Anadolu Agency Strategic Analysis Manager Bilgay Duman and Anadolu Agency Academy Deputy Director Mehmet Alaca wrote for AA Analysis about the historical background of the political separation between KDP and PUK in KRG and its possible effects on the future of the regional administration.
The political tension between the two major parties in the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), KDP and PUK, is crossing a new threshold. Following the elections held on October 20, 2024, a parliamentary meeting could not be held for two years due to disagreements between the two parties regarding the sharing of government duties.
However, on November 4, 2026, the parliament, which convened for the first time after the election upon the call of the KDP, was attended by small parties and minorities, as well as some deputies from the PUK, New Generation and Halvest Movement, who boycotted the session. Thus, KDP, which has 39 deputies, ensured the election of the parliamentary administration with the participation of 52 deputies in the 100-seat parliament. Although this step initially gives the impression that "the two-year parliamentary crisis in the KRG has been resolved", it further deepens the crisis in the region.
From Ashbetal to joint management
The disagreements between the KDP and PUK, the two executive powers of Kurdish politics in Iraq, are neither related only to KRG internal politics nor limited to today. The history of Kurdish politics still being interpreted through two parties dates back to the 1970s. Because the Iraqi Kurds, who started an uprising against the Iraqi regime of the time in 1961, with the support of the USA and Iran, under the leadership of the KDP and Mullah Mustafa Barzani, made an autonomy agreement with the Baath regime in 1970 and achieved autonomy. However, after the Algiers Agreement signed between Iraq and Iran in 1975, the resistance of the Kurds was weakened, especially as Iran stopped supporting the Kurds in Iraq, and both autonomy was lost and Mullah Mustafa Barzani decided to withdraw his forces to Iran, thus the movement that was started as a "revolution" came to an end. The process, known as "Ashbetal (stationary mill)" in Kurdish political history, was an important break in the Kurdish national struggle. Following this decision of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, approximately three months after the agreement, Ibrahim Ahmed and Celal Talabani, two of the leading figures of the Kurdish movement, left the KDP and founded the PUK.
As a matter of fact, this situation extended to the civil war and the formation of two separate regional governments in the 1990s. However, with the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, Iraqi Kurds achieved common gains by pushing the political rivalry between them to the background to a certain extent. Although the KRG gaining federal status with the 2005 Constitution was a step towards the institutionalization of a political, administrative, geographical and legal structure after long struggles, the competition and separation between the KDP and the PUK could not be resolved.
Equal partnership or dual management?
However, the developments that took place on November 4-6, 2026 brought the future of this joint management model into question again. The fact that the KDP elected the parliament without compromising with the PUK, and the PUK withdrew from the current government and threatened to form alternative governing bodies, shows that the competition between the two parties may turn into an institutional separation again. Because in the last two years, the common rhythm of KDP and PUK in both domestic politics and Baghdad politics has not only been disrupted but has turned into competition. This situation manifested itself concretely in the presidential elections of the last two terms. As a matter of fact, PUK leader Bafel Talabani's statements on November 5 show that the separation between PUK and KDP has become concrete in the first place. Bafel Talabani's words, "If you appoint a president in Erbil, we will appoint one in Sulaymaniyah. If you elect a prime minister, we will also elect one" are particularly noteworthy. “So either equal partnership or a return to dual management,” he says.
At first glance, it is possible to read Bafel Talabani's statement as a threat of division. But there is also frustration and a search for solutions. The statement is not unexpected. PUK is pressuring KDP through a parliament that cannot form a government. The message that it can establish a separate administration based in Sulaymaniyah is the strongest trump card of this pressure.
But it would be wrong to assume that the rupture reflects a will to completely separate. The possibility that the process is part of a strategy of controlled tension and mutual positioning between the parties should not be ignored. It would be appropriate to say that the actual implementation of this rupture scenario would mean that the parties have exhausted their trump cards on the table. Paradoxically, the moment when the possibility of disintegration is felt most may also be the moment when the possibility of peace is closest.
From de facto separation to institutional division
However, it is not impossible that KDP and PUK will take more radical steps in the coming period and the crisis will deepen. The focus of the issue is no longer just the establishment of a government or the sharing of political offices. However, it is unrealistic to directly attribute the developments to a civil war scenario. The heavy costs of past conflicts are obvious. Therefore, the real risk for the KRG today is the erosion or even disappearance of the political and administrative integrity of the region, rather than armed conflict. In such a situation, two separate administrative orders will be formed on the Erbil-Duhok and Suleymaniye-Halebçe axis. This scenario means that the current de facto separation becomes official in legal and political terms and the status of the KRG disappears. In other words, the political and administrative division of KRG.
A constitutional process is necessary for this process to gain a legal character. This is also quite complicated. However, if a de facto political and administrative division occurs, PUK in particular can be expected to take steps to carry this into a constitutional process. Because it is said that PUK has formed or will form a delegation to initiate and follow the legal process for the direct connection of Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, Raparin and Germiyan to Baghdad.
However, there seems to be still time for the threat of actually separating Sulaymaniyah from Erbil to be implemented. As a matter of fact, no one wants to be remembered as "the leader who divided the Kurds and KRG." There is also strong social objection to the official division of KRG. Of course, PUK can shape the political narrative in the region under its control. But this would create deep disappointment in Kurdish geopolitics as a whole.
Here, reading the entire situation through KYB will not give accurate results. KDP's uncompromising attitude is also a big problem. In a rational evaluation, it is also a problem for the KDP that it does not force Bafel Talabani to take more radical steps with the steps it will take regarding the presidency and government issue. Because it is clear that the KDP does not officially desire a return to two separate administrations. However, considering the irrational attitude he has exhibited in Baghdad and Kirkuk politics for a long time, it becomes difficult to make a definitive assessment.
Washington's silence
While all these developments were taking place, it is also noteworthy that US Ambassador to Ankara and Special Representative for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack, who had contacts in Iraq and met with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi on the day Bafel Talabani made his statement, did not make any statement on the issue, but still emphasized Iraq's sovereignty. Although the USA and Barack himself had previously taken some steps to reactivate the KRG parliament and end the political deadlock, Washington did not take a clear stance against the new division that emerged after the KDP convened the parliament without compromising with the PUK. Assessments that the Trump administration is less willing to mediate disputes between Kurdish parties also make this silence meaningful. This situation may even turn into a choice for the USA, which has recently wanted to strengthen Baghdad.
It is necessary for mediators, especially Ankara, to step in and reduce tensions. The opposite scenario will not have positive consequences for regional politics, including Türkiye. A balanced KRG is the most reasonable political choice for Türkiye. The process should not be left to Baghdad and Tehran.
Will the mill stop again?
In this respect, the current crisis can be read together with the historical connotations of the Ashbetal metaphor. The mill, which stopped with the end of the Kurdish national struggle in 1975, started to operate again with the political and administrative institutions established in the following years. Today, the disintegration of the common political will that keeps these institutions alive brings to the agenda the possibility of a new rupture of the PUK and the mill coming to a halt once again. However, unlike 1975, the danger for the Kurds this time is not the defeat of an uprising and the division of the political movement, but the dysfunction or even collapse of the constitutional and institutional status the Kurds have achieved due to internal political division.
This situation will have positive or negative consequences for the parties in different aspects. However, it is almost certain that it will fundamentally lead to the loss of perhaps the greatest geopolitical, political, administrative, geographical and legal gain that the Iraqi Kurds have achieved to date. However, it would not be wrong to say that the division in the KRG will create a multi-layered political and psychological fracture in Kurdish geopolitics. In an environment characterized by mutual distrust and reactionary politics, it is worrying that the possibility of reconciliation is gradually weakening. At this point, in order to reduce the tension, the KDP must take responsibility, show political will, adopt a more encompassing approach and create a basis for renegotiation with the PUK. If a will that can stop the deepening political, administrative, institutional and economic erosion cannot be created, it seems that it will not be easy to stop the separation.
