Lecturer in International Relations, Security and Defense at Qatar University. Ali Bakır wrote about the geopolitical importance of the lands captured by the Houthis in Yemen and the conflict over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait for AA Analysis.
When the war between Israel/USA and Iran started on February 28, 2026, the Houthis largely contented themselves with giving verbal messages of support. The restraint they displayed had nothing to do with missiles or lack of willpower. In fact, they were waiting for Tehran to decide when and how most effectively to field regional militias. The awaited decision was finally made. Houthi forces, who quickly captured Moha and Dhubab in the last few days, also captured Perim (Meyyun) Island, which divides the Bab al-Mandeb Strait into two. They now control both Yemen's Red Sea coastline and the gateway to these waters.
The Bosphorus constitutes the transit route for approximately twelve percent of global trade, eleven percent of oil transported by sea and eight percent of LNG. Considered alone, these rates are tolerable levels. Ships travel around the Cape of Good Hope, freight costs rise and global markets can absorb the shock. However, what makes the current situation different is that the other major oil bottleneck in the world has actually been closed due to the war. With Hormuz closed and Bab al-Mandab under threat, Saudi Arabia lost its alternative exit route.
Strategic direction change
The Houthis have targeted Riyadh for years as part of the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry that has spread across the region. After the two countries normalized their relations, they narrowed the scope of their operations and turned the route to a completely different front. They focused all their attacks on Israel before moving on to a new strategy of hitting Saudi Arabia, the country's infrastructure, energy facilities and export routes. When viewed from Yemen's internal dynamics, this military cycle of escalation, retreat, silence and sudden redeployment does not make much sense. However, when the issue is approached as an extension of Iran's regional proxy network, the pieces fall into place.
Missiles, drones and guided munitions have given the Houthis a far greater operational reach than a conventional army of their size. In this way, they can hit Saudi Arabia's energy facilities, southern cities and maritime traffic at extremely low costs and with almost no reaction time for the other side. Controlling the coastline and Perim Island now includes weapons that are much more difficult to defend against. Because artillery batteries, anti-tank missiles and mines are activated at close range and in direct line of sight.
The consequences of this move by the Houthis are already being felt on the field. Riyadh closed the East-West pipeline after successive UAV attacks. Jizan, Abha and Najran are on constant alert. 73 civilians were injured in attacks on civilian and economic facilities. When read from Tehran's perspective, it seems that this step serves three main purposes.
First, this move gives Iran a second leverage over energy flows without having to deploy its own army to a new front. The Houthis' gains on the ground narrow Saudi Arabia's export alternatives, raise the political cost of US operations against Iran, and prove that Tehran has cards to play even under pressure. This also signals that Iran is returning to its initial plan of driving down oil prices to levels the global economy cannot handle and forcing Trump to stop the war under pressure from both domestic opinion and major importing and exporting countries.
Second, it undermines Saudi Arabia's regional leverage and deepens existing fissures within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) over Yemen, the Strait of Hormuz, and the war itself. Since the beginning of the war, Iran has been distributing the financial, humanitarian and infrastructural costs of the conflict among the Gulf countries. For a while, the UAE bore the heaviest risk, and then Kuwait took over, and now the heaviest price falls on the shoulders of Saudi Arabia. The UAE front has already begun to implicitly blame Riyadh for the Houthi advance in areas formerly held by the forces they support. Moreover, all of this, according to the statements of the Iranian President himself, coincides with a period when Tehran and Abu Dhabi reached an agreement to repair tense relations and turn a new page.
The decisive test for the alliance
Third, this move tests the resistance of the Mecca Defense Alliance. Ironically, the first serious test the alliance faced came not from Israel but from the Iranian front. Saudi Arabia now has to deal with three fronts simultaneously, the Houthis in the south, Iraqi militias in the north and Iran in the east. Iran's mobilization of the Houthis against Riyadh serves as a catalyst for Pakistan and Türkiye to reinforce their commitments to the alliance. Tehran aims to create an illusion among small states that this pact has no practical power on the ground and to create the perception that appeasing Iran is a much safer alternative.
While Saudi Arabia tried to reduce tensions throughout the war, both warring sides preferred the opposite. By using the Houthis as a means of attack, Iran risks antagonizing all its neighbors. The real paradox is that although Israel started the war, the only state that Tehran avoids targeting is Israel. The Israeli Minister of Defense recently boasted that Tehran knew that American jets were taking off from Israeli territory to bomb Iran, but did not dare to respond, and presented this as evidence that Israel's deterrence continues.
This move in Yemen ultimately benefits Israel. Netanyahu has been pushing Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords for some time, and when the Houthis took action, he presented himself as a savior ready to help whenever requested. A broader war and rising oil prices are also straining Turkey and Pakistan to shift their attention elsewhere. Especially for Türkiye, the Israeli threat is not an issue that can simply be left aside.
The main question that remains to be answered is whether the Houthis will be able to hold on to the areas they have captured, or whether their newly acquired positions will leave them in an extremely vulnerable position if Saudi Arabia and its allies launch a decisive pushback.
