Local incoming calls become accomplices to scams: Police demonstrate the complete process of remote phone control→
Quick Look
- Beijing police recently busted a black-and-gray industry gang that provided voice transfer services for overseas telecommunication fraud dens.
- The gang induced middle-aged and elderly people to click on unfamiliar links by forging local mobile phone caller IDs, thereby remotely controlling their devices to steal funds from their bank accounts.
- Currently, seven main suspects have been criminally detained, and the cardholders who provided the mobile numbers have been placed under administrative detention.
AI-generated summary
Why It Matters
Overseas telecom fraud gangs use voice transfer technology to forge the caller ID of domestic local mobile phone numbers to lower the vigilance of victims and commit fraud. Such mobile phone cards are mostly provided to criminals by part-time staff after they are processed in batches at the business hall.
The caller ID showed a local Beijing mobile number, but the person making the call was actually overseas. Recently, the Beijing police dismantled a black-market and gray-industry syndicate that provided voice transfer services for overseas telecommunications fraud dens, uncovering the modus operandi of this new type of telecommunications fraud.
Not long ago, Ms. Jiang from Beijing's Fangshan District received a call from someone claiming to be a customer service representative of a social networking website, who stated they could help her cancel the platform's automatic deduction feature. Following the instructions on the phone, Ms. Jiang clicked on an unfamiliar link sent by the other party. After operating it, her phone screen directly went black, and over 40,000 yuan in her bank card was fraudulently stolen. Ms. Jiang immediately reported the incident to the public security authorities.
Zhai Yuxuan, a police officer from the Criminal Investigation Detachment of the Fangshan Branch of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau: After receiving this police report, we analyzed that this was a very typical telecommunications fraud impersonating platform customer service. One suspicious point was that the mobile number used for traffic redirection was not an overseas mobile number, but a caller ID showing Beijing.
Through analysis and judgment, the police locked onto this voice transfer black-market and gray-industry syndicate dedicated to serving overseas telecom fraud dens. The syndicate members disguised calls from overseas scammers and dialed them to victims as ordinary domestic mobile numbers.
Meng Ziang, a police officer from the Criminal Investigation Detachment of the Fangshan Branch of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau: The victims they called were all older, middle-aged and elderly people.
First, syndicate members would go to labor markets to post part-time job information, luring people with the bait of several hundred yuan in remuneration for getting a phone card, and then have applicants batch-apply for mobile cards at telecom operator business halls in Beijing and surrounding areas. After getting the phone cards, they would drive to areas around the outskirts of Beijing, set up dens inside their vehicles, and use illegal software to complete signal transfers.
With the help of this camouflage method, the calls from overseas scammers were transformed into "local numbers."
Meng Ziang, a police officer from the Criminal Investigation Detachment of the Fangshan Branch of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau: Making high-frequency calls to unfamiliar numbers in the same time period, especially since these phone cards are registered on the same day and put into use immediately on the same day—sometimes even a single phone can make hundreds or thousands of calls.
The syndicate members drew commissions based on the amount of money involved in the fraud, earning a cut ranging from 100 yuan to 800 yuan for each successfully defrauded order. Some migrant workers, knowing full well that risks existed, still participated in this so-called "part-time job" to make quick money.
Meng Ziang, a police officer from the Criminal Investigation Detachment of the Fangshan Branch of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau: These phone calls will be incorporated into the monitoring of telecom operators and anti-fraud centers. Once monitored by the anti-fraud center, the anti-fraud center will immediately call the victim back. If the line is busy, the anti-fraud center will call people related to them around them, such as relatives or children, to have them conduct anti-fraud dissuasion. If the situation is true, the anti-fraud center will freeze the phone card based on the phone number.
Currently, seven major suspects of the syndicate have been criminally detained according to law on suspicion of the crime of helping information network criminal activities; the cardholders who provided the phone cards have been administratively detained for violating the "Anti-Telecommunication Network Fraud Law," and the case is under further processing.
Demystifying Remote Phone Control: National Anti-Fraud Center Police Officer Demonstrates On-Site
In this case, victim Ms. Jiang performed a very crucial operation after receiving the call, which was clicking on the unfamiliar link provided by the other party, resulting in her phone being remotely controlled afterwards. To let everyone clearly see the risks involved at a glance, a police officer from the National Anti-Fraud Center simulated and demonstrated on-site, revealing the complete scam process of remote phone control.
Lu Senlin, a police officer from the National Anti-Fraud Center: Assuming the phone on our left is the victim's phone and the one on the right is the suspect's phone, we follow the suspect's request, click on the unfamiliar link, download this remote control software, and log in to the same account. In this way, the two devices are successfully connected.
We can see that through the victim's side, no matter how we swipe the screen or any product App displayed on the interface, the scammers can see it.
Once the victim's phone achieves screen sharing with the other party, the other party can not only see the victim's phone interface, but also remotely control the victim's phone in real time.
Lu Senlin, a police officer from the National Anti-Fraud Center: We can actively browse the victim's phone through the suspect's phone. We can see some of the victim's chat records through WeChat; contacts and chat content can all be seen. We can also click on software with payment functions, and we can click on transfers; the interface is also displayed synchronously. In addition, we can also make phone calls by operating the victim's phone.
In other words, at this point, the suspect has already gained control of the victim's phone and can arbitrarily operate on the victim's phone remotely.
Police Reminder: Caller ID Can Be Forged, Local Numbers Also Hide Fraud Traps
Many citizens are accustomed to judging the identity of the other party based on the origin of the caller ID when answering calls, and let down their guard when they see a local mobile number. The police remind you once again that caller ID can be tampered with and forged through black-market and gray-industry equipment.
According to reports, criminals can use voice transfer equipment to disguise overseas scam calls as domestic local numbers and dial in. Impersonating platform customer service, they use reasons such as canceling automatic deductions, handling refunds, and claims to induce victims to click on unfamiliar links, thereby stealing bank card funds. Middle-aged and elderly groups are the primary targets of this type of fraud.
Zhai Yuxuan, a police officer from the Criminal Investigation Detachment of the Fangshan Branch of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau: Do not let down your guard even if you see a call from a local number. Anyone on the phone who claims to be platform customer service and induces you to click on unfamiliar links or enable screen sharing under the pretext of canceling deductions, claims, or refunds must be treated with high vigilance. Most of these are telecommunications network scams.
In addition, migrant workers must never apply for or sell personal phone cards to earn so-called part-time pay, nor assist criminals in setting up equipment and transferring scam calls, as this also constitutes illegal and criminal activity.
(CCTV reporters Zhao Xuerong, Li Jun, and Cao Xiaozheng)
What to Watch
AI outlook — possibilities, not facts
The public security organs will continue to dig deeper into the upstream and downstream chains of this black and gray production gang, and more people may be subject to criminal coercive measures.
Likely · Within weeks
The National Anti-Fraud Center may strengthen monitoring and early warning mechanisms for similar voice transfer equipment
Possible · Within months
Open Questions
- Is this black and gray industry group directly related to a specific overseas fraud den?
- Is it possible to recover the more than 40,000 yuan that was stolen?
- Are there other similar black and gray voice transfer gangs still active?





