The erosion of Hezbollah’s internal alliances and the challenges of the political and security scene in Lebanon

The second anniversary of the assassination of the former Secretary-Generals of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din, revealed a bitter reality that Hezbollah is suffering from inside Lebanon. It showed that the party lost its network of allies internally, as evidenced by the absence of figures who were allies of the party before the 2024 war, for the first time in two decades.

Two years after the assassination, those closely monitoring the party’s situation believe that it faces not only the challenge of rebuilding its capabilities and organizing its ranks, but also the erosion of the network of alliances it has accumulated over the years. It seemed that a number of political forces reconsidered the feasibility of continuing association with it, in light of the shifting balance of power internally and regionally.

Only the head of the Marada Movement, Suleiman Franjieh, who was the party’s presidential candidate before the election of President Joseph Aoun, appeared among his most prominent former allies in commemorating Nasrallah, along with leaders representing the Amal Movement, his partner in the “Shiite duo.”

The party had succeeded in building a wide network of political alliances that extended to most Lebanese sects and sects, since it signed the memorandum of understanding with the Free Patriotic Movement in 2006, which allowed it, according to its opponents, to provide “political cover” to keep its weapons and strengthen its influence, leading to the establishment of a reality parallel to state institutions.

However, after the “Gaza Support” war, this network began to gradually disintegrate, in parallel with the major military decline that befell Hezbollah and the change in its position in the Lebanese equation. One of the most prominent manifestations of this disintegration was the distancing of key allies from it, first and foremost the “Free Patriotic Movement” on the Christian scene, in addition to the decline in the presence of its allies among the Sunni and Druze forces.

The party's allies' distance from it is not only linked to the change in the balance of power after the war, but also to the political and financial risks that have come from being close to Hezbollah, in light of the US sanctions that have already affected individuals and entities linked to it or accused of providing support to it, in addition to the threat of expanding the circle of sanctions to include allies and other political figures. This prompted some of the party's allies to reconsider their calculations, fearing that the relationship with it would turn from a source of political influence into a source of costs and penalties.

Professor of Political Science at the American University of Beirut, Dr. Hilal Khashan, believes that the “cross-sectarian network” that the party has tried to build since it entered politics was, in essence, “marginal,” noting that “the party has long benefited from its military strength in building broad political influence, and from presenting itself as a force capable of imposing a balance with Israel.”

According to Khashan, the party worked for years to “perpetuate a narrative based on transferring the battle to the Galilee and demonstrating the existence of a military balance with Israel,” a narrative that “was believed by a large portion of the Shiite environment.” However, the party’s military strength, which was considered one of its most prominent sources of influence in the region, “suffered an unprecedented blow during the war, which had a decisive impact on its political position.”

Khashan told Asharq Al-Awsat that the party, over the past period, “provided political cover for parties and forces in exchange for cover for its policies and weapons, which made many alliances closer to utilitarian alliances and mutual interests than to established political or ideological partnerships.”

Khashan believes that “the collapse of the balance of power that allowed the party to manage this relationship will make rebuilding the previous network of alliances extremely difficult, especially since the political forces that believed that the alliance with him carried gains and political protection are now facing a different reality,” suggesting that the “Amal Movement” through new faces will take over the leadership of the Shiite community in the next stage.

For his part, the political writer and editor-in-chief of the Janoubia website, Ali Al-Amin, believes that Hezbollah, which was “a focus of attraction for allies and political clientelism over many years, is no longer like that today, three years after the start of the support war. It currently lacks allies and suffers from an internal and external siege, and this is a reality that can be felt automatically.” Al-Amin added: “This became clear on the anniversary of the assassination of its two former general secretaries; The majority of those who were crowding to sit in the first row were absent from the scene.

Al-Amin said in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that “this aversion to it is likely to increase,” pointing out that “the weapons file is another matter related to the role and position of Hezbollah, which does not seem to have read what has befallen it and what has befallen the Shiites and Lebanon in terms of a major catastrophe. It is still clinging to its function as an Iranian tool subject to the calculations drawn up by the Guardian Jurist from within Iran.”

Al-Amin concludes: “In light of the current political and security conditions, and in light of the party’s continued discourse that is inconsistent with reality and its new facts, it will not find an echo outside of its partisans... and the visits it makes to some political parties have not resulted in what can be described as a restoration of its alliances or friendships, and therefore it is practically trying to get out of the hole it fell into by falling into more holes, which will deepen its predicament and reveal its inability to reformulate its presence on the rules of the state.” He added: “In view of all of this, the party cannot be expected to repair its fractured alliances, but rather to increase their collapse and disappearance.”

On Sunday, the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Ali al-Zaidi, ordered the formation of an investigative committee to uncover the circumstances of the transgression on the flag of the United States of America by factions in the Popular Mobilization Forces, during a military parade in Tahrir Square in central Baghdad, as part of the activities and celebrations of “Sovereignty Day” launched by the government on September 30, on the occasion of the withdrawal of the “International Coalition” forces.

The incident sparked the anger of prominent American figures, without an official position being issued by Washington.

The spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Sabah Al-Numan, said in a statement, “The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces condemned this act, stressing the need to adhere to diplomatic laws and customs, and directed that the necessary legal measures be taken against the transgressors, complete the investigation, and submit its results as quickly as possible.”

The Popular Mobilization Forces did not issue any explanation regarding what happened, while sources close to the government told Asharq Al-Awsat, “What happened causes severe embarrassment to the government, and is unacceptable or responsible behavior, and exposes the country, in general, to major problems.”

The source, who preferred not to mention his name, added, “There is confirmed knowledge that the Revolutionary Guard has penetrated many leaders in the Popular Mobilization Forces, and they are the ones behind this reprehensible behavior.”

The source believes that “some government trends are seriously considering removing these leaders and replacing them with officers from the regular army, but this desire is being faced by intense factional and Iranian pressure.”

While there was no official comment from Washington regarding what happened, Victoria Taylor, a former political and security official, who currently holds the position of director of the “Iraq Initiative and the Syria Project” in the “Middle East Program at the Atlantic Council,” expressed strong dissatisfaction with the insult to the American flag.

Taylor said in a blog post on the “X” platform, “When Iraq announced ‘Sovereignty Days’ to celebrate the departure of American forces and the end of Operation Inherent Resolve, I felt upset. The Operation Inherent Resolve mission was in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government to fight ISIS.

She added: “I knew in advance that something would happen that would show people walking or driving over the flag, and here it is, and this time by the Popular Mobilization Forces, not just the militias.”

She continued: “I know that this does not represent all Iraqis, but the Iraqi government should have behaved better and avoided this kind of outright hostility toward America on the part of the official forces.”

US Representative Joe Wilson called for “the liberation of Iraq from Iran” against the backdrop of insulting his country’s flag. He said in a similar blog post, “(The pictures) show the (Popular Mobilization Forces), an official formation within the security services of the Iraqi government, desecrating the American flag as an expression of disrespect, and praising the murderous Iranian regime.”

He added: “If you need more evidence that Iraq has become an Iranian province, Zaidi, is this your opinion of America?”

Lebanon fears that the Lebanese-Israeli military meeting, under American auspices in Florida on October 20, will constitute a stop to pass the time until the Knesset elections are held in Israel on the 27th, and the “American midterms” on the third of next November, relying on American intervention to activate the implementation of the “Framework Agreement.”

Lebanon is afraid of being involved in managing the crisis to fill the void, and is seeking, through its military delegation to the Florida negotiations, to create a breach that opens the door to continuing the implementation of the “Framework Agreement,” which is a point of intersection between Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in their meeting in Washington, instead of the meeting being a station that Washington is looking forward to to pass a message that it is continuing to sponsor the negotiations regardless of the results that the negotiators may reach.

In this context, a Lebanese source concerned with the negotiations said that filling the void with wasted time with minimal damage requires reducing the level of internal tension and preventing Israel from expanding the security zone so that Lebanon can withstand keeping the negotiations dependent on the election results in Israel. He confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that contacts are ongoing between Beirut and Washington to fix the deadline for holding the military meeting, which is headed by the Lebanese side, the head of the negotiating delegation, former Ambassador Simon Karam, in the presence of Ambassador Nada Hamada Moawad, and the Director of Operations at the Army Command, Brigadier General George Rizkallah, who heads the military team.

The source pointed out that the Lebanese delegation to Florida is betting on American intervention to bring the negotiations out of their eighth round of stagnation, and he proposes including the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, and resolving the controversy surrounding the formation of a “verification mechanism” for the deployment of the Lebanese army in the “experimental zone,” after expanding it and ensuring that it is free of Hezbollah weapons and its fighters, and establishing a ceasefire, on the meeting’s agenda.

He believed that removing the “verification mechanism” from the tensions requires agreement on its role and on who heads it, in addition to providing guarantees that the team of observers emanating from it will not be harmed. This is what is required of Israel and Hezbollah, which continues its campaign against direct negotiations, insists on keeping its weapons, and demands dropping the “framework agreement” and linking the Lebanese track to Iran with its proof of the Iranian-American “memorandum of understanding” as an alternative to the agreement despite Washington’s rejection of that.

The source confirmed that Lebanon fears that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will resort to expanding the security zone by targeting the heights located between Iqlim al-Tuffah and Jabal al-Rayhan, and hopes that Washington will intervene to control the performance of the Israeli army, despite the fact that Tel Aviv’s withdrawal of combat units, meaning those belonging to the Golani Brigade, means from the military point of view that it has no intention of attacking with the aim of expanding to the extent that it continues to close in on the security zone by bulldozing towns and destroying what remains of the homes in it, and it is now in A defensive position to prevent Hezbollah fighters from infiltrating it, in exchange for its control of the towns located on the front edge north of the Litani River overlooking its south, turning them into scorched earth, similar to what happened to the towns located within the Yellow Line.

But the source is not reassured that Netanyahu will not deviate if he is forced to raise his level of support in the elections to ensure his return to head the government.

In addition, a Western diplomatic source in Beirut, who is aware of the atmosphere of preparations for the military meeting, revealed that Netanyahu is not willing to provide facilities, in deed and not in word, to begin implementing the “framework agreement” before it passes the electoral deadline, and therefore refuses to respond to Lebanon’s request to expand the “experimental zone.” He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Netanyahu agrees to its expansion on the condition that it be limited to the towns located on the front edge of the northern Litani River, some of which his army controls by fire and occupies others.

The source confirmed that implementing the consistent steps, as Lebanon demands, means, from the point of view of the international community, led by the United States of America, agreeing on a timetable for Israeli withdrawal, in exchange for developing a plan to disarm Hezbollah in instalments. He said that he does not support the campaign against the Lebanese army, accusing it of negligence, and holding it responsible under the pretext of its leadership’s reluctance to implement the exclusivity of weapons in the hands of the state, adding that “the decision in this regard is under the responsibility of the Council of Ministers collectively and that the military institution implements the decisions it takes, especially since there is no going back from the exclusivity of weapons in the hands of the state. This is what Aoun confirms in his meetings between Lebanon and abroad, and he enjoys international appreciation for his position and support from the majority of the Lebanese.”

Accordingly; Attention remains drawn to the Florida meeting in light of exploring the extent of Washington’s willingness to intervene by causing a breach that opens the door to proceeding with the implementation of the “Framework Agreement” so that it is not limited to filling the void, even though achieving tangible progress will inevitably strengthen the state’s position in its bet on the “Framework Agreement” and weaken the position of “Hezbollah,” which will not stop threatening the Presidents of the Republic, General Joseph Aoun, and the government, Nawaf Salam. But the party is also wary of resorting to the street to put pressure on the government, because its ally, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, stands strongly against using the street to settle scores, and sees no justification for toppling the government, setting red lines to “fortify civil peace.”