Germany as the main target of Russian hybrid attacks – warnings and protective measures

Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt had brought a warning. It is assumed that “Germany is the target of further hybrid attacks by Russia,” he said when he announced the sanctions with which Germany wants to respond to the Russian attempted attack at Leipzig Airport. Russia, in turn, threatened to respond to the punitive measures. In what ways might the Kremlin escalate its hybrid war of aggression? And how can you protect yourself against it?

So far, Europe has seen multiple individual hybrid attacks, but Russia is capable of a coordinated hybrid operation with devastating consequences, says Jukka Savolainen. The Finn is working at the “European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats” in Helsinki on the question of how societies and systems can protect themselves against hybrid attacks. Damage to power and internet cables, manipulation of hydroelectric power plants, IT attacks, disinformation campaigns in social networks - Savolainen sees the previous hybrid operations as tests to see how vulnerable the systems in the West are and how the societies there react.

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Nordic governments have long been concerned with the question of how to protect themselves from such attacks. Most recently, they unanimously supported the federal government after it blamed Russia for the failed drone attack in Leipzig. In Denmark, the PET intelligence service warned that Russia was planning to sabotage military deliveries. The National Security Council met in Sweden. A further escalation must be taken into account, said Thomas Nilsson, head of the military intelligence and security service MUST in the country. At the same time, he pointed out that Sweden is not a priority target for Russian hybrid warfare, but rather Germany, Poland and the Baltic states.

Damage to gas pipes, explosions in the power grid

Savolainen considers Germany to be the main target. He points out that Russia has long been mapping its energy infrastructure. From his point of view, a coordinated attack could proceed as follows: damage to the gas pipelines from Northern Europe, multiple explosions in the power grid, which would lead to a long-lasting blackout, as well as the cutting of internet cables. This could be combined with false news that drinking water is supposedly unsafe.

The consequences for the economy and every individual would be devastating. Savolainen assumes that such a large-scale attack would be accompanied by a prepared disinformation campaign with the aim of dividing the Federal Republic. Is Germany prepared against such a coordinated attack? Neither the authorities nor the population are considered particularly resilient. As far as the authorities are concerned, there is still a lack of a clear division of roles between the federal and state governments. Even if something is moving in drone defense, for example, there is still a lot to be done four and a half years after the start of Russia's war of aggression.

An example: The states are responsible for disaster control, but the federal government is responsible for civil protection in the event of defense and in the event of tension. How exactly this division works is difficult to understand. And in times of hybrid attacks it is a hindrance, after all it is usually initially unclear who the perpetrator is and whether the danger comes from abroad. The federal and state governments are supposed to develop a “Civil Defense Capability Roadmap for 2029,” which was also the focus of the Interior Ministers’ Conference in Hamburg in early summer. But 2029 could be far too late.

Finland was right

So you shouldn't expect much help from the authorities in an emergency. In addition, in large situations, aid goes first to the most vulnerable, such as hospitals; The general population, on the other hand, has to cope on their own first. The Nordic countries show how this can work. The role model, including for its neighbors, is Finland, which was ridiculed in the quiet 1990s for maintaining its suspicion of Russia and its focus on national defense. But it was right.

Finland has long practiced the “total defense” model, according to which a country is only ready to defend itself militarily if its institutions and society are resilient. Many in the country regularly attend defense courses, and there has always been compulsory military service, which means that military knowledge is deeply anchored in society. There are also thousands of bunkers in the big cities for emergencies - in Helsinki there are even more places than there are residents.

Building all of these structures in Germany will probably take decades, if it is possible at all. But you can also learn from Finns, as well as from Swedes and Norwegians, when it comes to individual defensive preparedness. In many places it is common practice to store supplies and emergency equipment at home. In Sweden, the brochure “When crises or wars come” was distributed to all households in 2024. Warning signals are explained, possible shelter locations are described and practical tips are given.

Supplies for at least a week

If the heating fails in winter, you should gather together in a room, hang blankets over the windows and lay carpets on the floor. It is advisable to stock up on supplies for at least a week. Among other things, non-perishable, easy-to-prepare food, water, candles, a crank radio, a charged power bank and toilet paper. Ideally, you should still have a camping stove, a first aid kit and medication at home. And last but not least, it is recommended to fill up the car with gas.

In Germany there is a corresponding brochure, the guide “Preparing for Crises and Disasters” from the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief. In some cases the recommendations even go beyond those in the north. It says that you should stock up on food and drinking water for ten days. Two liters are charged per person per day. For a five-person household that's 100 liters.

The brochure is detailed and clear, including what to do in the event of air raids, how to talk to children about crises and how to handle medical emergencies. The problem is: so far hardly anyone in the country knows about the brochure. When asked by the F.A.Z. why it wasn't distributed to all households like in Sweden, Dobrindt replied in June that they had now started intensively advertising the brochure.

Savolainen from Finland warns that the authorities must react quickly to attacks in view of the hybrid danger; it is no longer enough to follow the normal path of investigations, indictments and court decisions and in the end show basically no reaction. The German authorities have now reacted in an exemplary manner by blaming Russia only around a month after the Leipzig incident, based on the results of the investigation. A much quicker response, within days, is needed in the event of a coordinated attack, for example if people die in elevators because the power goes out for days, says Savolainen. Russia is afraid of a quick assignment because it does not want to antagonize the German population.