Power struggle in Warsaw: Why are institutions at odds in Poland?

Eastern Europe regional expert Emrah Dokuzlu wrote for AA Analysis about the reflections of the deepening political and institutional crisis in Poland over the Constitutional Court on the country's domestic politics and foreign policy.

The tension in front of the Constitutional Court in Warsaw on the night of October 30 showed that the ten-year-long battle for constitutional authority in Poland had turned into a de facto struggle for sovereignty. This rupture is a natural continuation of judicial legitimacy, which has not been shared among state bodies since the 2015 elections. The process started with the controversial judge elections held at the last moment by the Civil Platform, which was losing power, and then deepened when the Law and Justice (PiS) government deemed these appointments invalid and appointed its own candidates to the court. Court decisions, which have been the subject of independence criticism by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and European Union (EU) institutions for years, were rendered practically unenforceable when the Donald Tusk cabinet, which took over power in 2023, stopped publication in the Official Gazette.

By 2026, the crisis has become institutionalized rather than resolved. While the parliamentary majority aimed to change the composition of the court by electing new judges, Polish President Karol Nawrocki used his authority to veto the appointment of most of these names. The court administration also clarified its side by confirming that the president is not obliged to approve. At this point, the issue in Poland is no longer a purely judicial debate. It has evolved into a double-headed state crisis, in which the parliamentary majority and the government on the one hand, and the presidency and the current court administration on the other hand, do not recognize each other's powers.

In Poland, a three-fifths majority in the parliament (Sejm) is required to overcome the presidential veto, and the Tusk coalition does not have this majority. The second veto gate after the Presidency is the Constitutional Court. This institution has the final say in authority disputes between the president and the prime minister. Moreover, the judges' 9-year term is longer than the election calendar. Whoever shapes the court today can tie the hands of the government after the 2027 elections. The key institution in the debate on the supremacy of EU law is the Constitutional Court.

What happens next?

In Poland, institutional duality is no longer a prediction but a de facto situation. On November 3, the crisis deepened further with new meetings. The wing that took over the management of the Constitutional Court approved the 2027 budget of the court in the General Assembly, which was held under the shadow of absolute majority discussions, and formed disciplinary committees against the former president and his deputy, who were suspended from office. The Polish Presidency and the former administration immediately declared these decisions invalid. The Supreme Court, which convened on the same day, could not reach the quorum due to boycotts and registered the de facto division in the judiciary. Thus, after the state architecture in Poland, the higher judicial bodies themselves became two-headed.

Tension does not decrease on the political ground either. Opening the National Security Council meeting, Nawrocki asked Tusk for two things: to "restrain the excesses of his power" before Independence Day on November 11 and to put an end to "illegal activities" in the Constitutional Court building. Nawrocki said he would use "all his powers" to protect the constitutional order, but did not explain what they were. Polish Presidential Office Head Zbigniew Bogucki's suggestion that the court be dissolved and the judges re-elected showed how narrow the ground for compromise had become. This calendar, which is tied to a national holiday, will create new breaking points in the coming weeks, along with budget and discipline processes. While this uncertainty affects the outcome of more than a thousand files pending before the court, it also weakens legal predictability in many areas, from taxes to public services.

Refreezing EU funds seems unrealistic under Tusk because Brussels has clearly favored the government. The main risk is that if a right-wing government is formed in 2027, the rule of law condition will come into play again in the next EU budget period. Polexit, that is, Poland's departure from the EU, is not a realistic scenario. What is more likely is that Poland, while remaining in the EU, will selectively implement EU Court of Justice rulings and Brussels' demands on matters it considers to fall within its sphere of sovereignty.

There is a risk of cracks in the coalition. According to the survey conducted by IBRiS in October, 32.7 percent of the participants do not find either side right in the political tension. About half of Third Way voters agree. The October data of the research foundation CBOS indicates that polarization benefits the two major parties, the Civil Coalition (KO) and PiS, while the smaller coalition partners remain below the threshold. Although this picture may help Tusk re-unite his own voter base, it may create fatigue among the central voters. According to some parliamentary distribution estimates, the right-wing parties consisting of PiS, Confederation, Braun's party and Morawiecki's political movement are together capable of providing a majority in the parliament. While the crisis brings together different right-wing groups on common political ground, President Nawrocki stands out as a figure who can bring together the divided right-wing voters.

Reflections of the crisis on foreign policy

Due to its geography, Poland is dependent on Washington for security and Brussels for economy. The two camps differ on which basis to prioritize, and they carry out this division through internal veto points such as the Constitutional Court. The crisis therefore deepens the country's two-headed foreign policy: On the one hand, the government aligned with Brussels, and on the other hand, President Nawrocki leaning on the Trump administration.

Nawrocki openly linked the two files at the National Security Council, which he convened to discuss the permanent US base. He said it would be deeply irresponsible to sacrifice the American military presence "because of people who are not Supreme Court justices." This shows that the Washington channel has turned into a tool of legitimacy and pressure in domestic politics. The polarization also spread to the external representation network. Poland's ambassadors to Beijing and Bucharest, Jakub Kumoch and Paweł Soloch, resigned, finding the move against the court unlawful. UN Permanent Representative Krzysztof Szczerski also requested that his term of office be shortened without giving any reason. It is noteworthy that all three people who resigned were from the close circle of former Polish President Andrzej Duda. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski argues that the pressure from the presidential office is behind the resignations. All these developments show that the duality in foreign policy has now become embedded in institutions.

The two camps are not on the same page regarding Ukraine. The Polish government puts military and political support for Kiev at the center of its foreign policy. Polish President Nawrocki and his base support Ukraine against Russia, but follow a more cautious and conditional attitude. Nawrocki's signing of the law abolishing special support measures for Ukrainian refugees in February and his frequent bringing of historical issues to the agenda of relations with Kiev are signs of this. The €44 billion SAFE defense loan veto in March also showed that institutional gridlock can slow defense decisions.

The division in internal politics in Poland could also make the country's support for Ukraine's EU membership more uncertain. A similar task sharing is also seen in regional collaborations. The Weimar Triangle, which brings together Poland, Germany and France, is one of the platforms prioritized by the Polish Government. The Three Seas Initiative, which brings together 13 EU countries in the region extending from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and the Black Sea, is a cooperation platform highlighted by the Polish Presidency.

As the political crisis deepens, the Polish Presidency can be expected to place greater emphasis on improving relations with the United States. This trend in the Three Seas Initiative, in which Türkiye is a strategic partner, is also worth monitoring closely for Ankara.

The crisis in Poland highlights a broader problem facing liberal democracies: By what means and at what costs can politicized institutions be rebalanced? Although the tension on the streets has decreased for now, the political conflict has now moved into the legal system. The first important test will be given on November 11, but there is a possibility that the crisis will turn into a political stalemate that will last until the 2027 elections. The impact of the steps Warsaw will take in this process will not only be limited to the elections, but will also affect how the balance between judicial independence and national sovereignty will be established in Eastern and Central Europe.