Although Army Intelligence detected on July 27 the "very probable" risk of a "massive entry" of immigrants into Ceuta on July 30, the final report with that key alert did not reach the Chief of the Defense Staff (Jemad), Teodoro Esteban López Calderón, until the morning of the 30th. It was then that he "dispatched" with the Minister of Defense, Margarita Robles, and she "coordinated" with Pedro Sánchez. But by then the avalanche could no longer be reversed from the Spanish side, according to government sources.
As EL MUNDO has learned exclusively, the Armed Forces Intelligence Center (CIFAS) sent the final report to Jemad in an email at 10:06 a.m. on the day the avalanche of entries occurred - more than 70,000 people. Then, López Calderón informed Minister Robles, but the operation against the "territorial integrity" of Spain "had already begun, around 11:00" and there was no room to block the border, according to other sources familiar with the conversations that day.
Didn't the Government have time to react? In La Moncloa they assure that no: "The flow was allowed from 10:30 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., due to the collapse situation, with people already on the breakwater or in the water." That is, to prevent more deaths.
This means that, for the Executive, the cause and culprit of Robles and Sánchez not having the alert in time would be the Intelligence Center of the Armed Forces. "The protocols must be reviewed and why the reports are not submitted," the sources point out.
If the fault was theirs, in the opinion of the Government, it is worth wondering if there will be sudden dismissals for it. It must also be remembered that, in addition to the report of the 27th revealed by this newspaper, on the 29th there was a meeting at the Ceuta Government Delegation in which, according to Robles, the intelligence agents "reported the call for the next day, precisely to be able to swim in taking advantage of a party that was taking place in the neighboring country." It was enough to cross-reference both information.
The question that hovers over this entire case is the following: what happened so that the Army detected the risk of "massive entry" on a Monday, but the final report did not reach Jemad - and, therefore, to Robles and Sánchez, later - until Thursday?
On July 27, the 32nd Electronic Warfare Regiment (REW 32), based in Seville, notified the Intelligence Center of the Armed Forces that Moroccan border police agents had already detected the certain possibility of the migratory avalanche, and had ordered that no one leave their post on the Moroccan side of the border. The information from these agents is that a large entry could take place in Ceuta either on the night of July 29 or 30, "taking advantage of the Throne Day holiday in Morocco."
The CIFAS took very good note of this primary report, and sources from said Center assure that they included it in their final analysis, supported on the 29th. This document followed a chain of command: from the deputy director of CIFAS it went to the director -Antonio Romero Losada- and, on July 30 at 10:06, it reached the Jemad.
Sources from La Moncloa assure this newspaper that the Executive did not receive the report of July 27. «Many organizations sent reports starting at 10:00 on the 30th, when things were already underway. The Government did not receive any extraordinary alert until the 30th.
The last report from the National Center for Immigration and Borders (CENIF), they exemplify, was sent at 1:56 p.m., in full avalanche. «In addition, the CENIF did not remove its alerts from the internal circuit. "He decided not to raise them."
And why wasn't the Army activated sooner, which was not deployed until late in the afternoon, around 8:00 p.m.? Because "there was no operational need at that time." "The need was on the other side of the border." That is, in Morocco. Which did nothing to stem the flow. On the contrary: according to the CENIF, gendarmes and plainclothes agents helped in the avalanche with "active guidance."
In fact, the alert on the 27th, prepared with information from Moroccan border police, implies that commanders from the neighboring country were aware of the plans, but did not activate the closure of the border, as they did on August 15. That is to say: it is Morocco, therefore, that decides when yes and when no.
