Germany has broken a taboo in its security policy: its spies will be able to go from monitoring the adversary to sabotaging its operations. The Bundestag approved this Friday what the Minister of the Interior, Alexander Dobrindt, proclaimed as the "reform of the century": an expansion of powers that will allow the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) to disable facilities abroad, manipulate supplies and paralyze servers. The objective, in the words of the minister, is to convert the information services into "genuine secret services."
The reform brings the BND closer to the field of clandestine operations in which services such as the American CIA, the British MI6 or the Israeli Mossad operate. The new German mandate has an express limit: killing operations are excluded.
With 309 votes in favor, 190 against and 71 abstentions, the coalition of conservatives and social democrats carried out a profound reorganization of German security. In a government accustomed to publicly discussing its differences, the agreement represents a political victory for Dobrindt. The SPD demanded tightening controls, but supported the core of the new operational powers. Germany is "a terrain of operations for terrorism, extremism and foreign powers," the minister said before the Bundestag.
Their response to this "shadow conflict that threatens our freedom" involves giving agents tools to deactivate threats where they are prepared. The Executive points especially to Russia, although it also warns of the activities of China and Iran. Computer counterattacks, known as hackbacks, are no longer a red line. The BND may penetrate systems, alter or delete data, block communications and disable servers from which attacks are launched. The action must comply with specific legal conditions and criteria of necessity and proportionality.
The reach goes beyond the screens. Examples set forth by the Government include introducing defective components in certain deliveries or accessing the systems of a drone factory or a chemical weapons laboratory to interrupt its production. The rule contemplates responding to immediate dangers discovered during an investigation and acting in the face of persistent and planned threats from foreign powers. That mandate will require means. The networks, specialists and experience to sustain operations abroad are not born with a parliamentary vote. Berlin wants to reduce its dependence on allies, whose warnings have been decisive in preventing attacks in Germany. The legal authorization opens a field in which the BND will have to develop its capabilities.
Within the country, the reform crosses another threshold: that of housing. In situations of particular danger, agents of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), responsible for internal intelligence, may clandestinely enter a home, for example to manipulate a technical device. The faculty will be subject to specific requirements and the prior use of other measures. It does not authorize access simply to find out how a suspect lives. Police arrests and open searches will continue to be the responsibility of the police. Physical coercion against people is excluded for both services. The Government invokes a specific problem to justify the exception. A foreign agency may provide information about a potential terrorist and prohibit it from being passed on to police to protect its sources. Until now, the internal service had to resort to other authorities to intervene. In certain urgent cases, you may do so on your own if those authorities cannot prevent the damage in time.
There lies the most delicate frontier of the reform. The separation between police and Intelligence was established as a guarantee against the concentration of power and the abuses of Nazism: some collect information and others exercise police powers. The coalition assures that the principle remains. The opposition questions to what extent the new exceptions erode it. The Left warns of the risk of creating a secret police. The Greens support the modernization of the BND, but criticize the powers of the internal service, including the possibility of recruiting underage informants. There is also concern about the use of these tools under a future AfD government. At the request of the SPD, a "resilience clause" was introduced that will allow cooperation with the services of a federal state to be restricted when essential security interests are threatened. Although it does not mention the AfD, it responds to fears that sensitive information could be exposed under a far-right regional administration.
