Before sitting in front of a computer to start scamming strangers, the applicant had to pass one last test: the polygraph. Those responsible for that clandestine office in Türkiye wanted to make sure that the new employee did not have links with the police or intend to expose the business. If you passed the exam, a short training period began. They taught him to lie, manipulate his victims and convince them to transfer their savings. Then came the routine of any company: signing in, occupying a table, meeting objectives and making money. The difference was that on the other end of the phone were people who were being ruined.
The story is told to Crónica by an inspector from the Cybercrime Unit of the National Police who has followed the investigations into these criminal organizations. His testimony opens a window to a little-known reality: the scam factories that operate from Turkey, Ukraine and the Balkans, where the Spanish authorities have confirmed the presence of compatriots recruited as teleoperators to participate in a business that moves millions of euros.
"We have confirmed the presence of Spanish citizens who have been recruited as teleoperators," explains the researcher. Some arrive deceived by job advertisements. Others partially know the activity to which they are going to dedicate themselves. The inspector recalls the case of a police source who was recruited through word of mouth. "These people did know a little bit about what they were going for." A week later, that worker left the center. "He turned back out of remorse," he recalls. He was not detained nor had his passport been confiscated. He just couldn't stand to continue scamming.
It is an important difference compared to the criminal complexes in Southeast Asia, especially those installed on the borders of Burma, Laos and Cambodia, where thousands of people have ended up subjected to trafficking networks to commit digital fraud. In the European centers investigated by the Spanish Police, the conditions are closer to those of a clandestine company. "Good work environment," summarizes the inspector when describing the Turkish case. There were financial incentives, but no physical punishments for failing to meet objectives. The comparison does not mean that all European organizations function equally or are free from exploitation.
The model reproduces the organization of large commercial companies. A person responsible provides the building and technological infrastructure. Below are teams of teleoperators divided by geographic markets. Each table has a boss who controls its activity and aspires to obtain enough profits to become independent and set up another office. "They were like franchises," explains the police officer. Employees work with false identities, prepared speeches and personal data of their targets. Some centers remain open for a short time before moving to another location.
The dimension of this industry was revealed in March 2025 thanks to Scam Empire, an investigation by the OCCRP journalistic consortium and more than 30 international media. A leak of 1.9 terabytes of internal information, which included thousands of recordings, conversations and business documents, made it possible to reconstruct the operation of two networks based in Georgia, Israel and several European countries.
Between 2021 and 2025, according to the periods investigated for each organization, they had received at least $275 million from more than 32,000 people. Spain was among the main markets of one of the networks. In the Tbilisi offices, the agents in charge of calling Spaniards used fictitious names such as "Esteban Fernández."
7% commissions for each fraud
Subsequent police operations have confirmed that these are not isolated episodes. In December 2025, an investigation coordinated by Eurojust led to action against fraud centers located in kyiv, Dnipro and Ivano-Frankivsk, in Ukraine. The organization employed around a hundred people recruited from different European countries. There were more than 400 victims identified and losses exceeding ten million euros. The operators charged commissions of up to 7% for each fraud carried out. The criminals posed as police officers or bank employees and assured their victims that their accounts had been compromised.
In April 2026, another international operation dismantled three centers in Tirana, Albania. The agents seized 443 computers and 238 mobile phones. The estimated losses exceeded 50 million euros. The employees earned about 800 euros per month, in addition to commissions, and were organized into teams of six to eight people depending on the language of their victims, including Spanish.
The Spanish inspector precisely identifies the impersonation of authorities as one of the modalities used by the Turkish center from which he has obtained information. The victim receives a call from someone who claims to represent an official organization and warns him that his money is in danger. The alleged officials offer an immediate solution: transfer the funds to a secure account. In reality, he belongs to the criminal organization.
Scammers don't improvise. "It's not a cold call. They have information about the financial institution, mobile phone, email. Everything," warns the police officer. With this data they build a credible story, adapted to each victim. In some international operations, artificial intelligence makes it possible to reinforce identity theft through synthetic voices, images and manipulated documents.
For Carmen Jordá Sanz, director of the Criminology and Security area at the Camilo José Cela University and principal researcher of the TecSec group, this phenomenon represents a profound transformation of organized crime. The expert talks about crime-as-a-service, a clandestine market in which organizations can acquire malicious programs, stolen data, false identities or artificial intelligence tools without developing the entire infrastructure. "The criminal organization can, thus, fragment and externalize different parts of the criminal activity," he explains.
The machinery is also fed by another especially destructive fraud: sentimental scams. Patricia Hernández Hidalgo, doctor in Criminal Law and director of the Master in Cybercrime at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, describes how criminals use false profiles to seduce their victims for weeks. Good morning messages, apparently authentic photographs and promises of the future build a relationship that leads to requests for money or false investments. "Artificial intelligence is greatly multiplying its ability to act," he warns. Technology makes it possible to create compelling photographs, voices and stories, and to hold numerous conversations simultaneously.
The coup does not end when the money disappears. "The victim loses money, but he also loses a relationship," explains Hernández Hidalgo. Deception can cause anxiety, depression, shame, and even symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. Many people do not report for fear of admitting that they have been manipulated. This shame helps to hide the true dimensions of the business.
The money circuit
The other great difficulty is in prosecuting those responsible. The money stolen from a Spanish victim can first circulate through national or European bank accounts and then travel to Türkiye, Hong Kong or China. "The main investigation technique", based on following the financial trail, loses effectiveness, explains the inspector, "due to the speed with which the money moves and the slowness with which the judicial systems move."
Jordá adds that criminals distribute servers, communications, accounts and cryptocurrency wallets between different jurisdictions. An IP address or phone number is rarely enough to identify those who actually control the organization. International cooperation is essential, although there is not always sufficient will. The Spanish inspector recognizes that, when foreign authorities do not share the same interest in an investigation, the exchange of information can be very limited.
Spain is not off the map of these factories either. In July 2025, the National Police, the Civil Guard and the Mossos dismantled an organization that had swindled more than ten million euros from offices in Barcelona. The agents arrested 21 people and discovered premises rented for short periods, false investment platforms and even a panic button prepared to disconnect computer systems in the event of a police raid.
The expansion of the business also poses a dilemma for investigators: distinguishing the voluntary criminal from someone who has been forced to commit a crime. Jordá recalls that some networks recruit young people with technological or language knowledge through false job offers and then subject them to threats, fictitious debts and violence. "The criminal organization turns the victim into an instrument of the crime," he points out.
The National Police inspector admits that they have not yet managed to directly break into one of these international centers during their investigations. "We have not yet been able to break in a door in a scam center. We would like to very much." For now, much of his knowledge comes from former workers, confidants and international collaborations.
As authorities try to reconstruct money movements and identities hidden behind screens, the business continues to adapt. It is no longer necessary to travel to a lost city on the Mekong to find a factory of deception. It can be in an office in Istanbul or in a building in kyiv.
