Mainland Chinese prefer coercion over military force on Taiwan, low faith in US but favor engagement
Quick Look
- A China Pulse survey shows Mainland Chinese citizens prefer coercion over military force to resolve the Taiwan issue, hold low opinions of the US, yet support engaging Washington on trade and security matters.
- The survey ran from April 16 to June 26, 2026, straddling the first Trump-Xi summit in Beijing but preceding the second in Washington.
AI-generated summary
Why It Matters
The China Pulse survey is a biannual study conducted by The Carter Centre and Emory University to gauge Mainland Chinese public opinion on foreign policy issues, including Taiwan and US relations.
China Pulse study also reveals faith in the US remains low, although still support for engaging with Washington on trade and security issues
3 -MIN READ3 -MIN
Mark Magnierin New York
Published: 5:14am, 6 Oct 2026Updated: 5:16am, 6 Oct 2026
Mainland Chinese prefer coercion over military force to settle the “reunification question” with Taiwan, and their opinion of the US remains low, although they favour engaging with Washington on trade and security.
These are the results from the latest survey of Mainland citizens, conducted between April 16 and June 26. This straddled the first summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing but came before the second one in Washington last month.
“The Chinese public attitude towards Taiwan fits very well with domestic messaging on Taiwan in China,” said Nick Zeller, lead researcher with The Carter Centre, which conducted the biannual China Pulse survey with Emory University.
What to Watch
AI outlook — possibilities, not facts
Mainland China will continue to favor non-military coercion over force in Taiwan policy unless provoked
Likely · Within months
Open Questions
- What specific forms of coercion do Mainland Chinese favor regarding Taiwan?
- How do younger generations in Mainland China differ in opinion from older cohorts on Taiwan and US engagement?
- What are the long-term implications of low US favorability despite support for engagement?







