CNI reports deny the Government's version of the assault on Ceuta
Declassified documents reveal that the Government Delegation in Ceuta was alerted in advance of the seriousness of the assault
Quick Look
Declassified reports from the CNI reveal that the Government Delegation in Ceuta and the security forces were alerted about the massive assault on the city on July 29, contradicting official statements that denied knowing the seriousness of the risk.
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Why It Matters
The CNI sent tactical reports warning of a massive assault on Ceuta coinciding with the Throne Festival. The Government had previously denied knowledge of the seriousness of the threat.
The declassified reports from the National Intelligence Center (CNI) on the assault on Ceuta and sent to the Council of Ministers reveal a very important part of the Government's version. On the one hand, it is confirmed that the Government Delegation in Ceuta knew it, because on the 29th it received a tactical report "due to the extraordinary seriousness" of the situation that was approaching for the Throne Festival, the following day. On the other hand, the CNI also notified the Moroccan intelligence services.
The Government has defended that it did not know the seriousness of the existing risk, and specifically the delegate in Ceuta denied having received warnings; Now it is revealed that he did receive them. Furthermore, several ministers have praised Morocco's collaboration. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Manuel Albares, has highlighted Rabat's "essential" collaboration to stop the crisis, when it is clear that it did nothing to prevent the assault on Ceuta despite knowing about it in advance.
The declassified reports are different. The first of those prepared by the CNI corresponds to July 27 and was sent to the Presidency of the Government. It was what is called a "strategic note", that is, a note like many others that are sent regularly, but which already warned that there was high migratory pressure in Ceuta and Melilla.
Furthermore, this note warned of the possibility of a swimming assault on Ceuta, as it ended up happening. Furthermore, and in this it coincides with the first explanation offered by Pedro Sánchez, this intention to migrate to Spain was related to the Supreme Court ruling.
The second note, however, is not a conventional note. It is a tactical note sent on July 29 through an early warning channel to three actors: Civil Guard, National Police and Government Delegation.
Regarding the Civil Guard, whose responsibility is the physical security of the borders, it was sent to UCE-3, that is, to the Special Central Unit 3 of the Benemérita Information services. For its part, the National Police received that note at the CENIF, the intelligence unit of the General Commissariat for Immigration and Borders. Both the Police and the Civil Guard are the usual recipients of notes like this.
However, on this occasion, and due to "the extraordinary seriousness" of the situation, the Government Delegation in Ceuta was included, according to sources familiar with the case, and the note was sent to his chief of staff.
The proof precisely of that sending and the information that the delegate received is in this WhatsApp conversation between the CNI and the Government Delegation Cabinet, also declassified:
CNI: In RRSS there is a call for an assault by fence and sea tomorrow at 8 p.m.
CNI: Taking advantage of the throne party and that their FCS will be involved
CNI: There are two different groups with a total of 180,000 followers
CNI: To give you an idea of the scope of the dissemination
Delegation: Your rilas
21:34
Delegation: Call (11 minutes)
Finally, this note was also sent that same day the 29th to the Moroccan intelligence services: it was received by the DGST and the DGED, that is, the internal and external intelligence service, respectively.
Regarding the details of this note from the 29th, CNI agents and analysts identified a very clear threat: calls for a massive swimming assault on the city of Ceuta by organized groups, and a very clear date: the Throne Festival, which would take place the following day.
Of all the organized groups, the Spanish intelligence services identified three groups in the note as being the most numerous, and therefore those that could cause the most problems. The first was a WhatsApp group called "Assault on the Ceuta Fence".
The second and largest of all was a Faceook group with more than 160,000 members called Ceuta Fnideq [the Arabic name for Castillejos]. The third, also a Facebook group, was called Hraga Ceuta [the expression hraga means 'he who burns'], and had more than 2,000 members.
Among the publications that stand out in these groups, it is said: "Whoever wants to cross has the last chance at the throne party at 8, the authorities will be distracted with celebration and parades."
Regarding the possibility that Morocco was behind the organization of the assault and that it was an operation orchestrated by some institution of the Alawite State, the declassified reports say nothing. That, according to intelligence experts, would be another question, a topic to investigate separately.
The conversation with the UCE-3 of the Civil Guard is even more detailed and emphatic, and also proves that the information reached the Interior:
CNI: We have information about an attempt to swim and jump over the fence for tomorrow, the day of the Throne Festival
CNI: We have several groups on Facebook and WhatsApp encouraging these entries.
Open Questions
- Why did the Government deny having received the alerts?
- What measures did the Government Delegation take after receiving the notice?




