Western Sahara and limits of the Security Council

The Security Council (SC) has just been involved in a unique episode. The disagreements of two permanent members have left the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), deployed since 1991, without a mandate. On October 30, Russia vetoed a US resolution that had obtained eleven favorable votes. A Russian counterproposal to extend it also failed: it gathered three supports, eleven abstentions and a negative vote from the United States. MINURSO, whose annual renewal had become almost a diplomatic routine, has entered the liquidation phase after thirty-five years in the territory, prior to the withdrawal of its troops.

The Moroccan reaction was immediate and surprising. The Royal Palace proclaimed the closing of a historical stage and demanded the withdrawal of troops, equipment and symbols of the United Nations (UN). Furthermore, he stressed his intention to ensure that the matter disappears from the agenda of the CS and other bodies of the entity. A non-decision by the SC - since it was unable to approve any resolution - changed, in the consequences projected by Rabat, a transcendental step towards the definitive closure of the legal file of Western Sahara (SO) in the UN.

Morocco celebrates and extrapolates the dismantling of an international instrument that has accompanied its greatest diplomatic successes in recent decades. The controversy over the territory, registered since 1963 on the list of "non-autonomous", had found a channel in the CS that was progressively favorable to Rabat. The autonomy proposal presented in 2007 gained ground until it became the axis of the negotiations. Resolution 2797 of October 2025 represented an important step forward in that direction, although it preserved the mutually acceptable solution compatible with self-determination.

Why give up now on a procedure that has produced such good results? Perhaps because Morocco believes that it has gotten everything it could get from the UN. The final objective was to transform the political support for their proposal into the legal consecration of their sovereignty. And there the Russian veto, the Chinese reservations and the nuances expressed by other members of the SC have emerged.

Washington's original approach established autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the only viable solution and the Rabat plan as the only basis for negotiation. It also planned to reconfigure MINURSO into a political mission, reduce its military component and eliminate the "R" for referendum from the acronym. It was not a mere update of an operation created to organize a consultation that has not been carried out; It was the attempt to modify the rules and predetermine the outcome.

The objections raised forced corrections to be introduced in successive drafts. Autonomy stopped being the "only" viable solution, becoming "more" viable. References to the Charter and self-determination reappeared. Mission transformation was softened. But the United States, in charge of the preparation and leader of the negotiation of the text - the penholder, in CS jargon -, preserved the essential: the Moroccan plan would be the only basis for the talks.

Russia prevented it by veto. His demand for international law is difficult to reconcile with the invasion of Ukraine and the harangues of its leader against the order of which the CS is the key. But the Kremlin's contradictions do not automatically make any American alternative legitimate. China preferred to abstain, although it criticized the attempt to predetermine the outcome of the negotiations, taking Moroccan sovereignty for granted. Pakistan and Somalia also did not accompany Washington. And several countries that voted in favor, such as Denmark or Latvia, clarified that they were not recognizing any Moroccan sovereignty.

The outcome revealed the limits of the American fiat. The eleven favorable votes did not entail eleven recognitions of sovereignty. Nor did they express a shared will to liquidate the international presence in the territory.

There is, however, a more revealing aspect. Russia later proposed a one-year extension without substantially altering MINURSO's mandate. His text did not obtain the necessary nine votes. The United States voted against and did not facilitate a negotiated solution. There is no evidence of prior collusion between Washington and Moscow, but there are reasons to understand that Washington tactically consented to a term that frustrated its project while limiting the extension of the existing device without the proposed modifications.

The explanation of the European vote allows us to appreciate the uniqueness of that option. France, which in 2024 had gone further than Spain and the United Kingdom in placing the future of the territory under Moroccan sovereignty, supported the American project, but warned of the risks of losing the mission. London also supported the American project, although it reiterated the demand for a mutually accepted solution that guarantees self-determination. Both distinguished between favoring Moroccan autonomy and dispensing with an international stabilization instrument. Spain, for its part, forms, together with the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia, the Group of Friends of Western Sahara. In March 2022, Pedro Sánchez informed Mohamed VI, through a letter that the Alawite Royal Palace disclosed, that he considered the Moroccan plan the most serious, credible and realistic basis to resolve the controversy. Without recognizing Moroccan sovereignty, it abandoned the traditional position of not taking sides in the conflict. It remains, by the way, unknown what position the Sánchez government defended during the consultations that preceded the failure of the CS.

Rabat's public satisfaction does not therefore seem improvised. The Foreign Minister, Nasser Bourita, has admitted that Morocco was aware of the Russian intention to veto the US project and had evaluated its consequences. The official celebration has its political logic. Morocco has the determined support of the Trump Administration. It has made considerable diplomatic progress, but runs into a barrier when it tries to get the SC to recognize its sovereignty over the SO. The disappearance of MINURSO eliminates an international presence that reminded each year of the inconclusive nature of the controversy. Rabat may prefer to consolidate the de facto path and resort to bilateral recognitions rather than continue subjecting its position to periodic examination by an institution in which it does not reap definitive victory. And it borders on paradox that Morocco aspires to occupy a non-permanent seat in the SC during 2028-2029.

At the internal level, the struggle for the SO continues to be a fundamental element of legitimization of the monarchy since Hassan II. Presenting territorial integration as an outdated issue would have obvious political and dynastic value in a period of dynastic relief with the growing prominence of the crown prince and unrest among young people.

But proclaiming a victory is not equivalent to obtaining it. The expiration of the mandate - even the departure - of MINURSO does not alter the legal status of the SO, which continues to be registered among the non-autonomous territories of the UN. It does not transfer sovereignty, it does not extinguish the powers of the General Assembly and it does not resolve the conflict with the Polisario Front (FP). The 1991 ceasefire broke down in 2020, leading to low-intensity hostilities. Both Morocco and the PF have recently expressed their willingness to avoid an escalation. Minso's withdrawal, however, eliminates an observation and containment mechanism when stability remains precarious.

The episode acquires its true dimension when contemplated from the evolution of the multilateral system. For decades, the United States used its influence at the UN to push for agreements and guide pacts and mediations, even when these did not entirely respond to its priorities. The history of the Baker II Plan, valued by the CS in 2003 as an optimal political solution but never applied in the face of Moroccan rejection, illustrates the limits that the negotiation imposed on the projects of the great powers.

The novelty of 2026 lies in Washington's (un)willingness to preserve an instrument when it fails to transform it to its convenience. The main architect of the international order that emerged in 1945 shows less and less interest in his institutions if they do not comply with his objectives. It is not that before power was subject to law without exceptions. But that architecture made it possible to channel rivalries, contain crises and keep solution procedures open.