In his interview with Channel 12, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gave new information about the intelligence and decision process that resulted in Israel striking the al-Kibar facility in eastern Syria in September 2007.
According to Olmert's account, the key role in revealing Syria's nuclear activities was played by a young Mossad officer whose identity was not disclosed and who goes by the name "Anat".
Olmert said that after Anat completed his training at Mossad, he wanted to work on the possible nuclear activities of Syria instead of Iran.
He stated that the young intelligence officer did not have any definitive evidence at the beginning, but some pieces of intelligence he encountered created a strong suspicion in him that Syria was running a secret program.
According to Olmert, Anat's approach was not taken seriously by his superiors at first. The failure to yield results from two separate intelligence operations against Ibrahim Osman, Chairman of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, strengthened the view within Mossad that "there is no nuclear program in Syria."
However, Anat continued his research. Olmert said that an internal evaluation process was initiated against him due to his insistence, and that the officer later continued to stay in Mossad and rose to senior positions over the years.
MOSSAD CHAIRMAN ALSO CALLED HIM TO THE MEETING
Olmert stated that then-Mossad Director Meir Dagan invited Anat to one of the critical meetings regarding the discovery of the facility in Syria.
According to Olmert, Dagan preferred to include people who could express what other participants did not say in the meetings.
The collected intelligence was later delivered to then-Prime Minister Olmert. In addition to Dagan, Tamir Pardo, Amnon Sofrin and another Mossad official, whose identity is kept secret, also attended the meeting.
Olmert said that after the intelligence briefing, he called his advisors Yoram Turbowicz and Shalom Turgeman and decided that Israel should destroy the facility.
Olmert said that his priority at that stage was not to investigate why Israeli intelligence had not noticed the facility before, but to ensure the elimination of the nuclear capacity.
Stating that the Israeli administration was preparing for the possibility of a comprehensive war with Syria during the operation, Olmert claimed that even the option of kidnapping Ibrahim Osman was considered in order to obtain intelligence.
THE ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT IN 2007
Israeli warplanes carried out an air attack on the al-Kibar facility in eastern Syria in September 2007. Israel did not officially claim responsibility for the attack for nearly 11 years and announced the operation publicly in 2018.
Olmert said secrecy was vital to the success of the operation. He stated that it is critical for the Syrian administration to not learn that the facility was discovered by Israel in order to maintain strategic superiority.
According to the information provided by Olmert, before the operation, approximately 2,500 people were aware that nuclear activities in Syria were being monitored.
Olmert said that people with information signed documents stating that they would face Shin Bet investigation in case of a possible leak, and explained that he held some of the sensitive meetings at his official residence instead of the Prime Ministry building.
Referring to his meeting with then-US President George W. Bush, Olmert said that although the operation was known to such a wide circle, it was surprising in Washington that it was not leaked to the press.
"WOULD ASSAD USE IT? I COULDN'T TAKE THIS RISK"
Olmert argued that Syria's attainment of nuclear weapons capacity could pose an "existential threat" to Israel.
When asked whether the Syrian President of the period, Bashar Assad, would actually use such a weapon, Olmert stated that it was not certain and said that the Israeli administration could not risk such a possibility.
Olmert also explained that although he had information about the facility, he continued to evaluate a possible peace agreement with the Assad administration over the Golan Heights at that time.
Claiming that Assad was trying to mislead him, Olmert argued that the opposite happened in the end.
