Mojtaba Khamenei's Security Move: The Old Guard Returns to the Field

The most striking point in Mojtaba Khamenei's preferences was that instead of creating a new and young security generation after the war, he turned to experienced figures who served in critical periods from the Iran-Iraq War to the regime's internal security crises. The common feature of the commanders appointed to important positions in the Iranian armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard is that they represent the hard security line against the USA, as well as their long years of experience within the system. For this reason, the appointments are read in Tehran as the re-fortification of the state according to the order of battle, rather than a simple "filling the vacant seats" operation.

One of the strongest links in the appointment chain was 71-year-old Muhsin Rızai. Rezai, who led the Revolutionary Guard Army between 1981 and 1997 and was the head of the institution throughout most of the Iran-Iraq War, was appointed General Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. With the decision announced by the office of President Massoud Pezeshkiyan, Rezai replaced Mohammed Baqir Zulkadr, while Mojtaba Khamenei, with a separate decree, made Rezai the representative of the religious leader in the council. Thus, Rezai not only returned to the management of the mechanism where Iran's most important security decisions are taken; At the same time, he gained the political weight to act directly on Khamenei's behalf.

RETURN OF RIZAI: A “WAR VETERAN” TO THE TABLE OF HORmuz

Rıza's return draws attention especially due to its timing. While contacts between Iran and the USA regarding the future of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions and ending the war continue, Tehran has placed one of the most well-known commanders of the Iran-Iraq War at the center of its security policy, instead of a negotiator technocrat. In analyzes published in French and English, Rezai's appointment is considered as a sign of Khamenei's quest to increase the weight of Iran's security bureaucracy in future negotiations with Washington. After taking office, Rezai also argued that Iran would not open a second sea corridor in Hormuz, and that the strait would not return to the old order before the war ends and no steps are taken regarding the frozen Iranian assets.

Mojtaba Khamenei was not satisfied with this. New appointments were made to six critical positions in Tehran's military command. While Major General Ali Abdullahi became the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, Kiyumers Haydari was appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff. Ahmed Vahidi was promoted to major general and made General Commander of the Revolutionary Guards Army, and Mustafa Izadi was appointed as his deputy. While Ali Azmaei became the head of the Revolutionary Guard Naval Forces, Hussein Taib, one of the most controversial figures in the Iranian security system, returned to the command of the Basij Organization.

A significant portion of the seats occupied by these names are made up of the heavy gaps left by the war in Iran's command level. Abdullahi assumed the position of Chief of General Staff, replacing Abdurrahim Mousavi, who was killed in the US-Israeli attacks on February 28. Ahmed Vahidi took over the seat of Muhammed Pakpur, who was also killed in the attacks. In the Revolutionary Guard Marine Corps, Ali Azmaei replaced Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed in the Israeli attack in March. Hüseyin Taib was appointed as the head of Basij after the death of Gulamreza Suleimani. In other words, Tehran replaces the commanders killed by the war with names with high combat experience and whose loyalty to the regime has been tested.

INSTRUCTION IS NOT JUST "DEFENSE"

The language of the appointment decrees is at least as important as the names. Mojtaba Khamenei asked the new military administration to strengthen the capacity and preparedness of the Iranian Armed Forces against both traditional and "emerging" military threats. While giving instructions to complete the planned structuring between the General Staff and the Hatemu'l-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the task given to the new Revolutionary Guard Commander Ahmed Vahidi emphasized "deterrence" as well as preparation for strong offensive operations against the enemy. This statement strengthened the assessments that Iran's next strategy may not be limited to a defense doctrine that only counters the attack.

One of the most striking turns in the appointments was 63-year-old Hüseyin Taib. Taib, the former head of the Revolutionary Guard Intelligence Organization, was dismissed in 2022 without a detailed reason being disclosed to the public. Taib, who previously directed Basij, stood out as one of the important actors of the security mechanism, especially during the protests following the controversial presidential election in 2009. Now, his return to the head of Basij leads to comments that Mojtaba Khamenei has increased the firewall not only against the war outside, but also against social fluctuations that may arise inside.

NEW TASK FOR BESİC: FROM STREET TO INTELLIGENCE

Khamenei's instructions to Taib are particularly noteworthy in this respect. Besic's nationwide "public intelligence network" is requested to be strengthened, education and talent capacity to be increased, and new technologies to be used more intensively. The expansion of the intelligence capacity of the Basij structure, which extends to very wide segments of Iranian society, from neighborhoods to universities, from workplaces to public institutions, shows that new protest movements that may arise if the economic crisis deepens are at the center of Tehran's security calculations.

Jason Brodsky, policy director of the US-based organization United Against Nuclear Iran, also interpreted the appointments as an indication that the Iranian administration is adopting an approach that is ready to take more risks and conflict. According to Brodsky, Mojtaba Khamenei's return to the field of the "old guard" reveals that Tehran continues to see itself at war for the foreseeable future. Taib's appointment as head of Basij is not only explained by external threats; It is evaluated that the Iranian administration is worried that the deteriorating economic conditions will cause mass protests again, and in such a case, Basij will be one of the main forces on the street.

Khamenei IS THERE, BUT STILL NOT THERE

Although Mojtaba Khamenei signed all these decisions, one of the most striking paradoxes of Iranian politics continues: The new religious leader has still not appeared in public. The fact that Mojtaba Khamenei, who took over the government after his father Ali Khamenei was killed in the attacks at the beginning of the war on February 28, has not been physically seen for months, although this is explained for security reasons, brings about discussions about his health, mobility and real influence in the system. On the other hand, the decrees he issued indicate that he started to create his own power network, especially in the security and military bureaucracy.

However, the appointments do not mean that all gaps in Iran's war management have been closed. It is stated that the permanent names of some critical positions at the head of the Revolutionary Guard Intelligence Organization and the Intelligence Protection Organization, as well as sensitive intelligence and operations positions within the General Staff, have not been disclosed to the public. Uncertainties also continue regarding Iran's permanent defense and intelligence ministers. This picture suggests that Khamenei is carrying out the reorganization of the intelligence structure in a more controlled manner while rapidly reconstructing the military command chain.

SECOND WAR IN TEHRAN: BALANCE OF POWER

Another dimension of the appointments is the internal power struggle in Tehran. According to the evaluations reported by the French newspaper Le Monde, Mohammed Baqir Zulkadr's departure from the Supreme National Security Council and his replacement by Rezai can also be read as Mojtaba Khamenei's attempt to limit the recently increasing influence of the Parliament Speaker Mohammed Baqir Qalibaf. While Zulkadr is considered to be close to Qalibaf, the arrival of Rezai may have aimed to balance the weight of Qalibaf, who came to the fore in the contacts with Washington, on the security council. Iran expert Hamidreza Azizi also evaluates the change as the new religious leader starting to establish his own circle within the collective governance system formed during the war.

This situation also creates a sensitive equation for President Massoud Pezeshkiyan. While the Pezeshkian administration advocates keeping diplomatic channels open and using the option of negotiating with Washington, the shift in the center of gravity of the security bureaucracy towards names such as Rezai, Vahidi and Taib may strengthen the hand of hardliners in the decision-making mechanism. International analysis particularly highlights the assessment that Rezai's appointment shows that Tehran has not completely closed the door to a possible agreement, but does not want to step back without serious concessions from the United States.

THE 60-DAY HOUR IS UP, NOW EYES ARE ON WASHINGTON

The real question is how all these military and security fortifications will affect the diplomatic process with the United States. The expiration of the 60-day period for reaching an agreement with Washington coincided with the start of new staff in Tehran. While Parliament Speaker Muhammed Bakır Kalibaf stood out in the contacts so far, it was considered that Kalibaf had a less harsh line compared to some names in the security system. Rezai's appointment as head of the Supreme National Security Council and the strengthening of staff with high combat experience in the Revolutionary Guard indicate that future negotiations can be conducted within a stricter security framework.

The picture coming out of Tehran is therefore quite clear: Mojtaba Khamenei has not yet appeared before the Iranian people, but he has put his team on the field. On the one hand, Muhsin Rezai, the 71-year-old commander of the Iran-Iraq War, and on the other hand, Hussein Taib, with his background in intelligence and fighting against protests; Ahmed Vahidi at the head of the Revolutionary Guards, Ali Azmaei at sea... The new religious leader's first major staff choice was to return to the oldest security reflexes of the Islamic Republic, instead of looking for new faces for the "new Iran". It is not yet known whether the table will be re-established with Washington; But it is now much more obvious that Tehran has strengthened its trenches before pulling its chair to the table.