The decision to fix interest rates in Egypt for the fourth month in a row raised questions about the inflation that the country is witnessing.
Experts believe that “the Central Bank of Egypt’s measures aim to contain the inflation rate in the short term,” and they expect “an increase in inflation rates at the end of this year due to the impact of regional unrest on energy prices.”
The Monetary Policy Committee of the “Central Bank” decided, on Thursday evening, “to keep the basic return rates unchanged,” and according to a statement from the “Central Bank,” the interest rates, deposit and lending, will be fixed for one night, and the main operation rate at 19 percent, 19.5 percent, and 20 percent, respectively, in addition to “keeping the credit and discount rates at 19.5 percent.”
This is the fourth time that the Central Bank has decided to fix the interest rate since last April. The Monetary Policy Committee of the Central Bank holds its regular meeting every six weeks (45 days), and it has three meetings remaining during the current year, as the markets await developments in inflation, the exchange rate, and global energy prices.
According to the Central Bank’s statement, the decision came “as a reflection of the Monetary Policy Committee’s assessment of the latest inflation developments and expectations.”
The annual general inflation rate witnessed a slight increase last July to reach 14.9 percent compared to 14.3 percent last June, while the core inflation rate recorded 14.7 percent in July compared to 14.3 percent from the previous month, according to the Central Bank, which indicated that “monthly price developments showed stability with a decline in the prices of some goods and services.”
Walid Gaballah, a member of the Egyptian Society for Economics and Legislation, says: “It was expected that the Central Bank would take the decision to stabilize interest rates again.” He explained to Asharq Al-Awsat that “the difference between the interest rate and inflation rates allows the central bank to take the stabilization decision, as the increase in inflation rates was slight and not at high rates.”
The stabilization decision was considered “a monetary tightening taken by the government in light of the state of uncertainty that the global economy is experiencing.”
According to the Central Bank’s statement, “Economic activity at the global level witnessed a slight slowdown affected by geopolitical fluctuations and weak demand, while inflation remains high in general, with inflationary pressures varying across economies, which led to varying monetary policy decisions of central banks.”
The statement noted that “the outlook for the global economy is characterized by uncertainty and remains vulnerable to a range of risks, the most important of which are the continuation of regional tensions for a longer period and renewed supply chain disruptions.”
The continued stabilization of interest rates does not mean that the Egyptian economy is able to reduce inflation rates, according to Gaballah, adding that “it is difficult for inflation levels to decrease in light of the continued rise in energy prices.”
He suggested that “inflation rates will likely rise by the end of this year to rates less than 17 percent, in light of the continuing geopolitical turmoil,” noting that “the central bank preferred to wait to stabilize interest rates to await global developments and conditions, especially with regard to energy prices.”
Economist Mustafa Badra explains that “the Central Bank’s current measures aim to contain inflation at the short level,” and he tells Asharq Al-Awsat that “inflation rates are expected to increase at the beginning of next year, especially with oil prices not declining due to regional unrest.”
“Energy markets were once again subjected to upward pressure and their volatility increased amid the intensification of regional tensions, and agricultural commodity prices also tended to rise as a result of concerns about supplies resulting from geopolitical tensions,” according to the Egyptian Central Bank’s statement.
Badra points out that “the continuation of regional conditions in the current situation will result in an increase in inflation rates, and thus this will be reflected in a rise in interest rates by the end of this year.”
He also points out that “if any new tension occurs in the region and the price of a barrel of oil rises above the current $94, it will mean taking more stringent economic decisions to hedge against the new effects.”
The Central Bank expected that “the average real GDP growth rate will reach about 5 percent in the fiscal year (2025-2026),” in addition to “real economic activity continuing its slight decline in the second quarter of this year, as a reflection of the negative impact of the regional conflict.”
The Iranian-backed Houthi group has tightened its security grip in Ibb Governorate, coinciding with the escalation of tension and confrontations on the surrounding lines of contact, and has pushed units of its elite forces to areas close to the fighting fronts with the Taiz, Hodeidah, and Al-Dhalea governorates.
Local sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group intensified its security deployment in the city of Ibb and areas near the contact lines in the west of the governorate, and strengthened its presence on the roads leading to the fronts, while imposing strict control on the movement of residents and their communications.
Ibb gains military importance due to its location. It is located on supply lines linking Houthi-controlled areas to the fighting fronts in Hodeidah, Taiz, and Al-Dhalea, and is about 192 kilometers south of Sanaa.
According to the sources, the Houthis moved the headquarters of the military region, which includes the governorates of Ibb, Al-Dhalea, and Taiz, to the city of Damt, located east of Ibb, and they also pushed two units of the elite forces known as the “Al-Samad Brigades” to areas close to the contact lines.
The sources added that the group pushed fighters from Ibb to the front lines, while the two “Al-Samad” units remained at the rear of the front to monitor the forces and prevent any local elements from fleeing or retreating during the confrontations.
According to the sources, this deployment reflects a state of mistrust in the fighters who were recruited from the people of the governorate, at a time when the group is working to tighten security control inside cities and towns and on the roads leading to the combat areas.
The Houthis turned the areas of eastern Ibb into a center for managing military operations related to the fronts surrounding the governorate, in conjunction with the redistribution of their units and their deployment in areas close to the lines of contact.
These movements come in light of the escalation of military tension on several fronts, and at a time when the group continues to tighten its security grip within the governorate, which is one of its most prominent recruitment and supply areas.
This coincided with the one-year anniversary of a massive arrest campaign carried out by the group in Ibb, targeting more than 115 educational, academic, medical and engineering personnel, according to local sources.
The sources said that the campaign lasted more than three months, from late May to October of last year, and 14 detainees were released at varying intervals, the last of which was about a week ago, while the rest are still detained.
According to local sources, a number of those wanted by the Houthis are still unable to leave the governorate towards government-controlled areas, while about 260 families were able to leave the group’s areas of control and reach government areas.
In a related context, Siham Al-Abab, the daughter of educator Siddiq Al-Abab, revealed the deteriorating health condition of her father, who has been detained by the Houthis for more than a year, amid his family’s inability to visit him or check on his health condition.
She said that her father called the family a few days ago, and that the fatigue was evident in his voice, adding that the family does not know the nature of his health condition and cannot see him or check on him.
She added that the call had a major psychological impact on her, noting that her father's voice remained present in her memory after the call ended.
The daughter had previously spoken about the suffering her family is experiencing as a result of her father's absence, and said that he left behind a small family in need of support, while he languishes in prison without the family knowing the charge against him.
The Houthis kidnapped educator Siddiq Al-Abab during a massive arrest campaign that targeted hundreds of people in the governorates of Ibb, Taiz, and Al-Bayda, and affected doctors, teachers, lawyers, employees, and social figures, according to local sources.
For his part, Zakaria Al-Jabri said that his father has been forcibly detained by the Houthi group since June 12, 2025, at the Political Security headquarters in the city of Ibb.
He explained that the family was only able to communicate with him three times, and that the only visit he was allowed took place more than 11 months after his detention, before the family was later prevented from visiting him.
He added that the Houthis contented themselves with allowing his father to make limited phone calls, while the family does not know the conditions of his detention or his health and psychological condition, despite the knowledge of the party holding him that he suffers from health problems.
Al-Jabri said that the family tried during the last period to communicate with several parties and people in search of an answer or assistance, but the response was often that those responsible for the case knew nothing, and that the party responsible for it was in Sanaa.
He wondered who issued the detention order for his father, the reasons for not referring him to the prosecution, and why the family was not informed of the charges against him or his legal path.
He said that the family does not know “who has the decision and who can end this detention,” considering that his father’s continued detention has caused major psychological and social effects on the family members.
He also considered that his case reflects, as he described it, the absence of a clear official body that the family can turn to, despite their repeated attempts to request assistance from government agencies, civil society organizations, and notables and notables in the region.
Informed sources in the kidnapped Yemeni capital, Sana'a, revealed an escalation of disagreement within the corridors of the Houthi group, against the backdrop of recent statements by Sultan Al-Sami'i, a member of the group's coup ruling council called the "Supreme Political Council," in which he criticized the group's practices and warned of the repercussions of expanding grievances and violations in areas under its control.
The sources said that the dispute escalated between senior Houthi leaders regarding the fate of Al-Sama’i, amid pressure from a wing affiliated with Saada, the group’s main stronghold, towards his arrest and imprisonment, while other leaders affiliated with the group’s wing in Sana’a expressed reservations about this step, fearing that it would reveal the extent of the discrepancies within the group.
According to the sources, leaders affiliated with the Saada wing are pushing towards taking more stringent measures against Al-Sami’i, given that his statements crossed what the group considers red lines, while other leaders in Sana’a have reservations about arresting him or escalating measures against him, for fear of the issue turning into an internal crisis.
The sources confirmed that the dispute is no longer linked only to Al-Sami'i's position on the group's performance, but rather has turned into a conflict over how to deal with leaders who direct criticism from within the Houthi institutions. She pointed out that his statements sparked dissatisfaction in influential Houthi circles, especially after he linked the expansion of grievances and the accumulation of popular discontent with the future of the group.
These developments come after a series of positions made by Al-Sami’i over the past months, in which he spoke about marginalization and exclusion within the group and criticized what he described as regionalism. He also warned in recent statements that the continuation of injustices and violations, especially inside prisons, may backfire against the Houthis and lead to a “dire end.”
In the face of these statements, Houthi leaders launched an attack on him. Leader Radwan Al-Haimi accused him of identifying with the positions of what he called “opponents,” and hiding, as he put it, under “the guise of advice,” considering that his statements at this time affect “the morale of the street and the sacrifices of the fighters.”
In another escalation against Al-Sama’i, Houthi leader Hashem Al-Wadaei attacked him, calling on him to resolve his position and stop what he described as “playing both ways and political one-upmanship.” He gave him the choice between adhering to the group's decisions, submitting his resignation, and leaving Sanaa, warning against exploiting his official position to make statements that he described as inflammatory from within the Houthi-controlled areas.
Al-Wadaei also hinted at the possibility of lifting Al-Sama’i’s immunity, saying that the current stage no longer tolerates what he described as “opportunism or dual roles.”
This tone reflects the transition of the dispute over the Sami from the realm of personal positions to a sensitive internal issue, especially since the man holds a membership in the group’s highest political body. The threat to lift his immunity and demand that he leave Sanaa opens the door to the possibility of taking more stringent measures against him if efforts to contain the crisis fail.
The Al-Sama'i crisis comes at a time when the Houthi group is facing increasing internal pressure, against the backdrop of complaints of arrests, violations, and deteriorating living conditions, coinciding with escalating discrepancies between centers of influence and leaders affiliated with different wings.
Observers believe that the dispute reflects an aspect of a hidden conflict within the group, and that the Houthis’ arrest of Al-Sami’i may turn his statements into an internal political crisis, while keeping him without measures may lead to continued criticism coming from within the group’s institutions themselves.
Circulating data indicate that the Al-Sami’i case may turn into a new test of the group’s cohesion, especially in light of talk about the widening gap between the centers of influence in Saada and Sana’a, and increasing criticism from figures affiliated with the Houthis regarding the method of managing the areas under their control.
