While Spain enters the terrain of electoral relativity, Catalonia is rapidly advancing towards ungovernable entropy. The Ipsos survey for La Vanguardia, carried out between September 23 and October 1 on a sample of 2,000 interviews, paints a chaotic and fragmented scenario in which the unstoppable rise of the extreme right (Catalan and Spanish), the collapse of Junts and the fall of the PSC dynamite any coherent or at least viable majority.
The estimates show chilling figures for the two Catalan parties that have shared hegemony in Catalonia since the democratic transition: the PSC not only does not capitalize on its government action but also loses 12 seats (falling from the 42 it obtained in the 2024 elections to an expected 30, now). For its part, Junts would suffer a disaster of planetary dimensions: it would give up 19 seats and go from the current 35 deputies to a forecast of 16. Only Esquerra would resist, with a balance of three more deputies (up to 23), while the Popular Party would give up four seats (they would remain at 11) and the Commons, two (from six to four).
Only the extreme right forces would experience a substantial improvement (of unprecedented magnitudes in the case of the ultra-Catalanist Aliança Catalana), since Sílvia Orriols' party would go from two seats, in May 2024, to 30 currently. In turn, Vox would win 18 seats, seven more than two years ago. In both cases, this takeoff would be based on the cannibalization of their respective competitors in the conservative space: Junts would be the main victim from the rise of AC, and the PP, from that of Vox.
This advance towards political chaos brings Catalonia closer to the paradoxes of the quantum universe, in which subjects can be simultaneously alive and dead. The independence movement, for example, does not currently embody any viable project after the fiasco of the process (and would still be below 50% of the votes). But the secessionist forces would once again gain a solid majority: 72 seats. The problem is that the main pro-independence party today would be Aliança Catalana, with the same number of seats as the PSC, but without other possible partners than Junts (which would bring together a total of 46 deputies).
The same paradox is recorded in the eventual turn to the right of the Catalan Chamber: the conservative-oriented forces (AC, Vox, Junts and PP) would now add a comfortable absolute majority of up to 75 seats. However, for the purposes of governance, their antagonistic identity sign makes them as incompatible as water and oil. Even so, the programmatic agenda against immigration would have the not inconsiderable figure of 48 seats in Parliament, at least.
Finally, there is no quantum paradox in the case of leftist forces. Socialists, ERC, Comuns and the CUP would only gather 60 deputies (eight short of the absolute majority), so they would hardly be able to govern with the rest of the Chamber against. Only an unlikely formula that brought together the two center-left forces (PSC and Esquerra) together with the declining Junts could compose an operational majority of 69 seats.
The perceptions that explain this electoral earthquake are perfectly reflected throughout the survey. For example, half of those consulted by Ipsos (the same figure as in the survey a year ago) consider that Catalonia is “on the wrong path.” But, simultaneously, the percentage of those who think that the country is going “in the right direction” has fallen six points – to 20%. Only among PSC voters are there a clear majority (42%) who judge the progress of Catalonia positively. And by age, the most critical are the young (up to 60% negative opinions), while the most benevolent are those over 65 (but with only 30% positive opinions).
The evaluation of the Catalan political situation also registers a decline (of six points) in favorable perceptions (up to 23%). And again, only among Salvador Illa's voters are the majority (but only half of those consulted) those who issue a positive judgment. Among the voters of ERC and, above all, of the Comuns, a “regular” assessment of the political situation is imposed. Only the evaluation of the economic situation reflects a certain stability, but with a majority of negative judgments (45%, three points less than a year ago), which surely respond to the context of rising prices that obscures the sustained job creation.
Political dissatisfaction is reflected above all in the assessment of the management of the socialist Illa's Government (and in the growing perception that he does not fulfill his programmatic promises). Positive opinions on the management of the Catalan Executive have fallen nine points in one year and only represent a significant figure among PSC voters (although only among 49% of them), while they fall to 41% among Comuns voters and 34% among Esquerra voters (where the “regular” rating dominates).
The backdrop of the critical evaluation of the Government is made up of the list of the main problems of Catalonia. Housing appears in first position, cited by a third of those consulted. And it is the main concern for left-wing voters and, to a lesser extent, also for those of Junts and the PP. Immigration appears as the second most important problem in Catalonia, and is the main one for AC and Vox voters. Now, and although to a much lesser extent, this issue constitutes the second concern of the socialist or ERC electorate, and, to a greater extent, of the PP and Junts. At this point, and to understand the populist drift of a part of the center-right electorate, it is worth noting that the third concern (almost tied with the second) of Puigdemont or Feijóo voters is “politics” as a serious problem.
Hence, with a similar expectation of participation, vote transfers reflect the deterioration of the electoral support of the main parties. The PSC, for example, has the loyalty of 62% of those who voted for Illa in 2024, while one in ten would now support Aliança (the same as 12% of Esquerra voters). And in the case of Junts, loyalty falls to 44% of its former voters, compared to a third who would now support Orriols.
In fact, in the leaders' chapter, only the Republican Rufián garners the approval of more than 50% of those consulted. Illa only obtains the approval of 36% (nine points less than a year ago) and Oriol Junqueras, 35%. And then Orriols appears (30%), eight points above Puigdemont (with an approval level of 22% of those consulted and the highest degree of disapproval: 67% suspend him).
