Recent images at the Ceuta border have channeled public debate towards emergency assistance response. However, the migration phenomenon should not only be approached as a specific crisis or emergency at the point of arrival; it is worth highlighting the underlying economic and political forces that are behind the triggering causes of said crises. Spain has once again placed the management of irregularity at the center of the international board in 2026, not only in recent weeks after the massive arrival of migrants to Ceuta, but also before the summer with the temporary regularization program to facilitate the labor incorporation of migrants in sectors with a labor shortage. To transcend the situation, it is worth referring to two investigations that provide empirical evidence related to both topics. The first affects the factors at origin that drive asylum applications in developed countries. The second is the impact on migratory flows of granting legal status at the destination.
Economic studies that explain migratory flows between countries agree that income inequality between origin and destination is one of the most important factors, but these differences in income are not enough to obtain asylum in the destination countries.
In research with co-authors from the University of Göttingen recently published in the journal Migration Studies we analyze the economic and socio-political factors that push people to migrate from 84 countries of origin to request asylum in countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Using advanced statistical methods of data analysis, which allow us to establish a causal relationship, we reach interesting conclusions. Contrary to the notion supported in previous studies that political terror or the loss of civil liberties alone explain the peaks in asylum applications, using data from more than two decades, we find that government instability is the most robust and persistent determinant. A deterioration in this generates a more than proportional increase in asylum applications. For their part, internal conflicts become significant in the most recent subperiod, after the collapse after the Arab Spring. The results of the work also indicate notable regional disparities. While global political risk clearly influences Latin America, in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) internal conflicts prevail and in Eastern Europe ethnic tensions stand out.
In a second study on regularizations and the “call effect” published in Spanish Commercial Information, Revista de Economía, we address another unknown of the debate: do regularizations generate a “call effect”? Faced with the fear of granting amnesties that stops many governments from taking measures, the work documents more than one hundred and fifty extraordinary regularization programs in OECD countries between 1945 and 2024, which have benefited nearly eighteen million people. Analyzing bilateral migratory flows from almost two hundred countries to OECD destinations in the last three decades, the research confirms that the “call effect” exists, but is nuanced. It does not operate indiscriminately, but rather through the diffusion hypothesis and pre-existing social networks. That is, information about legal opportunities travels between family and friends, reducing the perceived costs and risks of the trip.
The most relevant contribution of this study for the design of public policies is the existence of an effective deterrent mechanism. This is the prior residence requirement. The models show that requiring a minimum period of at least eight months of prior residence in the receiving country completely neutralizes the “call effect.” Suffering the uncertainty and risk of living in the shadows for almost a year eliminates the incentive to travel solely motivated by the promise of obtaining papers. The most important conclusion is that rigor in the design of public policies is key to good data-based management.
The interconnection of both works offers a crucial lesson. Phenomena such as pressure on the Ceuta border cannot be corrected with paralysis or mere military containment. At its origin, cooperation must prioritize strengthening institutional stability. At destination, regularization is not an empty concession, but a socioeconomic management tool that formalizes employment and increases tax collection. The “call effect” is not an inevitable fatality, but a risk that is perfectly manageable through a rigorous regulatory design.
