists and employees, in conjunction with repeated assassinations of funding sources, money changers, and prominent activists in its financial system, something that has been observed more over the past few days.
Hamas warns merchants
The current reality prompted the Hamas police force in Gaza to issue a general circular in which it warned shop owners and others not to deal in cash, stressing the necessity of receiving cash from citizens of all kinds, new and old, provided that it is not damaged. She stated that she will begin her duties to follow up on everyone’s commitment to this, and will take strict legal measures against violators, calling on merchants not to create crises that would restrict the population.
An official Hamas police source told Asharq Al-Awsat that there is “a strict decision to take strict measures against any merchants who refuse to deal with banknotes.” He promised, “The matter is not only related to government employees or movement activists, but also to the families of orphans, war victims, the wounded, and prisoners who benefit financially from various relief institutions, and cannot find anyone to take cash from them.”
Media outlets affiliated with the Hamas movement inside the Gaza Strip did not hesitate to launch a media campaign against banks affiliated with the Monetary Authority of the Palestinian government in Ramallah, accusing them of encouraging merchants to move to electronic payment only, and of working to close hundreds of bank accounts for residents in the Strip, which some banks have denied more than once, and renewed their denial a few days ago, stressing that there are no decisions to close any accounts.
App scare campaign
This led to the spread of an unprecedented campaign across social media warnings against wasting cash in favor of banking applications and other electronic wallets, amid fear campaigns of an imminent new war between Iran and the United States that will affect the entire region again, which could lead to the owners of electronic funds losing their money. This was denied by an official banking source, confirming that the funds within the banks will remain preserved, and that there is a transition to electronic work.
The source told Asharq Al-Awsat that what is happening is updating the data naturally, and determining the nature of the activities of the holders of these accounts, in light of fears of the presence of money being laundered in one way or another, indicating that the banks have instructions to facilitate enabling Palestinians to own accounts for financial inclusion, and this is also happening in the West Bank, and not only in the Gaza Strip.
In recent days, Israel assassinated Jabr Moqbel, the owner of an exchange shop and a prominent activist in the “Al-Qassam Brigades” in Gaza City, after targeting him inside a vehicle in Deir al-Balah in the middle of the Gaza Strip. Muhammad Abu Alwan, a financial official in Hamas, was also assassinated during a raid that targeted him in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip. On Sunday, an Islamic Jihad financial official was seriously injured in an assassination attempt targeting him west of Gaza City.
The Israeli army said in a statement, a few days ago, that throughout the war, it liquidated 16 prominent economic activists who were involved in transferring money and worked to finance the military activity of the Hamas movement. He stated that all the activists who were liquidated managed money transfers worth more than one billion dollars, through a network that includes dozens of money changers in Türkiye and the Gaza Strip.
He explained that he, along with the General Security Service (Shin Bet), are focusing their efforts on harming Hamas' financing capabilities and preventing the rehabilitation of its infrastructure and military capabilities.
