Huang Renxun suspected of falling into spy war "honey trap" - South Korea also fell into this trap

After Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang admitted to having an extramarital relationship with a woman suspected of being connected to Chinese intelligence agencies, the outside world also began to pay attention to one of China's traditional intelligence work methods, commonly known as the "honey trap."

On November 8, Jen-Hsun Huang sent a message to Nvidia employees, acknowledging his relationship with Chinese businessman Alice Huang and apologizing for his "infidelity to his wife."

Huang Le is accused of having ties to Chinese intelligence agencies and is reported to have been an executive at Megaspeed, a data center company headquartered in Singapore.

On the same day, Nvidia's board of directors announced that it would launch an independent investigation to confirm whether Huang Renxun was the target of counterinsurgency operations by foreign intelligence agencies.

A honey trap is an intelligence work technique that involves deliberately establishing a romantic or sexual relationship with a target in order to obtain confidential or sensitive information, or using this relationship as a weakness to threaten or absorb the other party.

This technique is also called "Honey Trap", which means taking advantage of the other person's feelings and sexual desires to make them fall into a trap.

The term "Honey Trap" was included in the Oxford Dictionary in 2014, but this type of intelligence technique itself is said to have been used by intelligence agencies in various countries for many years.

China, in particular, has long been questioned for using various intelligence-gathering techniques, including honey traps, overseas to safeguard its own interests. The United States, Europe and other countries also continue to be wary of China's intelligence activities.

China’s beauty trap also appeared in South Korea?

The often-mentioned Chinese beauty trap case that occurred in South Korea (South Korea) is the so-called "Shanghai Consulate General Scandal" that caused huge social shock.

Deng Xinming, a 33-year-old Chinese woman at the time, developed inappropriate relationships with a number of South Korean diplomats working at the South Korean Consulate General in Shanghai, China. Later, it was discovered that the contact information and diplomatic-related information of many government figures were leaked in the process.

According to reports in 2011, Deng Xinming allegedly maintained inappropriate relationships with a number of South Korean diplomats for several years starting around 2006.

In the computer files and USB devices held by Deng Xinming, the contact information of about 200 important figures in the South Korean government and the ruling party, the emergency contact network of the Shanghai Consulate General, information related to visa issuance, and personnel documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade were found. It is said that some of the data also contains information that needs to be kept confidential.

After the incident broke out, former consuls from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy were investigated. They are suspected of providing various conveniences to Deng Xinming and handing over internal information.

As the incident expanded, the South Korean government established a joint investigation team composed of the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Justice and other units to go to the local area to investigate.

However, because Deng Xinming is in China and has Chinese nationality, investigators cannot question her directly, and the investigation is subject to certain restrictions.

In the end, relevant parties were unable to obtain concrete evidence to prove the key issue in the case, that is, whether Deng Xinming was instructed by Chinese intelligence agencies to approach South Korean diplomats, or whether he only established relationships with them to obtain business benefits related to visa issuance.

In the final investigation results, the government's joint investigation team determined that the incident resulted from serious lax official discipline among staff of the overseas agencies and poor information management.

The investigation team also stated that Deng Xinming was closer to a broker engaged in visa issuance-related business than a professional spy. During the investigation, more than a dozen current and former employees of the Consulate General were also found to have violated regulations, and their respective agencies have been notified.

Although it has never been officially confirmed whether Deng Xinming had received instructions from Chinese intelligence agencies, the incident showed that through personal relationships, sensitive government information may be leaked to the outside world. Therefore, this case has become an important warning to improve the information security management of overseas institutions and prevent the risk of leaking secrets through foreigners.

North Korea’s “honey trap” intelligence work

Although the claim that Chinese intelligence agencies have carried out "honey trap" operations in South Korea has not yet been confirmed, typical cases of using honey traps to conduct espionage activities against South Korea can indeed be seen in North Korea (North Korea).

In particular, cases have been exposed one after another in which female agents posing as North Korean defectors approached military personnel or public agency employees, established personal relationships, and used them to gain access to internal information.

The most representative case is the case of North Korean agent Won Jung-hwa, which was detected in 2008.

Won Jung-hwa is an agent affiliated with North Korea's Ministry of National Security and entered South Korea in 2001 disguised as a North Korean defector.

Since then, she has registered as a North Korean defector with South Korea's National Intelligence Service and conducted public activities such as national security lectures at military units. The investigation revealed that during this process, she got close to the politically trained officers at the military camp in northern Gyeonggi Province, developed a relationship with them, and collected military information.

The investigation showed that Yuan Zhenghua obtained about 100 military officer business cards and handed them to North Korea. At the same time, he collected information such as the location of military camps, personal information of military officers, and a list of security instructors who defected from North Korea.

The investigative agency stated that Yuan Zhenghua had a close relationship with one of the officers and even lived together, and she seemed to have received instructions to lure him to China and absorb him.

Yuan Zhenghua was prosecuted and found guilty for violating the National Security Law.

Another representative case of the "honey trap" operation against South Korea was the North Korean female agent Kim who attracted South Koreans through online chats.

In 2010, Kim, who was affiliated with North Korea's Ministry of National Security, was operating in China as a hotel employee and tourism operator, and approached South Koreans through video chat and instant messaging software.

During this period, she established a close relationship with former Seoul Subway executive Oh and was accused of obtaining more than 300 pages of internal documents, including the Seoul Subway emergency contact network, crisis response procedures, and crew schedules.

Wu was prosecuted for providing relevant documents to Kim and was sentenced to three years and six months in prison. After being arrested, Kim confessed to the crime and was willing to naturalize, so the prosecutor suspended prosecution.

In recent years, more cases of recruitment through overseas North Korean restaurants have been revealed.

In 2023, a representative of a South Korean information technology company visited North Korean restaurants in Myanmar and Laos (Laos) frequently for about seven years and established relationships with people related to the restaurants.

Police investigation revealed that a restaurant deputy manager whom A contacted was an agent of North Korea's General Reconnaissance Bureau, and A was accused of providing him with US$4,800 (34,600 yuan; NT$144,000 NT$) and items worth approximately 20 million won (US$13,900; 100,000 yuan; NT$417,000), including prescription drugs and narcotic substances.

The police believe that Mr. A was recruited by North Korea through his relationship with the waitress in the restaurant. However, Mr. A stated that he assisted the restaurant because of his emotional relationship with the waitress and denied that he was involved in intelligence work.

Later, he was transferred to the prosecutor on suspicion of violating the National Security Law and related regulations, but was not detained.

It’s no longer just public officials – business people are being targeted too

The honey trap is a traditional espionage tactic that has been used since the Cold War. One of the famous cases was the so-called "Romeo Spy" operation of the East German Ministry of State Security.

Beginning in the 1950s, East Germany sent male agents to West Germany to gain access to female employees working in government departments and intelligence agencies.

According to information released by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2018, some of these relationships even lasted from several years to decades.

The British intelligence agency MI5 also warned in its security guidance for politicians and public officials that foreign intelligence agencies may establish long-term personal relationships or exploit personal weaknesses to collect intelligence and carry out blackmail.

In the past, honey trap operations mainly targeted people with access to state secrets, such as military personnel, diplomats and government officials; however, as the controversy surrounding Jen-Hsun Huang grows, the risk that business people may also become targets of foreign intelligence agencies is attracting attention.