Openness must not be sacrificed in US science and tech policy on China

Denis Simon is a senior research fellow in the East Asia Programme at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, DC.

Published: 8:30pm, 8 Sep 2026

When President Xi Jinping arrives in Washington for his planned September 24 visit – his first state-level visit to Washington in more than a decade – artificial intelligence is expected to be near the top of the agenda. Both administrations are preparing for their first formal dialogue on AI.

Washington has framed much of that conversation around the need for tighter controls on sensitive technologies. That framing is the problem.

For much of the debate over US science and technology policy towards China, Washington has been stuck on a false choice between engagement (scientific exchange, international students and collaborative research) and security (export controls, research restrictions and visa limits). The real choice is between indiscriminate restriction and disciplined risk management.

The security concerns are genuine. Some advanced technologies have clear military or intelligence applications. Universities must take seriously undisclosed affiliations, conflicts of commitment and improper technology transfer. Federal research security policy already requires extensive disclosure of appointments, foreign support, affiliations and potential conflicts of interest and commitment. Advanced computing, semiconductors, quantum science, biotechnology and AI all raise legitimate national security questions, largely because so much of the work is dual-use.

But acknowledging those risks does not require treating every interaction with China as equally dangerous. The challenge is to protect what truly matters without damaging the openness that has long been one of America’s greatest scientific strengths.

Smart openness starts from a simple premise: technologies are not equally sensitive and not every Chinese institution carries the same risk. Military-relevant quantum sensing is not cooperation in basic mathematics or astrophysics. A researcher who conceals ties to a defence laboratory has little in common with a Chinese graduate student studying theoretical chemistry.