Like much of what has happened in Israel since October 7, 2023, the defamation lawsuit by former director of the General Security Service (Shabak), Ronen Bar, against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, revolves around the chain of strategic and tactical failures that allowed the Hamas attacks. For now, the exchange of accusations and the revelations about the alerts and responsibilities surrounding the attack do not influence the polls ahead of the elections on October 27.
"The object of this lawsuit is not an attempt by the plaintiff to evade his responsibility for the share of blame that corresponds to Shabak in the Intelligence ruling, but rather a manifestly defamatory publication by the defendant, which tries to attribute to the plaintiff the responsibility that corresponds to himself," says Shabak's boss between 2021 and 2025 (when he resigned 7-0) in a document without precedent even in the long history of the sensitive relations between rulers and security chiefs in Israel.
Given the information about warnings received in September 2023 about a possible attack by Hamas, Netanyahu denounced two weeks ago that it is "an infamous and false campaign aimed at attributing all of Ronen Bar's negligence and crimes to the prime minister." He again accused him of inaction, of not evacuating the Nova Festival and of not waking him up despite the signals received in the early morning before the attack and that "he knew the true danger." He also alleged that Bar spoke numerous times with the army chief that night. They didn't really talk.
"I have decided not to remain silent (...) In the absence of a state commission of inquiry, the truth will come to light in the courts," says Bar, despite the fact that Netanyahu can ask for immunity as a deputy.
The demand for three million shekels (just over 862,000 euros) is actually Bar's indictment against Netanyahu. The extensive document responds to the allegations ("blood libel") and reveals dates and details of his warnings about a possible foreign attack. The former head of the main Intelligence body in relation to this enclave, along with the army, accuses the premier of having promoted a policy of "calm at any price" towards the Gaza Strip under Hamas control, which deteriorated Israel's deterrence capacity, and of ignoring his advice to hit Hamas, including its leader, Yahia Sinwar.
"This defamatory publication is part of a systematic series of false publications by the defendant, in an attempt to rewrite reality, echoing conspiracy theories as absurd as they are serious," says Bar, who adds about his former boss: "With one hand, he torpedoes any attempt to create a state commission of investigation that leads to the revelation of the truth through a professional and objective investigation; and, with the other, he selectively and misleadingly publishes fragments of documents that are in his possession and are not accessible to the public, "while defaming and launching unfounded accusations against the plaintiff (and against other security officials), which constitute a real incitement against them, in an attempt to rewrite history and completely ignore their responsibility for the events of October 7."
"Bar, which looks for pretexts to justify its great failure, did not wake up Netanyahu on the night of October 7 despite all the indications received," the Government responds. They point out that weeks before the attack, in which 1,200 people died and 251 were kidnapped, the security agencies assured the cabinet that Hamas was "dissuaded" and that Sinwar was betting on agreements similar to the one that allowed 20,000 Gazans to work in Israel. For them, proof that there was no specific warning is that these organizations were not prepared.
The 20 notices
The list of more than 20 warnings from Bar to Netanyahu (without the place and date of the possible attack) begins a week after his victory in the last elections. On November 7, 2022, Bar told him that Sinwar was coordinating terrorist attacks in the West Bank from Gaza. Netanyahu did not react. On January 8, 2023, he noted in a meeting that Sinwar was "interested in a confrontation on multiple fronts." "The absence of a response would be interpreted as granting immunity to those who directed terrorism and would seriously erode Israeli deterrence," Shabak's official then considered.
On February 13, 2023, he warned in a letter to Netanyahu that the armed groups in the region feel that they are facing their great opportunity due to the weakness they detect in Israel: "The internal fracture (around the controversial judicial reform plan) and the instability in the Palestinian arena can bring Israel closer to the perfect storm."
On March 22, Bar informed him that alerts of terrorist attacks had multiplied by three, confirming that Hamas had now become Iran's military arm. According to him, Netanyahu was focused on knowing the position of the security chiefs in the event of a constitutional crisis. It is worth remembering the context in those months: massive protests against the government initiative to weaken the judicial establishment and Netanyahu's terrible relationship with the army chiefs and Shabak, whom he saw as part of the establishment. Hence, he considered many of the warnings from Bar, the head of the army, Herzi Halevi, and the Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, as attempts to stop judicial reform.
In May, Bar advised a targeted attack on Hamas, warning that Sinwar was "going through a messianic process." "Netanyahu's response is his fear of the balance between selective attacks carried out by enemies' plans to carry out similar actions against him personally," he recalls.
On July 23, 2023 and through the red telephone, Bar gave him a "strategic war alert", in which he clarified that they did not know how to "give the day and time." He suggested a preemptive strike. On September 29, Bar called for attacking Hamas leaders. "The imposition of calm dictated by the defendant and the reduction of the freedom of action of the security forces in the Gaza Strip deprived these forces of the central component to thwart terrorism: the attack," he charged.
According to his version, Netanyahu's policy of calm, including Qatari economic aid, ended up allowing Hamas to strengthen until it became a "terrorist army on Israel's border." "The defendant assumed a very risky security bet: that, in the absence of a timely Intelligence alert that would precisely and in advance indicate the time, place and method of the attack, the citizens of Israel would be exposed to a surprise attack," he said.
"How many people could we have saved..."
In his first reaction, Netanyahu responded to Bar's statement that he communicated intelligence information in the hours before the attack to the prime minister's military secretary and that he did not have Netanyahu's cell phone number. "You had the red telephone number, you could call me immediately like all security chiefs do... How many people we could have saved if only you had called on time." Bar replies that Netanyahu "was immersed in a lethargy for months" and did not wake up "despite the alarm sirens."
Netanyahu claims that the recent allegations, which also include testimonies from several former senior officials such as Bar and his military secretary Avi Gil, are "part of a political campaign" to make him lose the elections.
