Free lectures" Stability problems after the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concluded on October 29, and adopted the decision to persistently promote comprehensive and strict governance of the party, and determined that the 21st Party Congress will be held in the second half of 2027. Beijing prioritizes discipline and organizational control, and the public notice of succession arrangements shows no sign of this. The question left at this plenum is: What kind of stability can strengthened control bring?

The scale of the corruption crackdown is truly staggering. The plenary session confirmed the expulsion of 33 people from the party, and confirmed the removal of former director of the State Administration of Financial Supervision Li Yunze from his party position; only 279 Central Committee members and alternate members were present. Compared with the 376 people elected by the 20th National Congress, about a quarter did not attend. The increase in the number of people punished does not prove that corruption has been eradicated, nor can it be used to conclude that the regime is about to lose control; the large number of high-level dismissals shows that the past selection and supervision mechanisms have allowed these people to rise through the ranks. To judge the governance effect of the purge, it is also necessary to observe whether the use of power is more clearly constrained and whether similar problems recur repeatedly.

Brown, a scholar at King's College London, believes that continued high pressure will sacrifice officials' ability to proactively solve problems. There is no need to choose between integrity and vitality. The key lies in whether accountability can be expected. Corruption for profit, professional error, reasonable experimentation, and passive indifference should be identified in different ways; if the policy results are not effective, they may be held accountable for their loyalty, and prior authorization cannot guarantee subsequent responsibilities. Officials have reasons to ask for instructions at all levels, or only pursue short-term achievements that are easy to demonstrate.

Zhuang Jiaying, a scholar at the National University of Singapore, pointed out that the enthusiasm expected by Xi Jinping "mainly refers to the implementation level, not the decision-making level." However, implementation does not follow the rules: when dealing with debt, employment, and industrial transformation, local governments must judge whether central instructions are applicable and reflect obstacles upward. If pointing out problems is interpreted as questioning the policy, reporting good news but not bad news will become a way of self-protection; the more the central government relies on filtered information, the more likely it is to underestimate implementation difficulties. The cost of political control is not only in administrative speed, but also in the quality of information content.

The issue of succession is a deeper test. Xi Jinping is now 73 years old and is expected to be re-elected on the 21st. A highly centralized system faces a dilemma: if the successor is established in advance, authority may be lost; if arrangements are delayed, it is difficult for all parties to predict the future. The real key is who guarantees the handover commitment? How does the outgoing party believe that the arrangements will be adhered to, how does the successor gain executive authority, and how do the elites confirm that following the procedures will not result in arbitrary liquidation in the future. A purge of more than 30 Central Committee members has made everyone more aware of where this concern comes from. The more those in power worry about losing security after leaving office, the more likely they are to view staying in power as the safest option.

For Taiwan, Beijing’s purge cannot be directly converted into the probability of war across the Taiwan Strait. Five of the seven members of the Central Military Commission appointed in 2022 have been purged. What really deserves attention is whether decision-makers can obtain accurate capability assessments and whether the military can truthfully explain the risks of operations. Loyalty compresses professional opinions. The risk lies in misjudgment, not simply more or less courage to fight. Taiwan should be based on observable military capabilities and ensure effective crisis communication; any long-term cross-strait arrangement must also be able to withstand personnel changes and cannot rely on speculation about a certain leader's intentions.

Political stability requires not only obedience, but also officials’ willingness to report difficulties, decision-makers’ ability to correct mistakes, and rules-based transfer of power. If these conditions are not established, the order maintained by strengthened control will eventually face the dual test of governance performance and smooth succession.