June 2026. Some students are enthusiastically organizing a nationwide “Science Against Fascism” week of action. The action week is extremely well received with hundreds of events, and the enthusiasm of the students is contagious. But there are also irritations: such an initiative, according to the vehemently expressed position, violates scientific neutrality and the requirement of value freedom in the sciences. Understandably, this causes astonishment, and not only because at the same time entire institutes had unanimously agreed to support the week of action and show solidarity with the initiators.
Neutral towards fascism? What does that mean? In order to remain within the framework of science, can one only think about fascism and not speak out against it? So do you have to examine it first - with an open mind - in order to then be able to take a position for or against it as political citizens if necessary? Clearly, this cannot be what is meant, and it is to be hoped that this is just a misunderstanding resulting from an asymmetrical communication situation. But what is meant?
Fittingly, two scientists, Geert Keil and Armin Nassehi, have brought the somewhat outdated question of the value-freedom of science out of obscurity in the past few weeks. Nassehi (with Irmhild Saake in “Zeit” on July 25) warns against the (left-wing) politicization of the social sciences and an understanding of sociology as a critical science. Keil, in turn, discusses with great thoughtfulness the accusation of “agenda science” brought into play by the AfD and comes to the conclusion that at least parts of feminist theory and critical theory, with their openly presented “emancipatory” self-image, threaten to miss the criteria for scientificity - especially openness to results.
Worse still: the questioning of the ideal of value freedom carried out in critical theories threatens to become a “free pass” for “glaring cases” of academic activism and offers an “open flank” for the AfD’s attacks. The pursuit of “agenda science” - the AfD's fighting term suddenly seems to fit - is hitting back like a boomerang: Seen from this point of view, the first victims themselves were responsible for the feared restructuring of the scientific landscape by making the field, let's remain militarily, ready for storm. Blame the victim.
This is obviously something like a horseshoe theory of science: the extremes at the two ends of the political spectrum converge in their disregard and misunderstanding of science and their instrumentalization for political purposes. Only the middle can save us here: objective and value-neutral.
One could say: Here the academic field sorts itself out in advance obedience in order not to become the focus of the newly discovered authoritarian love of scientific neutrality. One could also say: the de-solidarization is in full swing. In the interests of preserving our scientific culture, wouldn't it be more correct and important to put aside the narcissism of small differences and actively stand in front of those who are already the focus of attacks - even if you don't share their positions without reservation? But this is about more than just strategic questions. The loss of solidarity is not only politically instinctive. She is also wrong about this.
There's not much to be gained legally here. The “serious and systematic attempt to determine truth in terms of content and form” and the acquisition of knowledge carried out “in a methodical, systematic and verifiable manner”, according to the narrow legal definition of science, can be carried out in many different ways in accordance with the constitution. For good reasons, the law delegates the specification of what orientation towards truth means and which methods are the most appropriate to science itself. Academic freedom protects the discussion of, but also the position on, norms.
But if the constitutional limits of academic freedom are not at stake at all, then it is a question of the correct understanding of science, the best approach and the appropriate ethos of science itself, what it should do in order to be good science, i.e. what are the inherent standards for scientific practice that is appropriate to the idea of science. As is well known, there are very different positions within the scientific discourse and a complex debate that will not be concluded any time soon.
Anyone who leads such a debate within science as one about science and thereby excommunicates the opponents from the club of serious science wants to establish exactly one position, namely their own position, as having no alternative. And this is a classic case of ideology. Because ideological patterns make one's own perspective the general and undoubtedly self-evident starting point. But it is also a power game within science, which is reflected not least in the fight for distribution of resources - even without the AfD.
One would not deny Nassehi and Keil their serious concern for the future of science. But their statements are of little use to “self-understanding about the question of how the so-called ‘activist science’ relates to the open-ended search for knowledge” (Keil).
The requirement of openness of results requires, above all, to be open to results that contradict one's own initial thesis and also one's own normative beliefs. Openness to results as a (scientific) attitude and practice then means the fundamental insight into the presumably never-ending need for revision of our interpretations, but also the insight into the complexity of problems. However, as Keil also knows, this does not contradict the fact that science thrives on interests that guide knowledge. Even if a climate scientist chooses his research interests based on the interest of slowing down climate change, this is not a problem as long as he does not manipulate his research results for this purpose.
For Geert Keil, however, the limit lies in the openly stated claim of critical theories to be part of a social emancipation process as a theory. This leads to partiality for one cause and to a misleading orientation towards political and social goals within the science in question, which adversely restricts its search for truth.
One of the founding fathers of the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer, described critical theory in a programmatic text in 1937 as “the theoretical side of the practical process of emancipation”. Critical theory, that is, takes a stand. So it is partisan. It subjects everything that is socially self-evident and given to a critical examination. And what's more: it itself, i.e. as a theory, claims to be part of the emancipation process. How can it still claim to be science?
First: Emancipation is not just any particular standpoint, but in this tradition it represents a historically developing potential of reason. You can find this bizarre or wrong. But it is important that this is not a matter of simple relativism, nor of the relativistic taking of an evaluative point of view. But it is linked to an explicit and strong (perhaps too strong) claim to objectivity that does not simply oppose value neutrality in an evaluative manner. But he criticizes it as relativistic, precisely because he wants to exclude so-called value decisions from the area of truth-capable questions. Seen in this way, the partisanship of critical theory is a partisanship for a party that abolishes partisanship.
Second: Emancipation is not a specific, politically detailed program, not the “agenda” that Keil speaks of. It is, as Hegel said, not yet determined. That is why the fear that such a oriented science always knows its results and will not allow itself to be dissuaded from its goals in a stubborn, self-righteous and undemocratic manner misses the point. Of course: there are always narrow-minded people, in all scientific and political camps. But a theory that claims to be part of an emancipation process does not already know what emancipation is. This is precisely why it is a process for which theory, with its conceptual offerings and analyses, acts as a catalyst when successful. Here criticism becomes analysis and analysis becomes criticism.
When Armin Nassehi woken students and Keil accuse the critical emancipatory theories of their political bias, what they want to say is: They already know what will come out. They are not interested in details, facts or good reasons (even ones that contradict their preconceptions).
However, the question of whether one thinks fascism is good or bad, or whether discrimination, social inequality, racism or social precarity are problematic or not is not open-ended. What students (and especially the committed ones) want to know are answers to questions like the following: Can you learn something from studying historical fascism? Is making analogies helpful? Is there a core of common characteristics between authoritarian and fascist movements? What is “new” about the new fascism? How do authoritarian attitudes relate to the neoliberal desire for freedom? How do socio-psychological dimensions of the phenomenon relate to economic dimensions? What are the causes of development?
These are all pressing and, above all, open questions. It is these types of questions that suggest organizing action weeks against fascism at universities, for example - in order to orientate oneself and understand the situation. These are also questions that need to be discussed with an open mind because there are still no clear explanations. For this purpose, historical, sociological and social-psychological material will be used, as well as fundamental philosophical considerations.
These are not purely normative questions, but neither are they purely empirical. Normative abstinence would make no sense here, as in many other cases. Normative assumptions are not prior to the scientific process, nor can they be outsourced or bracketed. They are part and starting point of the process and are transformed within it. Understanding and defending this is the real task of protecting academic freedom.
