Iliana Yotova, 62, a former journalist and former MEP, is the new president of Bulgaria since this Sunday. His election, after crushing the liberal and pro-European Andrey Gyurov in the second round of the elections (by 57.7% to 39.4%), confirms the pro-Russian turn that began with the election in April, as prime minister, of the former Eurosceptic general Rumen Radev. And it consolidates the existence of a group of Eastern European countries - along with Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary - in favor of cutting aid to Ukraine.
Whether this state of opinion remains specifically limited to a part of the former member countries of the Warsaw Pact or spreads throughout the European Union will depend largely on the electoral evolution that occurs in the coming months in other European countries, where the extreme right espouses similar theses. All of this in a context of disenchantment among European public opinion, which is increasingly resistant to Ukraine's accession to the EU.
In her first statements, the new Bulgarian president - who was a popular television journalist in the 1990s before entering politics with the Bulgarian Socialist Party, heir to the former communist party - presented herself as a "peace president" and advocated restoring relations with Moscow and ending military support for Ukraine. His election reinforces the political line set by Radev, with whom he has formed a tandem since 2016, whose government defends ending sanctions against Russia and restoring purchases of Russian gas and oil.
Bulgaria is not alone on this front. Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary are on the same or similar wavelength. In the first case, the nationalist and populist Robert Fico - who in 2023 was elected prime minister for a third term, after a hiatus in the opposition - attributes the origin of the Ukrainian war to United States policy and, like his Bulgarian colleagues, is in favor of resuming relations with Moscow. In addition, it has cut off direct military aid to Kyiv and restricted aid to Ukrainian refugees. In the Czech Republic, the also reborn Prime Minister Andrej Babis – a wealthy Eurosceptic businessman who returned to power at the end of 2025 allied with the far right – has taken similar measures.
The case of Hungary is striking. Everyone hoped that with the fall of Viktor Orbán, who systematically blocked aid to Ukraine with his right of veto, things were going to change radically. It hasn't been like that. Certainly, the new Hungarian Prime Minister, Péter Magyar - elected last May - has a different attitude and does not put any brakes on the wheels. It lets things be done, but it washes its hands, which indirectly - according to critical European countries - helps Russia. The truth is that with Magyar relations between Budapest and Kyiv - historically tense due to the Hungarian minority living in western Ukraine - remain difficult. The Hungarian prime minister refuses to send him weapons and recently blocked a project to store Ukrainian oil in Hungary.
These four countries oppose continuing to contribute to the war effort in Ukraine, which after the defection of the United States under Donald Trump depends more than ever on European aid. The EU is currently debating how - probably through new common debt - to finance the additional 70 billion euros that Kyiv needs for next year (and which will not be covered by the loan initially approved for the 2026-2027 period of 90 billion). The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is traveling these days from capital to capital to raise awareness among European leaders about the urgency of resolving financing. Whatever the proposal that Brussels puts on the table at the summit on November 26, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary have distanced themselves from any commitment in this regard, taking advantage of the opting-out clause.
(The discussion has begun to mix with the debate on the EU budget framework for the next seven years. Germany, which is one of the countries that is making the most economic effort in support of Ukraine and leads the group of frugal countries that ask for cuts in community accounts, reproaches the Eastern dissidents for demanding to maintain the cohesion and common agrarian policy items, of which they are beneficiaries, while avoiding any economic commitment to Kyiv)
Could this dissident group expand in the coming months? It is not disposable. The elections that must be held in Spain (next November 29), France, Italy and Poland (in 2027) could substantially alter the political map and the balance of forces within the EU. With consequences also for Ukraine.
Due to its proximity to the other Eastern countries - with which it is part of the Visegrad Group - the case of Poland is interesting. The weight of History means that anti-Russian sentiment is very widespread in the country, so a rapprochement between Warsaw and Moscow is highly unlikely. However, relations with Kyiv are not going through their best moment - unrest in the country due to the high presence of refugees and the competition for Ukrainian wheat, old historical resentments... - and, what is more significant, the delivery of weapons to Ukraine has begun to be called into question: the main opposition party, the ultranationalist Law and Justice - which despite not governing has retained the presidency of the country - protested months ago against the shipment of Patriot anti-missiles, alleging that Poland was left unprotected and Ukraine was not protected. He drove like a loyal partner.
But the country that could change the balance is France. The presidential elections next May could end up elevating to the Elysée - this is what all the polls so far predict - the leader of the far-right National Rally (RN), Marine Le Pen, who had previously maintained close ties with Moscow (which financed one of her electoral campaigns). In a recent interview, Le Pen announced that her intention if she governs is to cut French economic aid to Ukraine (which she estimated at 6 billion euros per year) to dedicate that money to other internal needs. The RN presidential candidate, in an apparent gesture of magnanimity, said that she will instead maintain the supply of military material... as long as someone else pays for it, it is understood. At the other end of the parliamentary arc, Jean-Luc Mélenchon's La France Insoumise (LFI), from the radical left, maintains total ambiguity in its program regarding military support for Ukraine, a chapter in which it opts for diplomatic channels.
France's defection could cause a knock-on effect. In Italy, the prime minister and leader of the post-fascist Brothers of Italy, Giorgia Meloni, although in the past she had expressed some proximity to the Kremlin, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 she has firmly aligned herself with the rest of the EU and NATO against Moscow. Could you turn again? In any case, one of his government partners - the leader of La Liga, Matteo Salvini - is decidedly pro-Russian, as well as one of the rising figures facing the next elections: former general Roberto Vannacci, leader of the Futuro Nazionale party, which seeks to gain ground from the radical extreme right. On the other side of the political arc, the Five Star Movement rejects the shipment of weapons to Ukraine and is committed to solving the conflict through diplomacy.
In Spain, Vox, which could condition the political bias of a next PP government, has formally aligned itself with support for Ukraine and against Russian expansionism. However, his alliance in Europe - in the Patriots group - with rather pro-Russian parties and his proximity to the US president, Donald Trump, close to Vladimir Putin, could make him swing towards more "pragmatic" positions.
In such a scenario, could Germany continue to lead the European resistance? The Germans do not plan to go to the polls next year (in a national election), but we must not forget that the party that leads the voting intentions, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), defends approaching Russia again and leaving Ukraine in the lurch, without military or financial aid. Not refugees.
It is not strange that, in these circumstances, European leaders try to influence the process promoted by the US to seek a negotiated solution to the war as soon as possible, especially after Donald Trump - who has emerged enormously weakened from the midterm elections, but maintains control of US foreign policy - had turned in recent weeks in favor of the Russian president's theses and agreed with him to lift the diesel embargo. Next week, on the 10th and 11th, representatives from Russia and Ukraine and the US mediators - Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner - will meet in Abu Dhabi to address the conditions of an eventual ceasefire and a roadmap for a stable and lasting peace. The challenge is crucial for Europe, as Washington appears to have adopted Moscow's conceptual framework of addressing a global “European security architecture.”
On Thursday, representatives of Ukraine, the countries of the so-called E3 group (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) and the United States held a preparatory meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels. And the day before, this time at the EU headquarters in the Belgian capital, another meeting of the same actors plus the World Bank was held to address the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war. At the same time, a group of eleven European countries - including Spain - led by France and the United Kingdom will carry out maneuvers in Poland between November 9 and 22 of what may constitute the embryo of the future Multinational Force for Ukraine (MNF-U), which would contribute to guaranteeing security once a ceasefire has been signed. 2,800 soldiers will participate in the exercise, named Koalicja (coalition, in Polish).
Despite all this activity, the direct participation of the EU in the negotiations is not clear, nor is it clear who should be the interlocutor representing Europe at the table. The restricted format in which contacts are being addressed by the European side has irritated some leaders, such as the Italian Prime Minister, who considers it “unacceptable.” Giorgia Meloni sent a letter of complaint to the president of the European Council, António Costa, who has committed to finding a formula through which the EU can present a unified position.
In this context, the eventual accession of Ukraine to the EU becomes relevant, a process that initially began in 2022 with its official designation as a candidate and which has an uncertain calendar. Despite Kyiv's haste, the European Commission this week avoided venturing a date for its incorporation into the community club, while it did so with Albania, Moldova and Montenegro (between 2028 and 2029). Hence, the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, proposed at the time the creation of an “associate member” status so that Ukraine could begin to participate - without a vote - in the life of the EU (and hence also why he opposed the idea of the president of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, of using this term for the alliance with Canada).
Ukraine's accession path is expected to be full of obstacles, and not only due to the difficulties of the negotiation process and the reforms that are required, but also due to the resistance of some countries, particularly Hungary. The general atmosphere of European public opinion is not at ease with the future partner either. According to a survey by the Bertelsmann Foundation, 53% of Europeans are against, while 47% are in favor. By country, citizens of Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden are mostly favorable. Not so in Germany, Belgium, France, Italy or Poland...
