"Non-red supply chain" has become a very popular term when Taiwan talks about national security and national defense independence. But shouldn’t we also ask a more realistic question: Unless we buy from China, will the United States, Japan, and South Korea definitely have something to supply to Taiwan? The answer may not be that simple.
The United States announced a new defense supply chain policy in July this year (2026), requiring key materials and components to come from the United States or allied countries, and requiring defense contractors to trace the supply chain all the way back to the source of raw materials, while identifying risks such as bottlenecks, single sources, and insufficient production capacity. Japan's "White Paper on Trade 2026" is also promoting the reduction of over-reliance on specific countries, increasing domestic production, diversifying supply sources and building inventory. This tells us something very important: Even the United States and Japan dare not assume that "allies will always have supplies." How can Taiwan think so?
Therefore, "not red" is actually just the first level. The real question should be: Can this supply chain continue to function during a crisis?
Assume that the primary source of parts needed for an F16 fighter jet is in the United States; the United States itself is facing combat readiness needs and delivery is delayed. What should we do? Is there a secondary source? If the second source is also out of stock, are there any alternatives? The replacement needs to be re-certified. Does Taiwan have the engineering capabilities to make it? The part is broken, can it be repaired in Taiwan? There is a problem with the system. Can Taiwan diagnose it by itself? This is the real test question for national defense independence.
Therefore, what Taiwan is talking about in the next stage should not just be a "non-red supply chain", but should establish a supply chain structure that is "credible, replaceable, repairable, and self-rescuable." We can break down this logic into four stages:
● Tier 1 (non-red): Reduce dependence from high-risk sources.
● Second level (diversity): We cannot put all our eggs in the basket of the United States, Japan, or any single ally.
● The third level (independent): Deepening Taiwan’s own engineering and manufacturing capabilities.
● The fourth level (self-rescue): When a link break occurs, you have the confidence to repair, replace and independently maintain system operation.
Allies are friends, but they must first take care of their own security, industry and people. Truly mature national defense independence does not mean expecting others to always deliver things to Taiwan on time, but that even if one line is broken, we can still connect another; even if parts are unavailable, we still have the ability to repair, replace, or even re-manufacture.
This is also the most worthwhile direction for Taiwan's industry to invest. This is true for semiconductors, drones, aerospace and military electronics, and even more so for energy and communications. What we really want to pursue is not to "do everything ourselves" - that is neither possible nor necessary - but to keep the most critical core capabilities in Taiwan. If you can buy, buy from trustworthy partners; if you can cooperate, produce with allies; but if something goes wrong, Taiwan itself must know what to do.
This also echoes the recent discussion on "F-16 delay resilience": What we really want to buy is never the illusion of "always delivered on time", but the ability to "even if it arrives late, Taiwan can still hold on."
"Made in Taiwan" has never been the only criterion for national defense independence. The real standard is actually just one sentence: If there is a problem, can Taiwan solve it on its own? This is also the most important meaning of "delayed resilience". When weapons arrive late, we need to have supplies; when supplies are interrupted, we need to have replacements; when parts are damaged, we need to be able to repair them; when the worst happens, we still have the ability to maintain the system.
Therefore, what Taiwan should really do next is not just to join other people's non-red supply chains, but to let the world discover that Taiwan is not a fragile island waiting for supplies from others, but a key partner that deserves to be included in a trustworthy supply chain and can add resilience to the global democratic camp.
Non-red is the starting point; autonomy is the bottom line; substitution is resilience; being able to repair it yourself is the real supply chain security.
