Army officers and soldiers participating in new base training. (Photo by reporter Tu Jumin)
[Reporter Tu Jumin/Feature] The Army recently implemented the "Lu Sheng II" exercise, in which the 564th Brigade and the 269th Brigade conducted actual combat. The "New Base Training CTC 2.0" implemented in the first half of this year has also become a regular training. Although the training objectives of the two exercises are different, they both address the adversities that troops may encounter on the battlefield, including situations where officers and soldiers have physical and mental reactions due to battlefield pressure, the troops' offensive is frustrated, or they are forced to evacuate existing positions. This spirit of not being afraid to expose problems during training, allowing failure and learning from it is an important foundation for building a strong team.
Modern warfare is changing rapidly, and no war will proceed according to the script. In the past, the outside world's stereotype of the national military exercises was that the troops "performed according to the schedule", the weapons were fired smoothly, and finally the enemy troops were annihilated amidst the roar of cannons, declaring the battle a success. However, if officers and soldiers are only familiar with preset scenarios, they may not be able to respond effectively once the battle situation exceeds expectations, even if their performance in normal drills is outstanding.
Therefore, starting from the Hanguang real-force exercises in recent years, the national army has focused on "no scripts" and "no spoilers" exercises. The "CTC 2.0" implemented this year has also begun to reform the training system. In addition to extending the core confrontation to 10 days and 9 nights, it also broke the past model of measuring performance with a standardized rating scale. Instead, the chief officer of the participating troops set training goals, and the observers assisted the officers and soldiers to modify their tactics through guidance and post-action reviews. This reform does not make it easier for the troops to pass, but requires the grassroots commanders of the troops to understand the rationale behind the tactics, deeply "internalize" the missions and resources of the troops, and at the same time learn to make independent judgments in complex battle situations.
The National Army's Clouded Leopard Armored Vehicle participated in the Lu Sheng-2 exercise. (Military News Agency)
The "Lu Sheng II" exercise further verified the offensive and defensive capabilities of the brigade-level troops. According to news released by the military, the Army's 269th Brigade initially resisted step by step and delayed the 564th Brigade's offensive. After the former had been fighting for days and gradually reached the offensive limit, it carried out an ambush. Subsequently, the two sides changed their offensive and defensive positions. The 269th Brigade, which was originally defensive, turned to attack, and the 564th Brigade had to reorganize its defense line. The significance of this exercise is not to prove which brigade is more powerful, but to give both sides the opportunity to practice attack, defense and tactical transitions, and to become familiar with the response methods under different combat situations.
It is worth noting that these exercises also include "doorway" issues on the battlefield. For example, the newly installed M1A2T tanks must complete oil replenishment before moving in, and chemical troops deploy smoke screens to cover maneuvers; the Army's 564th Brigade even simulated officers and soldiers experiencing combat exhaustion due to the pressure of shelling, and the squad leader assisted in stabilizing their emotions (that is, ICOVER). These subjects may not be as exciting as artillery or missile salvos, but they are directly related to whether the troops can reorganize and restore combat effectiveness after encountering setbacks.
Of course, the exercise and training reform is in the right direction, but it does not mean that the national military's combat effectiveness has been fully improved. The real key lies in whether the military is willing to face up to the problem, truly review it, and have the patience to allow the troops to learn from experience. After all, it is not shameful at all to expose deficiencies in training during normal times. If problems are discovered during wartime, it may be too late to correct them.
When the Chinese army is carrying out various practical training exercises, there are more opportunities for troop vehicles to appear in the streets and alleys. I hope the Chinese people can have a better understanding of practical training. Traffic accidents may occur accidentally when maneuvering tanks, and large-scale drills will inevitably cause traffic control, noise and inconvenience to life. Of course, the military must pay attention to safety and continue to improve it, but society does not have to deny the overall value of training. Only by giving officers and soldiers the space to train bravely and learn from their mistakes can the national army be more capable of facing various challenges on the real battlefield.
