Deterrence is based on a simple fact: the enemy must believe that you have the means and the determination to hit them where it hurts. Germany and Europe are building missiles, drones and cyber weapons because they know that anyone who wants to deter must be able to act. In the struggle over what people believe and how they behave – the cognitive domain – we have a blind spot. Although our democracy is particularly vulnerable here, we are behaving purely reactively. We monitor our information space, debunk fake news, try to regulate social media - and think that's the whole task.
But the decisive terrain of the cognitive confrontation is not one's own society, but that of the attacker. What matters is not how well we filter out Russian narratives, but how well we understand and act on the machinery that produces them.
More than a decade ago, General Valery Gerasimov called for Russia to weight non-military over military means at a ratio of about four to one - to win wars before a shot is fired. Russia has built exactly this machine in the information space.
Two methods show how far things have come. Bot farms – large networks of fake accounts, increasingly AI-driven – are flooding social media to create the appearance of consensus. Even more perfidious: Since AI chatbots now access live results from the Internet, flooding the Internet with thousands of identical false claims can occupy the answer to a specific question - about a politician, a battle, a sanction - so that users receive answers close to the Kremlin without suspecting the source.
Nowhere are these methods used so intensively and nowhere are they as dangerous as before elections. Analyzes in Romania, Moldova and Armenia show identical patterns: massive manipulation of narratives, cyberattacks, economic pressure. Ahead of the German state elections, Russia used social media campaigns such as Matryoshka and “Storm-1516” to denigrate established parties and favor the AfD and BSW.
Defending the home front is urgently necessary, but not sufficient. A purely reactive attitude is doomed to a cat-and-mouse game in which each uncovered operation is followed by the next - and we are always one move behind. In the cognitive domain, whoever acts first has a huge advantage. But effective deterrence comes not just from reacting more quickly, but from understanding what drives Russia's own war machine so that the Kremlin knows: We see its weaknesses and, if necessary, can hit them where it hurts.
In our opinion, three factors are crucial for this.
Focus on Russia's weaknesses: In hybrid war, "understanding Russia" means understanding how the regime keeps its war machine running and recruits its soldiers - at what price, with what coercion, with what losses - including where its defense industrial supply chains are vulnerable and whether sanctions are actually noticeable.
Ukrainian experts have mapped where the regime is vulnerable - and recruitment in particular is a sensitive breaking point. An investigation by Open Minds of 132,000 posts on platforms such as Vkontakte and Telegram as well as 9,300 job advertisements showed that in 2025 around one in five recruitment advertisements presented military service as a “safe”, “away from the front” service. In fact, men who were recruited with the promise of deployment to the rear were sent to the front within weeks.
Moscow is also vulnerable in other areas where people have lost trust in regime propaganda. This is particularly true of the high social and economic costs of the Ukrainian war. Where regional recruitment bonuses, the core recruitment tool, stagnate or are cut while inflation continues, the regime's offer becomes devalued. At the same time, these payments increasingly reduce other government spending. The costs of the war are felt directly at the kitchen table. And with veterans returning home, violent crime is growing - an issue that deeply concerns many people and where the regime's messaging is in clear contradiction to what people on the ground are experiencing.
At such pressure points, truthful information, properly placed, can increase the real cost of Russia's war. Western governments, media and intelligence services should make greater use of these opportunities and be equipped for this task. The “legroom” required for the BND applies no less to the cognitive domain than to classic espionage.
From reaction to action: Targeting Russia's weaknesses does not mean mirroring Russia's methods. We must overcome our outdated ideas about what propaganda is. It's no longer about truth versus lies, not even about trolls and bots versus people - it's about who gets deeper into people's identities and hurts. Truth, used well, is a sharp sword: not as a dry fact check, but as an honest disclosure of what Russians already feel. The supposedly “safe service,” which quickly ends at the front, names a betrayal that Russian families feel before they can put it into words.
The question is: how can the West reach Russian society?
During the Cold War, Radio Liberty carried uncensored information about the Iron Curtain, reaching around 17 percent of adult Soviet citizens at its peak. The task of having an impact on the depths of Russian society takes on a new form today. On the one hand, technological progress also gives the West completely new, previously rarely used media influence options. But these are limited by ongoing restrictions on internet access. In addition, channels openly critical of the Kremlin only reach a limited, already convinced audience, and known dissidents are often reflexively dismissed or - in an increasingly tightening police state - avoided out of fear of what a searched phone might reveal. The task is therefore more subtle: How can we approach people within their own horizon of meaning instead of talking to them from outside? Which channels can be used to convey credible information that people trust and can reach them safely?
When it comes to how and with what topics best to reach Russian society, Europe can learn a lot from Ukraine. Their experience proves that access and impact are certainly possible, regardless of shrinking spaces. Decentralized networks and everyday digital spaces are ideal for this - where people don't talk about politics, but about their own lives. Germany can work with NGOs and Russian-language media.
But it's not just about whether a message resonates with the general public, but also about how the leadership in Moscow - the political, military and security policy decision-making level - reads the mood in their own country. When the Kremlin plans additional waves of recruitment or considers an escalation towards the Baltics, it relies on data and its view of its own society: How many men can still be recruited, and at what price? How many would leave the country if a new mobilization came? How far does consent go if costs rise?
The regime may be convinced that it can impose any version of reality on its population - but it is precisely in this self-assurance that there is a gap. The economics of war cannot be defined away, and the image that the leadership has of its own support can be influenced. Anyone who foresight shapes this perception not only affects society, but also the calculations of those who decide on escalation.
A European coalition of the willing: In view of increasing hybrid aggression, not only Ukraine, but also Europe should be prepared to take a more active role in the cognitive war. This requires leadership and new forms of cooperation, ideally in a coalition of the willing. Such a coalition could combine the analyzes from the government, think tanks and the private sector into a continuously updated picture of Russia's vulnerabilities. These findings would enable politicians to influence Russia's vulnerabilities in a more targeted manner than before - with their own narratives, sanctions, economic pressure or diplomacy. To do this, coalition members could build the skills and know-how that broad-based deterrence requires today.
Effective deterrence must follow ethical principles – and be openly announced
Such a coalition would be more than just another format to support Ukraine. Its purpose would be to specifically weaken Russia's capacity for hybrid aggression and thus contribute to de-escalation - as a common platform for intelligence about Russia, for cognitive deterrence and for countering Russian disinformation.
To do this, two things need to be clarified quickly. First, the ethical principles. What the West does in the cognitive domain must be based on truthful information and must be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. These principles should not be at the end of years of debate, but should be defined quickly - they are the prerequisite for being able to act at all, and not a subsequent reservation.
Second, the announcement. Deterrence only works if it is clearly stated. Europe should therefore openly declare that it is building these capabilities, under what rules it will use them and under what circumstances it is prepared to use them. Moscow needs to know that its vulnerabilities are known and that they will be exploited if necessary. Only then does analysis become deterrence.
Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven is a former vice president of the BND; Sviat Hnizdovskyi is the founder and CEO of Open Minds.
