The inexperience of the sole officer on duty is emphasized in the Alsu ship accident

In the report, it was determined that the only person on duty on the bridge of the Alsu ship was the 2nd officer, 3rd captain Murat Evciman.

According to Evciman's statement, it was reported that he joined the ship only one day before the accident and that the 00.00-04.00 shift at the time of the accident was his first cruising shift on this ship. The expert considered it a weakness that an officer who was not yet familiar with the ship's maneuverability, personnel and bridge devices was left alone at the busy traffic junction.

Additionally, records revealed that there was no lookout, trainee or helmsman on the bridge other than Evciman at around 03.13 when the accident took place.

While it was evaluated that the lookout trainee Yunus Türker and other personnel resting in the cabin and on the deck reduced the situational awareness on the bridge, the expert report also revealed that the captain Ahmet Erarslan was not on the bridge at the time of the accident and was sleeping in his cabin.

It was reported that Erarslan, who was found to have woken up with the shock of the conflict, was able to get to the bridge approximately 7-10 minutes after the accident. In his statement, the suspect claimed that he had the authority not to have a lookout in the open sea. The expert determined that this situation was completely against the ship's SMS rules.

In the report, it was evaluated as a serious violation that the ALSU ship did not have a helmsman or a lookout other than a single officer on the bridge while cutting the separation line, which is one of the busiest and most risky traffic areas. It was also found that Alsu had clearly violated the rule of "complete lookout", which must be done by visual and radar.

This situation was evaluated as the opposite ship's starboard turn maneuver, which was contrary to the radio agreement, was detected in a timely and early manner and was prevented from reacting.

Among the serious violations was the fact that the officer of the watch, Murat Evciman, noticed at a very close distance of 0.5 miles that the opposite ship was approaching them and turned to starboard, not complying with the radio agreement.

It was evaluated that at this stage, instead of making an early machine stop or a full astern (reverse) maneuver to prevent the conflict, Evciman only continued to take the route to the port, and not taking early speed reduction or stopping the machines may have increased the physical severity of the conflict.

The following statements were used in the report:

"While the fact that the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship turned off its AIS device and turned to starboard in the last 0.5 miles, contrary to the radio agreement, was reported as the active trigger factor that physically started the conflict, the main root cause behind why this trigger factor ended in a disaster is the bridge vulnerability on the Alsu ship. If Alsu, by complying with the 'Watch Condition B' rule in its own safety manual (BMM), had an experienced captain and an additional crew on the bridge. If a lookout had been present, Tuğberk İmamoğlu's uncontrolled turn to starboard maneuver could have been detected at a distance of 1.5-1.8 miles instead of 0.5 miles, and in accordance with COLREG Rule 8, the conflict could have been prevented completely by stopping the engines immediately or giving an emergency astern, or the sinking of Tuğberk İmamoğlu could have been prevented by minimizing the impact intensity.”

The report also states that the lone, inexperienced officer on the bridge could not analyze this situation in time and said, "The door to the tragedy of loss of life has been opened." It was said.